WEBVTT

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<v Ryan>Just for the
record, it doesn't appear</v>

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that we have Andrew Swisher online yet.

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But I think everyone
else is ready to roll.

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<v ->Okay.</v>
<v ->Right.</v>

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So hopefully Andrew will
be able to join us shortly.

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All right, go ahead.

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<v Russell>I was just gonna say</v>

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we can proceed without Andrew.

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We'll be fine as he gets here.

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<v ->All right, well, good
morning everybody.</v>

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And welcome to day two of
our 2021 wildfire mitigation plan,

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update technical workshop.

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I'm Ryan Arba programming
project supervisor

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with the mitigation branch.

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And if we could go ahead
and display the slides,

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I don't know if it's...

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I'm seeing another individual.

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If we need to look.

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If there's something I can do.

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There we go, perfect.

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So we'll start off with
our safety message.

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In these virtual times, we
are all in different locations.

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Please be aware of your surroundings

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and have two evacuation
routes mapped out

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from your location.

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If you are alone and you
feel comfortable doing so,

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please make sure someone
is aware of your location

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in the event of an emergency.

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These workshops are all day and requires

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to sit in front of a computer.

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We have built in breaks,

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but please be sure to move
around throughout the day.

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We also recognize the
challenge of the lives we're living.

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Please be sure to do
what is needed to take care

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of your mental health as well,

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including taking breaks as needed.

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Please practice public health
guidance regarding COVID-19

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if you are around other people.

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And finally, if you see
some, or excuse me,

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if you feel something, say something.

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If you need immediate assistance

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in addition to someone
knowing your location,

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you're welcome to say
so on the chat function,

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we will be monitoring the
chat throughout the day.

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Next slide please.

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So I'll take a moment to go
over the schedule for today.

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The general cadence of the
workshop is to allow a period

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of time for each utility to
present on the designated topic.

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Then take a break and
then enter into a question

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and answer session.

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First up is our grid design
and system hardening,

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which will be moderated by Andie Biggs.

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After that we'll have a break and then

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our Q&amp;A session on that topic.

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Next we'll have lunch followed
by the utility presentations

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on public safety power shutoffs.

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And then again, another break

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and our Q&amp;A session on that topic.

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We'll end the day with a
brief wrap-up and next steps.

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Next slide please.

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So in framing our discussion today,

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wildfire safety division
has asked utilities to focus

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on each of the five
questions listed on this slide.

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What progress have you
achieved over the past year?

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And how does that progress
impact anticipated work

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in 2021 and 2022?

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Question two, how do
you understand your risk

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and how does risk factor
into decision-making?

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Here we wanna emphasize
that utility mitigation

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initiatives should be prioritized
based on the reduction

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of wildfire emissions and PSPS events.

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It's imperative that the
utilities move towards a model

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where mitigation activities
are justified and risk reduction

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can be modeled and quantified.

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Question three, based on
the modeling described above

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what are your priority
mitigation activities

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in the next year,

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and where are these
activities being targeted?

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What is the anticipated
reduction in a risk

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as a result of these actions?

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Question four, how will
these mitigation initiatives,

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in addition to reducing ignition
risk also reduce the scale,

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scope and frequency of public
safety power shutoff events?

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And finally five, how will
initiatives reduce the risk

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of ignition, wildfire spread

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and impact the decision to use PSPS?

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The fifth question of course,
is essentially embedded

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in all of these previous four questions.

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Next slide please.

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So before I hand it
over to the moderator,

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for the first portion of
the workshop, I'll go over

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a few meeting logistics.
<v ->Go ahead.</v>

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<v ->Next slide please.</v>

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So most participants
are in listen only mode.

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That means you cannot
speak, but you're still welcome

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to interact and ask questions
using the chat feature.

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Please do not use the Q&amp;A feature,

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as we will be monitoring the chat.

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The chat and Q&amp;A tools are
in the lower right-hand corner

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of the WebEx screen.

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Again, please only use the chat feature

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to ask technical questions.

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The designated WebEx
host is a technical resource

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and not a member of the
Wildfire Safety Division team.

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Please only direct the
chat message to the host

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to resolve a technical issue.

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If you wish to ask questions,

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please select all panelists
in the chat function.

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Someone from the
Wildfire Safety Division

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will be monitoring posts.

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Again, please do not use the Q&amp;A feature

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as we will not be monitoring that,

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we will route questions as
appropriate to the panelists.

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Finally, note that we've
given several stakeholder

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organizations an opportunity
to serve as panelists.

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They will be able to
ask questions directly

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to the utilities.

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Next slide please.

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Okay, so stakeholders
designated as panelists

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may use the raise hand function

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in order to ask those questions

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and the moderator will
coordinate those questions.

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Everyone else again,
please use the chat function

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as described here on the slide.

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Depending on the number
of questions received,

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we may not be able to
cover all the questions,

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but certainly we'll do our best.

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And with that, I'll hand
it over to Andie Biggs

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to moderate our first
portion of today's workshop.

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<v ->Hi, good morning.</v>

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I'm Andie Biggs, I'm
a utilities engineer

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in the mitigation branch of
the Wildfire Safety Division,

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and I'll be monitoring
today's morning session

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on grid design and system
hardening, including inspections,

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mitigation choices and
emerging technologies,

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which is a pretty broad
range of important topics.

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Starting off, inspections
are arguably part

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of the background for prioritization

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and understanding of
the utility's earth and fields.

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As we've seen arson play a major part

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to start a catastrophic
wildfires in the past.

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Given the aging infrastructure
throughout the State,

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some of which nears 100
years old, it's imperative

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for utilities to conduct
effective inspections

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and fully understand
the state of equipment

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in order to accurately identify
where to conduct repairs,

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replacements and hardening projects.

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Be sure that traditional from
the ground visual inspections

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have not been adequate and
advancements and augmentation

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to past practices would
have been valuable

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in potentially preventing
fires, such as camp in Kincaid.

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From there we heard
a great deal yesterday

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about the efforts going
into identifying areas

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of highest risk to implement
grid hardening as a solution.

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From cover conductor, undergrounding,

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or even just the use of
spacers, utilities have already

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been implementing
grid hardening solutions

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as a major part of their
wildfire risk reduction portfolios.

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Hardening may be an effective solution,

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utilities need to be
demonstrating that implementation

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is occurring at areas of
highest risk and also need

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to be validating the actual efficacy

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of utilizing grid hardening solutions,

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especially given the high
cost and deployment time.

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Lastly, the utilities
have all been exploring

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new promising technologies,

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such as continuous monitoring sensors,

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rapid falls detection and
remote grid utilization.

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Utilities should be determining
how to move forward

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with these solutions based
on the results of research

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and pilots and continue to be leaders

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in wildfire prevention, not
just throughout the State,

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but globally as well.

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Utilities should be
taking the opportunity

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to implement cutting edge technology

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that seemed impossible previously.

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In order to find optimal solutions

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and reduce catastrophic
wildfires from occurring

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in the future.

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With that, I'll now turn
it over to the utilities

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for the hard classes getting
all of that in 20 minutes,

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following the same pattern as yesterday,

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starting with PG&amp;E, SCE and SDG&amp;E.

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<v ->Hi, good morning Andie.</v>

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Just doing a mic check, can you hear?

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<v ->I can hear you Mark.</v>

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<v ->All right, so I'll start off,</v>

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so good morning participants,
my name is Mark Esguerra.

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Thank you for the opportunity to present

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at the 2021 wildfire
mitigation plan workshop.

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I'm the senior director of PG&amp;E

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electric asset strategy organization.

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I'm responsible for
the investment strategy

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and lifecycle management
of our electric transmission,

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distribution and substation assets.

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I will be presenting
on PG&amp;E's grid design

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and system hardening program
and answering any questions

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you may have on this program.

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So I'll go onto the first slide here.

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Am I, there you go, thank you.

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So from a customer
perspective here, when you look,

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think about the wildfire risk across

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the PGE's service
territory, approximately 9%

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of our customers are located

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in the high fire threat
district tiers two and three.

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All over 1/2 of PGE's
service territory resides

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in the HFTDs.

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From an electric
infrastructure perspective,

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nearly 1/3 of our electric
lines that provide power

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to our customers are
now located in the HFTDs.

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The observed risk has increased

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with the higher temperatures,
extreme periods of dryness

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and extreme record wind we've experience

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have increased kind of the wildfire risk

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across all our service
territory, as well as the State.

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This last year was especially

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a challenging year for wildfires.

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So what you see here is that, you know,

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five and we'll get into next slide,

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five of the last six largest
wildfires in California history

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occurred in 2020, and of which all were

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in PGE serve territory.

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So, catastrophic wildland fires,

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they're a major threat
throughout our territory.

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It was on a major risk to our customers.

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Our equipment has
been the ignition source

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for a number of these fires.

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And hence, you know,
really taking a really strong,

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coordinated approach has been
developed to reduce that risk.

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When you look at that chart
here on the right hand side,

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you can see that 15 of
the 20 most destructive fires

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in California have occurred
within PGE service territory.

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Furthermore, you can see
that the frequency of these fires

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have been increasing,
but also the severity or the,

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what we're calling the
total structures damage

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from these events have also increased

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over the last 10 years.

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Some additional complications
that that we consider is that

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our service territory
that's caused by the HFTD

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has grown from 15 to over
50% from 2012 to 2018.

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So it's been evolving.

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And so with this understanding,
PGE is focused on ensuring

00:12:07.340 --> 00:12:11.530
that our risk assessments
and our operational work targets

00:12:11.530 --> 00:12:15.540
reduce the wildfire risk as
aggressively as possible.

00:12:15.540 --> 00:12:18.740
So we really have to make
sure that we are reviewing these

00:12:18.740 --> 00:12:23.160
and adapting and adjusting
our models as well as our plans,

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as we learn more and
more about the risks

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in our service territory.

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The next slide.

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So, on this slide here, as we
learn more about our system,

00:12:35.100 --> 00:12:37.010
you know, so what we're
seeing is that we've had

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to make some adjustments
to our wildfire risk model

00:12:41.800 --> 00:12:44.040
and in a way that to really take care

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of what we're calling as this
risk buydown, buydown curve.

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And as a result, we've had
to refresh a lot of our plans.

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So, as we learn more about our system,

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we made some specific enhancements,

00:12:56.550 --> 00:12:58.550
three enhancements to the components

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of our wildfire risk model.

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Yesterday, Paul McGregor,
our director of risk management

00:13:04.900 --> 00:13:08.120
from PG&amp;E presented
out on a lot of these details

00:13:08.120 --> 00:13:09.860
behind the risk modeling enhancements,

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which I will not be
able to go into the detail

00:13:12.520 --> 00:13:15.330
that Paul went to,
but I'll spill them out.

00:13:15.330 --> 00:13:18.260
One was replacing the regression

00:13:18.260 --> 00:13:21.160
of vegetation index likelihood

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with the 2021 machine learning

00:13:24.370 --> 00:13:26.093
vegetation ignition probability.

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As well as replacing our
equipment ignition likelihood

00:13:30.690 --> 00:13:33.460
with the machine
learnings for the equipment

00:13:33.460 --> 00:13:36.260
vegetation probability
as well for this year.

00:13:36.260 --> 00:13:41.260
And then notably replacing
the Reax consequence values

00:13:41.400 --> 00:13:42.720
with what we're using

00:13:42.720 --> 00:13:45.640
from the Technosylva consequence values.

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And really the key
improvement that you get out

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of these enhancements
are one, is a risk models

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is now available in absolute values.

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And what we're saying
and come from a distance

00:13:58.340 --> 00:14:02.550
of 100 meter squares, and now
those values are now additive,

00:14:02.550 --> 00:14:04.173
where before they weren't.

00:14:05.830 --> 00:14:08.040
We've also increased
the model and accuracy

00:14:08.040 --> 00:14:10.727
by doing some
benchmarking with field folks

00:14:10.727 --> 00:14:13.010
and other utilities
here to check into this.

00:14:13.010 --> 00:14:16.730
And then we've also addressed
some of the overfit concerns

00:14:16.730 --> 00:14:18.580
that go along with machine learnings.

00:14:19.580 --> 00:14:22.690
The model also highlights
some of the importance

00:14:22.690 --> 00:14:24.760
of fast burning fuels.

00:14:24.760 --> 00:14:26.360
And then also we've tried to,

00:14:26.360 --> 00:14:28.730
we've worked to try to capture
more up-to-date prediction

00:14:28.730 --> 00:14:30.103
of fire behavior.

00:14:31.900 --> 00:14:33.860
So then, when you look
at the charts in the middle

00:14:33.860 --> 00:14:37.340
of the slide, they provide
a view of what we're calling

00:14:37.340 --> 00:14:39.480
the risk buydown curves and really,

00:14:39.480 --> 00:14:42.750
you're seeing here two
curves that we're getting,

00:14:42.750 --> 00:14:46.540
and what is this risk
buydown curve has changed.

00:14:46.540 --> 00:14:49.490
And so when you look at the top chart,

00:14:49.490 --> 00:14:51.060
focusing on that top chart there,

00:14:51.060 --> 00:14:54.400
you'll see it's a view into
the risk buydown curve,

00:14:54.400 --> 00:14:59.400
using what we had in the
2018 model and effectively,

00:15:00.610 --> 00:15:03.950
what you have here is
each of our circuit segments,

00:15:03.950 --> 00:15:06.020
and here we're calling it
circuit protection zones,

00:15:06.020 --> 00:15:09.290
we've done some work
to calculate and quantify

00:15:09.290 --> 00:15:12.250
what we are seeing as the risk.

00:15:12.250 --> 00:15:14.750
And each one of those represents a dot,

00:15:14.750 --> 00:15:15.980
and we've colored those dots.

00:15:15.980 --> 00:15:19.000
And when you line those
all up, it forms this curve.

00:15:19.000 --> 00:15:21.840
As you can see, this
curve is a pretty steep

00:15:21.840 --> 00:15:25.463
from the 2018 model
where the top curve here.

00:15:26.860 --> 00:15:29.420
And what you're seeing
here is that the top,

00:15:29.420 --> 00:15:31.620
or what we're calling
the highest wildfire risk

00:15:31.620 --> 00:15:33.720
circuit protection zones
or circuit segments,

00:15:33.720 --> 00:15:37.710
here you see CPZs from
our initial wildfire risk model

00:15:37.710 --> 00:15:41.180
in 2018 are colored here in blue.

00:15:41.180 --> 00:15:44.040
And it addresses, based on
where this curve is shaped,

00:15:44.040 --> 00:15:45.893
about 40% of the risk.

00:15:46.950 --> 00:15:50.660
As you can see that the
color blue dots on the top end

00:15:50.660 --> 00:15:54.040
of that curve, which
is effectively translating

00:15:54.040 --> 00:15:55.770
to higher risk.

00:15:55.770 --> 00:15:58.730
And our work around system
hardening was really focused

00:15:58.730 --> 00:16:03.730
on going after those top
items, those top blue dots,

00:16:03.860 --> 00:16:05.760
those in the top of our curve,

00:16:05.760 --> 00:16:07.853
top high risk circuit protection zones.

00:16:09.370 --> 00:16:11.700
Conversely, when you look
at the bottom of the chart,

00:16:11.700 --> 00:16:14.720
which is a more refreshed
view, factoring in some

00:16:14.720 --> 00:16:16.630
of these improvements on our risk model,

00:16:16.630 --> 00:16:18.320
you could see that our buydown curve

00:16:18.320 --> 00:16:19.913
has a slightly different shape.

00:16:21.741 --> 00:16:23.950
And what you can see here is that

00:16:23.950 --> 00:16:28.540
the highest risk CPZ models,
which are colored segments,

00:16:28.540 --> 00:16:30.240
which are colored in blue,

00:16:30.240 --> 00:16:33.380
when you factor in those
improvements are no longer

00:16:33.380 --> 00:16:36.870
at the top, they're more
towards the bottom half

00:16:36.870 --> 00:16:41.320
of that curve, which is really
translating to a lower risk.

00:16:41.320 --> 00:16:44.080
And what we've done here
is on the top end of the curve,

00:16:44.080 --> 00:16:47.590
the top 100 circuit protection
zones we've colored in red,

00:16:47.590 --> 00:16:49.530
and we've highlighted them as,

00:16:49.530 --> 00:16:52.310
and you can see that they're
on the top end of that curve.

00:16:52.310 --> 00:16:54.950
And conversely, when
you compare the two curves

00:16:54.950 --> 00:16:58.000
where we had a much
sharper amount where majority

00:16:58.000 --> 00:17:00.980
of the risks were in the
top circuit protection zones

00:17:00.980 --> 00:17:04.480
that you see the curve it's
not as sharp as that before

00:17:04.480 --> 00:17:07.540
where you could see it
spread out a little more.

00:17:07.540 --> 00:17:12.540
And so about 12.4% of that
risk is in the top 100 there.

00:17:14.400 --> 00:17:16.240
So you can see that some
of those enhancements

00:17:16.240 --> 00:17:19.880
really changed our risk
model and how we think about

00:17:19.880 --> 00:17:23.230
what the top areas to system harden were

00:17:23.230 --> 00:17:25.023
versus what were not.

00:17:26.300 --> 00:17:27.690
And the other thing to point out here,

00:17:27.690 --> 00:17:31.920
there wasn't much overlap
on what was considered

00:17:31.920 --> 00:17:35.133
the top 100 CPZs from both models.

00:17:36.210 --> 00:17:38.870
So as a result of that, we had to make

00:17:38.870 --> 00:17:40.300
some significant changes

00:17:40.300 --> 00:17:45.190
to our system hardening
prioritization and risk buydown.

00:17:45.190 --> 00:17:50.190
And also mentioned before,
was the risk was available

00:17:51.080 --> 00:17:54.760
in absolute values now
where we could apply

00:17:54.760 --> 00:17:56.540
like the distance factor,

00:17:56.540 --> 00:17:58.530
where before it was
not distance weighted,

00:17:58.530 --> 00:18:02.193
it was more relative risk, next slide.

00:18:03.930 --> 00:18:07.830
And so, for this next slide
here is our, as I mentioned,

00:18:07.830 --> 00:18:10.220
our system hardening
portfolio is shifting to be more

00:18:10.220 --> 00:18:12.663
of a risk informed execution strategy.

00:18:13.510 --> 00:18:17.990
And so our system
hardening program for 2021

00:18:17.990 --> 00:18:22.780
was based on this
updated risk buydown curve.

00:18:22.780 --> 00:18:27.780
And we have about 180 miles
that are planned for this year,

00:18:28.000 --> 00:18:30.010
where we're projected to reduce the risk

00:18:30.010 --> 00:18:32.053
by about 198 points.

00:18:33.320 --> 00:18:37.600
So in order to formalize our plan here,

00:18:37.600 --> 00:18:42.220
we did evaluate various
alternatives to system hardening

00:18:42.220 --> 00:18:45.240
that were based on
risk spend efficiencies,

00:18:45.240 --> 00:18:47.043
ingress/egress information.

00:18:47.043 --> 00:18:48.843
We were looking at strike trees,

00:18:50.730 --> 00:18:55.190
and also factoring in some
of the learnings from PSPS.

00:18:55.190 --> 00:18:59.400
We taken a look at a
lot of all our past events

00:18:59.400 --> 00:19:00.710
to try to understand, you know,

00:19:00.710 --> 00:19:04.930
where are the areas that are
more commonly prone to PSPS,

00:19:04.930 --> 00:19:08.520
as well as EC maintenance
tags and the timeframe

00:19:08.520 --> 00:19:13.513
that is allowed to
execute that work there.

00:19:14.767 --> 00:19:16.830
And then so when you look
at what we have in our plan

00:19:16.830 --> 00:19:19.373
from like a risk exposure
and where we're going,

00:19:20.260 --> 00:19:22.670
we're really kinda count
the circuit that are hardened

00:19:22.670 --> 00:19:25.183
in our HFTDs and
our high fire risk areas.

00:19:26.320 --> 00:19:30.510
We're working to after this
year, after this initial year

00:19:30.510 --> 00:19:33.420
to really build up our
portfolio and ramp up

00:19:33.420 --> 00:19:38.420
to reach a pace of about
450 to 500 miles per year

00:19:38.887 --> 00:19:41.430
from 2022 and beyond.

00:19:41.430 --> 00:19:43.600
And when you look at
what's gonna be comprised

00:19:43.600 --> 00:19:46.200
of those miles, we really
are focusing on a profile

00:19:46.200 --> 00:19:50.520
where we are aiming
for that 80% of our miles

00:19:50.520 --> 00:19:52.940
that we hardened, really have to be part

00:19:52.940 --> 00:19:54.960
of that high risk miles
that are based off

00:19:54.960 --> 00:19:59.960
of our 2021 distribution
wildfire risk model.

00:20:00.610 --> 00:20:02.530
And really what we're
looking at in there

00:20:02.530 --> 00:20:05.280
is that we wanna look at
that risk buydown curve

00:20:05.280 --> 00:20:09.660
and really focus on the
top 20% going after those.

00:20:09.660 --> 00:20:12.810
As well as miles that we are rebuilding

00:20:12.810 --> 00:20:15.260
as part of our fire impacts.

00:20:15.260 --> 00:20:18.800
And then also factoring
in that we wanna address,

00:20:18.800 --> 00:20:20.090
you know, are there mile steps

00:20:20.090 --> 00:20:23.690
are gonna mitigate impacts of PSPS.

00:20:25.830 --> 00:20:29.680
From a risk effectiveness perspective,

00:20:29.680 --> 00:20:31.830
we're really looking
at trying to prioritize

00:20:31.830 --> 00:20:33.330
those alternatives that provide

00:20:33.330 --> 00:20:35.360
the greatest risk reduction benefits.

00:20:35.360 --> 00:20:37.920
So really spending time with our teams

00:20:37.920 --> 00:20:39.410
to understand the opportunities

00:20:39.410 --> 00:20:42.160
on where we could do
more undergrounding,

00:20:42.160 --> 00:20:44.740
as well as in the form of line removals,

00:20:44.740 --> 00:20:48.330
where we could remove
the risk by removing lines,

00:20:48.330 --> 00:20:50.730
and going to a solution
where we're looking

00:20:50.730 --> 00:20:55.003
at potentially remote grids, next slide.

00:20:58.080 --> 00:21:00.150
And so what we have here is, you know,

00:21:00.150 --> 00:21:03.390
when you look at our new
plan on how the 180 miles

00:21:03.390 --> 00:21:06.210
are broken up, we've stood up

00:21:07.470 --> 00:21:09.470
an internal governance
committee comprised

00:21:09.470 --> 00:21:12.810
of various PG&amp;E officers
that are part of our,

00:21:12.810 --> 00:21:15.750
what we call our wildfire
governance risk committee.

00:21:15.750 --> 00:21:20.400
And they've effectively
reviewed our plans.

00:21:20.400 --> 00:21:23.037
And what's comprised of the 180 miles.

00:21:23.037 --> 00:21:26.930
And to give a double
click into those miles,

00:21:26.930 --> 00:21:29.380
what we've identified is
that about 80 of those miles,

00:21:29.380 --> 00:21:31.840
81 of those miles are
what we're calling in-flight.

00:21:31.840 --> 00:21:34.330
So these are projects
where we have worked

00:21:34.330 --> 00:21:36.490
that we've received authorization.

00:21:36.490 --> 00:21:38.580
We're further into
the pipeline of having

00:21:38.580 --> 00:21:41.950
these projects engineered,
procured and constructed.

00:21:41.950 --> 00:21:46.950
And these are more likely to
meet their timelines in 2021,

00:21:47.010 --> 00:21:49.782
due to their earlier
start in the scoping

00:21:49.782 --> 00:21:51.473
and planning processes.

00:21:52.370 --> 00:21:54.190
The other category of projects here

00:21:54.190 --> 00:21:55.720
is what we're calling the new projects.

00:21:55.720 --> 00:21:59.020
As you can see, we've
had to pivot our risk model

00:21:59.020 --> 00:22:00.890
to try to take on some
of these high-risk miles.

00:22:00.890 --> 00:22:04.490
And these are starting
with a little bit of a later start

00:22:04.490 --> 00:22:07.110
and where we're calling
these as new projects,

00:22:07.110 --> 00:22:09.090
which have not yet had kind of the,

00:22:09.090 --> 00:22:11.140
all the mitigation methods yet approved,

00:22:11.140 --> 00:22:13.060
but we're working towards that.

00:22:13.060 --> 00:22:16.580
And these projects may
have a greater lead time

00:22:16.580 --> 00:22:20.050
to get the scope worked
out, get the engineering

00:22:20.050 --> 00:22:21.030
and procurement worked out.

00:22:21.030 --> 00:22:24.790
So we do expect that
there will be fewer miles,

00:22:24.790 --> 00:22:27.900
and that's been reflected
here in this total with the 99.

00:22:27.900 --> 00:22:30.780
So that's what we've discounted already.

00:22:30.780 --> 00:22:33.710
And then when you look at the greater,

00:22:33.710 --> 00:22:38.700
when you apply the discount
rates, which miles are at risk

00:22:38.700 --> 00:22:41.580
of not being able to be
implemented this year,

00:22:41.580 --> 00:22:43.980
it turns out to be 180 miles.

00:22:43.980 --> 00:22:47.900
And so, again, as a result
of adjusting our models

00:22:47.900 --> 00:22:50.460
and really reshaping our portfolio,

00:22:50.460 --> 00:22:55.410
we've had to pull projects
into our Q4 system hardening

00:22:56.310 --> 00:22:58.880
that weren't originally conceived

00:22:58.880 --> 00:23:00.210
to be queued for a few years

00:23:00.210 --> 00:23:02.840
and some projects
that were in the queue,

00:23:02.840 --> 00:23:05.790
we've moved them down into
the process so that we can focus

00:23:05.790 --> 00:23:07.413
on these higher risk model.

00:23:08.770 --> 00:23:09.993
Okay, next slide.

00:23:14.880 --> 00:23:19.880
And so, as I talk about
here, our plan is to build up

00:23:20.090 --> 00:23:23.850
this pipeline so that
by 2022 and beyond,

00:23:23.850 --> 00:23:28.850
we're really hitting a pace
of 450 to 500 miles per year.

00:23:28.997 --> 00:23:32.100
And as you can see here,
the way you read this chart

00:23:32.100 --> 00:23:34.780
is there's the table
is really reflecting

00:23:34.780 --> 00:23:37.890
the different phases that go in through

00:23:37.890 --> 00:23:39.490
the life cycle of a project.

00:23:39.490 --> 00:23:43.330
So you've got your project
scoping, the estimating,

00:23:43.330 --> 00:23:46.930
clearing up various
coordinating the dependencies

00:23:46.930 --> 00:23:49.540
of permitting and clearances,

00:23:49.540 --> 00:23:52.900
and then those that are
going into construction,

00:23:52.900 --> 00:23:54.680
and then really closing out.

00:23:54.680 --> 00:23:56.090
As you can see that we have a plan

00:23:56.090 --> 00:23:59.100
to really hit a pace greater than 500,

00:23:59.100 --> 00:24:00.870
but a lot of those miles are really

00:24:00.870 --> 00:24:02.663
in the early scoping phases.

00:24:03.970 --> 00:24:06.490
When you look at it,
this is really looking

00:24:06.490 --> 00:24:09.790
at the projects we
have over 150 projects

00:24:09.790 --> 00:24:13.620
that are falling into this
particular category here.

00:24:13.620 --> 00:24:18.010
Again, the balance of those
are in the early scoping phases

00:24:18.010 --> 00:24:19.740
that we're really launching.

00:24:19.740 --> 00:24:22.900
Some of those projects
here can be scoped in time,

00:24:22.900 --> 00:24:26.580
potentially for the 2021 execution.

00:24:26.580 --> 00:24:30.040
And really, you know, if
those can advance further,

00:24:30.040 --> 00:24:33.440
could increase our
total from the 180 miles

00:24:33.440 --> 00:24:35.750
that were targeted in this year.

00:24:35.750 --> 00:24:37.790
And you can see where the miles are

00:24:37.790 --> 00:24:41.700
and how those could help
influence and raise our 180 miles

00:24:41.700 --> 00:24:43.913
that we're targeting for this year.

00:24:44.880 --> 00:24:47.520
So there's more miles to
have set in our pipeline,

00:24:47.520 --> 00:24:49.650
but as we've mentioned,
we've discounted some of them

00:24:49.650 --> 00:24:51.840
because of where
they are in the process,

00:24:51.840 --> 00:24:55.560
but should we be able to
kinda clear those phases

00:24:55.560 --> 00:24:59.020
and really move it into the pipeline,

00:24:59.020 --> 00:25:00.940
we could get more miles in there.

00:25:00.940 --> 00:25:03.130
However, the way we're
really looking at that,

00:25:03.130 --> 00:25:04.760
most likely they won't
be scoped in time,

00:25:04.760 --> 00:25:07.710
which is why we're
really building the inertia

00:25:07.710 --> 00:25:12.640
to get it into our pipeline
going in for 2022 and beyond

00:25:12.640 --> 00:25:14.393
to really hit the sustainable rate.

00:25:16.650 --> 00:25:21.650
Next slide, and so
what you have here is,

00:25:24.020 --> 00:25:26.770
you know, as I
mentioned, the limitations

00:25:26.770 --> 00:25:31.283
for what's going on
in our portfolio here is,

00:25:32.420 --> 00:25:36.000
you know, although that
we're doing less miles,

00:25:36.000 --> 00:25:38.170
one thing that's really
important to point out

00:25:38.170 --> 00:25:40.260
is that even with the less miles,

00:25:40.260 --> 00:25:43.090
when you compare it
against the previous portfolio

00:25:43.090 --> 00:25:47.310
that we had planned, we're
actually reducing more risk

00:25:47.310 --> 00:25:49.860
by targeting these higher risk miles.

00:25:49.860 --> 00:25:53.430
Then if we stuck to
the original portfolio

00:25:53.430 --> 00:25:55.410
that we had identified,
that was based off

00:25:55.410 --> 00:25:57.600
in the earlier model.

00:25:57.600 --> 00:25:59.390
And so, although we're doing more miles,

00:25:59.390 --> 00:26:00.650
we believe that we're actually going

00:26:00.650 --> 00:26:05.370
to be clearing more risk
here in the short term here.

00:26:09.510 --> 00:26:13.100
And just to kinda give a
view of some of the constraints

00:26:13.100 --> 00:26:15.150
that we have when you look at it

00:26:15.150 --> 00:26:18.260
from a permitting perspective, you know,

00:26:18.260 --> 00:26:22.030
so we can see here that
the days can add up in terms

00:26:22.030 --> 00:26:26.100
of the average amount of
time that it takes for permitting.

00:26:26.100 --> 00:26:29.560
So that's some of the constraints
that we're working towards

00:26:29.560 --> 00:26:33.540
to try to address here
as it pertains to hardening.

00:26:33.540 --> 00:26:35.110
And then when you look at the internal

00:26:35.110 --> 00:26:37.430
project scoping process, you know,

00:26:37.430 --> 00:26:40.160
a typical project can
take a little bit over a year

00:26:40.160 --> 00:26:45.160
to a year and a half, if
things move as planned.

00:26:45.190 --> 00:26:47.220
And so kind of the change
in work plan, you know,

00:26:47.220 --> 00:26:49.420
has to account for
that additional lead time

00:26:50.520 --> 00:26:52.810
to do those different
work from, as I mentioned,

00:26:52.810 --> 00:26:55.990
from the field and final
scoping, the estimating,

00:26:55.990 --> 00:26:57.710
the dependencies and contracting,

00:26:57.710 --> 00:26:58.980
and the different approvals

00:26:58.980 --> 00:27:01.670
and construction before we close out.

00:27:01.670 --> 00:27:04.900
And so we'd say that
we've taken the information

00:27:04.900 --> 00:27:08.940
from this updated risk model to be able

00:27:08.940 --> 00:27:10.980
to really pivot our
portfolio, to try to address

00:27:10.980 --> 00:27:13.500
those highest risk items while factoring

00:27:13.500 --> 00:27:17.740
in PSPS impacts, construction
constraints and really,

00:27:17.740 --> 00:27:19.650
you know, from a risk spend efficiency,

00:27:19.650 --> 00:27:22.480
what work is driving the highest amount

00:27:22.480 --> 00:27:25.223
of risk reduction in
this timeframe here.

00:27:26.430 --> 00:27:29.890
At this point, that
concludes my presentation.

00:27:29.890 --> 00:27:32.860
And definitely we'll hand
it over back to the hosts

00:27:32.860 --> 00:27:35.210
that will be available
for any other questions.

00:27:43.750 --> 00:27:48.750
<v ->Thanks so much, Mark,
let's going on to SCE next,</v>

00:27:48.750 --> 00:27:52.393
to hear about their grid
design and hardening efforts.

00:27:54.340 --> 00:27:55.433
<v ->Yes, thanks Andie.</v>

00:28:01.580 --> 00:28:05.410
I'm not seeing the slides on screen.

00:28:05.410 --> 00:28:07.060
Are they up, are you seeing them?

00:28:08.050 --> 00:28:10.163
Oh, there it goes.
<v ->Yep, now.</v>

00:28:11.176 --> 00:28:14.300
<v ->Okay, good morning everyone.</v>

00:28:14.300 --> 00:28:17.560
And thank you for the
opportunity to be here today

00:28:17.560 --> 00:28:20.850
and share with you what's
in our wildfire mitigation

00:28:20.850 --> 00:28:23.870
plan update for 2021.

00:28:23.870 --> 00:28:27.930
My name is Russ Ragsdale,
I'm a director of our asset

00:28:27.930 --> 00:28:29.360
and engineering strategy group.

00:28:29.360 --> 00:28:32.200
I have similar
responsibilities as Mark does,

00:28:32.200 --> 00:28:34.530
responsible for our
distribution, transmission,

00:28:34.530 --> 00:28:37.850
substation assets, including kind

00:28:37.850 --> 00:28:39.543
of our longterm strategies,

00:28:40.940 --> 00:28:44.800
determining where we
make capital replacements,

00:28:44.800 --> 00:28:47.820
determining how often we inspect

00:28:47.820 --> 00:28:50.760
and maintain them and developing.

00:28:50.760 --> 00:28:53.673
So the mitigation that's
share with you all here today.

00:28:55.320 --> 00:28:57.173
You can go to the next slide.

00:29:01.330 --> 00:29:03.720
So there's three kinda key topics

00:29:03.720 --> 00:29:05.740
that I'm gonna touch on today.

00:29:05.740 --> 00:29:08.463
The first is grid design
and system hardening.

00:29:09.520 --> 00:29:12.400
Share with you some
of the mitigations there,

00:29:12.400 --> 00:29:15.993
what we did 2020, and
where we're going in 2021.

00:29:17.170 --> 00:29:19.880
Next, I will speak to
the asset management

00:29:19.880 --> 00:29:23.230
and inspection, scope of work again,

00:29:23.230 --> 00:29:25.990
what we did in '20 and
what we did in 2021.

00:29:25.990 --> 00:29:27.270
And then in the third section,

00:29:27.270 --> 00:29:29.580
I will share some examples of some

00:29:29.580 --> 00:29:31.660
of the emerging technologies

00:29:31.660 --> 00:29:33.430
that we've included in our WMP.

00:29:35.804 --> 00:29:37.254
You can go to the next slide.

00:29:41.470 --> 00:29:44.650
So our grid design and
system hardening mitigations,

00:29:44.650 --> 00:29:46.960
as it says here on the
slide are really implemented

00:29:46.960 --> 00:29:49.727
to maintain, strengthen
and upgrade our equipment

00:29:49.727 --> 00:29:53.010
and infrastructure, really
with the focus of reducing

00:29:53.010 --> 00:29:56.823
the risk of ignition in our HFRA areas.

00:29:58.522 --> 00:30:01.920
The kind of underlying
foundation for this

00:30:01.920 --> 00:30:05.280
is our risk model, which we
follow a bow tie framework,

00:30:05.280 --> 00:30:09.610
and it's SCE which really
determines risk drivers,

00:30:09.610 --> 00:30:12.090
which is the probability
of a risk events

00:30:12.090 --> 00:30:14.400
as well as risk outcomes,
which are the consequences

00:30:14.400 --> 00:30:16.177
of those risk events.

00:30:16.177 --> 00:30:19.740
And so our system
hardening mitigations primarily

00:30:19.740 --> 00:30:22.700
are focused on reducing
the probability of ignition

00:30:22.700 --> 00:30:26.453
and thereby doing that,
the overall risk is reduced.

00:30:28.570 --> 00:30:31.590
When we look at our drivers

00:30:31.590 --> 00:30:34.883
of suspected wildfire initiating events,

00:30:36.060 --> 00:30:39.730
the primary drivers that we
see are contact from object

00:30:39.730 --> 00:30:40.920
and wire to wire events,

00:30:40.920 --> 00:30:44.350
those are associated
with approximately 60%

00:30:44.350 --> 00:30:47.133
of those suspecting
wildfire initiating events.

00:30:48.400 --> 00:30:50.880
So that's why you will
see that cover conductor

00:30:50.880 --> 00:30:53.280
is the largest mitigation
that we're deploying,

00:30:53.280 --> 00:30:56.640
because it is effective in
mitigating those contact

00:30:56.640 --> 00:31:00.690
from object or wire
to wire event drivers

00:31:00.690 --> 00:31:03.320
of potential ignition it gets.

00:31:03.320 --> 00:31:08.320
In 2020, we were able to
complete 965 circuit miles,

00:31:09.660 --> 00:31:12.470
which was above our target of 700.

00:31:12.470 --> 00:31:17.470
And in 2021, our target is
1000 miles with a stretch goal

00:31:19.700 --> 00:31:22.223
of getting up to 1400 circuit miles.

00:31:23.510 --> 00:31:25.650
We continue to believe
that cover conductor

00:31:25.650 --> 00:31:29.730
is the most effective way to
mitigate these primary risks.

00:31:29.730 --> 00:31:32.513
And by deploying it across the system,

00:31:33.370 --> 00:31:37.183
we will be able to mitigate
the risk of wildfire emission.

00:31:38.400 --> 00:31:41.710
We have several other
system hardening activities

00:31:41.710 --> 00:31:43.080
that are included in our WMP.

00:31:43.080 --> 00:31:45.370
Some of which are listed here.

00:31:45.370 --> 00:31:49.280
Continued to deploy fuses.

00:31:49.280 --> 00:31:53.700
In 2020, we deployed over 3000 fuses,

00:31:53.700 --> 00:31:57.553
combination of new
fuses and replacing fuses.

00:32:00.920 --> 00:32:05.920
And in 2021, we expect
to replace or install

00:32:06.160 --> 00:32:08.173
that 330 as you see on the slide.

00:32:09.722 --> 00:32:12.210
Installing these branch
line fuses is an effective way

00:32:12.210 --> 00:32:14.460
to reduce the risks,
especially on branch lines,

00:32:14.460 --> 00:32:16.600
where we don't have with fuses,

00:32:16.600 --> 00:32:21.443
because it allows you to
interrupt a fault much more quickly

00:32:21.443 --> 00:32:23.203
than if you didn't have a fuse,

00:32:24.100 --> 00:32:26.100
which reduces the amount of energy

00:32:26.100 --> 00:32:27.800
that's delivered to that location.

00:32:29.580 --> 00:32:31.880
Circuit breaker relay hardware upgrades

00:32:32.720 --> 00:32:34.300
has a similar purpose.

00:32:34.300 --> 00:32:38.360
In 2020, we did a
little over 100 of those,

00:32:38.360 --> 00:32:40.730
in 2021 proposing to do
somewhere between 60

00:32:42.982 --> 00:32:45.083
and 86 of these upgrades.

00:32:47.320 --> 00:32:50.230
And then undergrounding
and vertical switches

00:32:50.230 --> 00:32:53.490
are two system hardening mitigations

00:32:53.490 --> 00:32:57.910
that we primarily did
the planning for in 2020,

00:32:57.910 --> 00:33:00.960
so that we can do these
implementations in 2021.

00:33:02.421 --> 00:33:05.670
And undergrounding,
we're doing four to six miles,

00:33:05.670 --> 00:33:08.130
four miles is the target with up to six

00:33:08.130 --> 00:33:11.603
and for vertical switches,
planning on doing 20

00:33:11.603 --> 00:33:13.303
upto 30 vertical switches.

00:33:15.270 --> 00:33:19.740
In addition, in our 2021
WMP we are proposing

00:33:19.740 --> 00:33:24.433
some new mitigations that
were not in our previous WMP.

00:33:25.760 --> 00:33:29.070
For C-hooks, we're proposing

00:33:29.070 --> 00:33:34.070
to replace 40 C-hooks across our system.

00:33:35.170 --> 00:33:40.170
C-hooks are a piece of
hardware that you will find

00:33:41.570 --> 00:33:44.030
on our transmission infrastructure

00:33:44.030 --> 00:33:48.133
that holds our insulators in place.

00:33:49.270 --> 00:33:51.760
The C-hooks that are on
our system are primarily there

00:33:51.760 --> 00:33:56.760
from when SCE acquired another
utility many, many years ago,

00:33:57.220 --> 00:34:00.740
Go Electric and C-hooks
are not in our standard

00:34:01.912 --> 00:34:03.762
for normal transmission construction.

00:34:04.930 --> 00:34:08.570
We have done some
inspections and assessment

00:34:08.570 --> 00:34:11.380
of our C-hooks, and we
found that some of them

00:34:11.380 --> 00:34:15.540
are deteriorated because
of the age of them.

00:34:15.540 --> 00:34:17.550
We've also found that
it's somewhat difficult

00:34:17.550 --> 00:34:21.300
to identify the level of
deterioration on C-hooks.

00:34:21.300 --> 00:34:23.240
And so, because of those cases,

00:34:23.240 --> 00:34:25.987
because the deterioration
and the difficulty to inspect,

00:34:25.987 --> 00:34:28.710
and the fact that they're
not in our standards

00:34:28.710 --> 00:34:31.080
and the relatively known
number of these that we have,

00:34:31.080 --> 00:34:33.280
we are proposing to
replace at least 40 of them,

00:34:33.280 --> 00:34:35.640
if not all of them
in our high fire area,

00:34:35.640 --> 00:34:36.963
which is up to about 60.

00:34:39.140 --> 00:34:41.690
Vertical switches, we've
done some assessments

00:34:41.690 --> 00:34:45.880
and we found that vertical
switches that are installed

00:34:45.880 --> 00:34:49.490
on wood crossarms can become misaligned

00:34:49.490 --> 00:34:53.530
when that would crossarm
over time is exposed

00:34:53.530 --> 00:34:56.200
to changing temperatures
and therefore it warps.

00:34:56.200 --> 00:34:59.290
It can shrink, and then it
can cause a vertical switch

00:34:59.290 --> 00:35:02.840
to be warped in the context,
so not be perfectly aligned,

00:35:02.840 --> 00:35:05.310
which when the switch
has operated could lead

00:35:05.310 --> 00:35:10.200
to incandescent particles,
which could be an ignition risk.

00:35:10.200 --> 00:35:14.490
And so because of that,
we have identified a vendor

00:35:17.580 --> 00:35:20.610
that would provide
vertical switches attached

00:35:20.610 --> 00:35:22.250
to composite crossarms.

00:35:22.250 --> 00:35:24.200
And we plan to replace
the vertical switches

00:35:24.200 --> 00:35:29.200
that we have 20 of them in
2021, with these new types

00:35:29.710 --> 00:35:31.653
that are not subject
to the same failure.

00:35:33.600 --> 00:35:34.800
The third item on here that's new

00:35:34.800 --> 00:35:36.293
is our long span initiative.

00:35:38.087 --> 00:35:41.360
What we have found is
that there are certain types

00:35:41.360 --> 00:35:44.380
of construction in the
field that are subject

00:35:44.380 --> 00:35:47.280
to conductor clashing either because

00:35:47.280 --> 00:35:52.280
the span is very lengthy or
because the span happens

00:35:52.570 --> 00:35:55.240
at an angle where you're
traversing one direction

00:35:55.240 --> 00:35:57.490
with your span of wire,
and then the next span

00:35:57.490 --> 00:35:59.090
is traversing another direction.

00:36:00.380 --> 00:36:02.750
Or you have sometimes where
you have vertical construction

00:36:02.750 --> 00:36:05.050
and it transitions to
horizontal construction.

00:36:06.000 --> 00:36:08.910
Those are some examples of
scenarios in which the spans

00:36:08.910 --> 00:36:12.670
are subject to clashing,
the conductors clashing

00:36:12.670 --> 00:36:14.053
during high wind events.

00:36:15.061 --> 00:36:17.960
And so, because of these,
we would like to go out

00:36:17.960 --> 00:36:18.940
and remediate these.

00:36:18.940 --> 00:36:22.380
Remediations are a
combination of installing spacers,

00:36:22.380 --> 00:36:24.030
you know, between the conductors.

00:36:25.150 --> 00:36:26.870
If that's not an effective mitigation,

00:36:26.870 --> 00:36:28.910
then you can change the
construction at the crossarm

00:36:28.910 --> 00:36:33.570
to kind of widen the distance
between the conductors

00:36:33.570 --> 00:36:36.600
or it change the crossarm
itself to help widen the distance.

00:36:36.600 --> 00:36:39.630
And so we planned to do
300 of the highest risk locations

00:36:39.630 --> 00:36:41.993
up to 600 in 2021.

00:36:43.729 --> 00:36:46.177
Then the last item
on here is microgrids.

00:36:47.620 --> 00:36:51.140
This is more of a
mitigation of the PSPS risk

00:36:51.140 --> 00:36:53.620
that we're facing and
the impact of customers

00:36:53.620 --> 00:36:55.630
of de-energized circuits.

00:36:55.630 --> 00:36:59.480
And so what we are planning
to do in 2021 is evaluate

00:36:59.480 --> 00:37:03.280
the installation of a
microgrid to mitigate this.

00:37:03.280 --> 00:37:08.280
So we've identified a
location in our high fire area

00:37:08.630 --> 00:37:13.630
that is subject to PSPS risk,
and we are actively exploring,

00:37:16.130 --> 00:37:17.900
installing a microgrid in that location

00:37:17.900 --> 00:37:22.900
to keep those customers
up in case of a PSPS events.

00:37:25.740 --> 00:37:27.690
If we can go to the next slide, please.

00:37:31.920 --> 00:37:34.680
Okay, this slide is really
providing some examples

00:37:34.680 --> 00:37:36.450
of where we're using risks

00:37:36.450 --> 00:37:39.550
to prioritize the various mitigations.

00:37:39.550 --> 00:37:40.630
So on the left side here,

00:37:40.630 --> 00:37:42.430
we're talking about cover conductor.

00:37:43.360 --> 00:37:46.690
Similar to what Mark showed
on during his presentation,

00:37:46.690 --> 00:37:51.520
we're able to evaluate
the risk of each span

00:37:51.520 --> 00:37:55.480
in our high fire area,
again, based on probability

00:37:55.480 --> 00:37:58.440
of ignition, as well as
consequences of that ignition.

00:37:58.440 --> 00:38:01.520
And we are deploying
our cover conductor based

00:38:01.520 --> 00:38:04.963
on that highest to lowest
risk circuit segments.

00:38:05.840 --> 00:38:08.500
Now we continue to
evolve that risk model,

00:38:08.500 --> 00:38:11.500
as you probably heard yesterday
during the risk presentation

00:38:12.530 --> 00:38:16.660
and incorporate kind of new information

00:38:16.660 --> 00:38:18.360
and new technology into the model.

00:38:21.100 --> 00:38:24.320
We also, as we're deploying
our cover conductor scope,

00:38:24.320 --> 00:38:26.340
we look for operational
efficiencies and being able

00:38:26.340 --> 00:38:28.520
to bundle the work together.

00:38:28.520 --> 00:38:30.600
So being able to do cover
conductor along with some

00:38:30.600 --> 00:38:32.530
of the other mitigations
that are out there

00:38:32.530 --> 00:38:35.540
and being able to help avoid
some of those challenges

00:38:35.540 --> 00:38:37.500
that Mark spoke about
regarding permitting

00:38:37.500 --> 00:38:39.583
and being able to do the construction.

00:38:41.370 --> 00:38:43.890
The third bullet here is one
example of what I talked about

00:38:43.890 --> 00:38:45.903
of our risk model continually evolving.

00:38:46.981 --> 00:38:51.240
In 2020, we are using
the Technosylva tool,

00:38:51.240 --> 00:38:55.470
which is a tool that
helps us to better assess

00:38:55.470 --> 00:38:57.890
at a more granular level
what the consequence

00:38:57.890 --> 00:39:00.100
of ignition would be.

00:39:00.100 --> 00:39:03.760
And so we've updated our
risk model to incorporate that.

00:39:03.760 --> 00:39:06.690
And again, are using
that as a way to determine

00:39:06.690 --> 00:39:09.830
the kind of order in which we
would deploy perfect conductor

00:39:09.830 --> 00:39:12.930
in our high fire areas to make
sure that we're deploying it

00:39:12.930 --> 00:39:14.483
in the highest risk areas.

00:39:15.680 --> 00:39:20.680
We've also incorporated the
PSPS risk into our risk model.

00:39:21.280 --> 00:39:24.250
Again, looking at the
probability of a PSPS event

00:39:26.350 --> 00:39:29.770
and the consequence to
customers of that PSPS event.

00:39:29.770 --> 00:39:33.700
So as we move forward,
we will look to deploy

00:39:33.700 --> 00:39:36.360
our cover conductor and
our other mitigation based on

00:39:36.360 --> 00:39:39.770
that updated risk model,
which includes a risk of ignition

00:39:39.770 --> 00:39:41.110
as well as risk of PSPS.

00:39:44.240 --> 00:39:46.660
The right side of the
slide, we're showing our,

00:39:46.660 --> 00:39:50.300
the long span initiative
that I described thoroughly

00:39:50.300 --> 00:39:54.343
on the previous slide in terms
of how we use risk for this.

00:39:55.400 --> 00:40:00.300
So the way in which we
identify these at-risk spans

00:40:00.300 --> 00:40:02.810
is we use LiDAR technology.

00:40:02.810 --> 00:40:06.770
So we fly and take a
LiDAR scan of the spans.

00:40:06.770 --> 00:40:08.850
And then we process
that internally to look

00:40:08.850 --> 00:40:13.850
at where the spacing is
less than a certain threshold.

00:40:15.720 --> 00:40:18.900
And then based on the probability

00:40:18.900 --> 00:40:21.190
of that conductor clashing together,

00:40:21.190 --> 00:40:23.590
as well as the risk of a given location,

00:40:23.590 --> 00:40:26.310
we prioritize which spans to mitigate

00:40:28.462 --> 00:40:31.530
and kinda work through that
in that order from highest risk

00:40:31.530 --> 00:40:34.303
to lowest risk, similar to
that to how we're doing cover.

00:40:36.170 --> 00:40:40.650
For undergrounding, we
look at kind of multiple criteria

00:40:40.650 --> 00:40:45.090
to determine if undergrounding
makes sense in a given area.

00:40:45.090 --> 00:40:49.050
Oftentimes, undergrounding
is much more expensive

00:40:49.050 --> 00:40:51.773
than doing overhead
work like cover conductor.

00:40:52.640 --> 00:40:53.780
So we're looking at, you know,

00:40:53.780 --> 00:40:55.850
the cost of the undergrounding work,

00:40:55.850 --> 00:40:57.520
but we're also looking
at what are the risks

00:40:57.520 --> 00:40:59.300
in a given location?

00:40:59.300 --> 00:41:00.640
Not only are they ignition risks,

00:41:00.640 --> 00:41:02.500
but as well as the PSPS risks.

00:41:02.500 --> 00:41:05.200
We're looking at the terrain,
how constructable it is.

00:41:06.700 --> 00:41:09.980
Considering the community,
egress of the community

00:41:09.980 --> 00:41:10.830
and that cost.

00:41:10.830 --> 00:41:14.440
And so based on that
and the types of risks

00:41:14.440 --> 00:41:18.260
that are present in the
area, in some cases,

00:41:18.260 --> 00:41:20.940
it makes sense to do
undergrounding in lieu

00:41:20.940 --> 00:41:23.030
of doing something like cover conductor,

00:41:23.030 --> 00:41:24.310
because of all of these factors.

00:41:24.310 --> 00:41:28.980
So in 2021, again, we're
planning to do, you know,

00:41:28.980 --> 00:41:32.413
those four miles of
undergrounding up to six miles.

00:41:35.150 --> 00:41:38.555
We are also evaluating kind
of longterm possible benefits

00:41:38.555 --> 00:41:43.555
of undergrounding, including
impact on potential inspections

00:41:43.580 --> 00:41:45.990
in the future, potential
vegetation management

00:41:46.890 --> 00:41:50.680
to really be able to
do a better assessment

00:41:50.680 --> 00:41:53.230
of undergrounding as
compared to other mitigations.

00:41:54.371 --> 00:41:58.052
So continue to evolve
our thinking in that space.

00:41:58.052 --> 00:42:00.385
We can go to the next slide.

00:42:02.530 --> 00:42:04.280
So this is the second topic,

00:42:04.280 --> 00:42:06.213
asset management and inspections.

00:42:07.160 --> 00:42:11.030
So our plan in 2021 is
to continue to do perform

00:42:11.030 --> 00:42:14.290
a 360-degree distribution
and transmission inspection.

00:42:14.290 --> 00:42:16.660
So what we mean by 360
degree is that we're performing

00:42:16.660 --> 00:42:19.550
both a ground and an aerial inspection

00:42:19.550 --> 00:42:20.993
of the same structures.

00:42:22.570 --> 00:42:25.890
And the structures that we've
identified to inspect in 2021

00:42:26.735 --> 00:42:29.720
are 59% of our distribution and 53%

00:42:29.720 --> 00:42:31.300
of our transmission structures.

00:42:31.300 --> 00:42:33.350
That covers structures
that are responsible

00:42:33.350 --> 00:42:35.817
for 99% of the total wildfire risk.

00:42:35.817 --> 00:42:38.583
And you'll see some more
detail on that in the next slide.

00:42:39.840 --> 00:42:41.460
We will do ground and aerial inspections

00:42:41.460 --> 00:42:46.460
on 163,000 distribution and
16,800 transmission structures.

00:42:46.770 --> 00:42:48.630
In addition to these visual inspections,

00:42:48.630 --> 00:42:53.630
we're also deploying
different technologies

00:42:54.320 --> 00:42:59.320
to be able to inspect
other parts of our system.

00:42:59.430 --> 00:43:02.490
So we're using infrared,
corona scanning,

00:43:02.490 --> 00:43:04.620
I mentioned LiDAR previously,

00:43:04.620 --> 00:43:08.624
and then these high
definition images and videos.

00:43:08.624 --> 00:43:10.960
We're using a combination
of helicopters and drones

00:43:10.960 --> 00:43:14.873
for aerial inspection,
really looking for

00:43:14.873 --> 00:43:16.820
kind of all the different ways
that we can identify hazards

00:43:16.820 --> 00:43:18.293
around the system.

00:43:19.750 --> 00:43:23.730
We're moving towards
being able to use machines

00:43:23.730 --> 00:43:27.330
to help improve the quality
and increase the efficiency

00:43:27.330 --> 00:43:28.700
of our inspection process.

00:43:28.700 --> 00:43:31.810
And so we can train those
machines using machine learning

00:43:31.810 --> 00:43:36.090
by capturing images
on a consistent basis.

00:43:36.090 --> 00:43:38.280
We can train those machines
and have them be able

00:43:38.280 --> 00:43:42.720
to identify hazards that
maybe a human might miss

00:43:42.720 --> 00:43:46.560
or be able to do it in a
fashion that is more quick

00:43:46.560 --> 00:43:47.490
than a human can do it.

00:43:47.490 --> 00:43:50.490
Think our initial deployments
of this will be supplemental

00:43:50.490 --> 00:43:53.190
to what the human is doing
and help to make sure that,

00:43:54.640 --> 00:43:57.213
you know, we're catching
everything that's out there.

00:44:00.470 --> 00:44:02.140
In addition to our base inspections,

00:44:02.140 --> 00:44:05.260
we've put a carve-out in our WMP

00:44:05.260 --> 00:44:10.260
for some optional inspections
based on emergent risks.

00:44:10.760 --> 00:44:13.850
So, our wildfire risk
model is primarily based

00:44:13.850 --> 00:44:18.570
on probability of events
happening due to high winds,

00:44:18.570 --> 00:44:21.460
but there are other
factors that can contribute

00:44:21.460 --> 00:44:23.300
to risks out on our system.

00:44:23.300 --> 00:44:26.320
And so these additional
30,000 distribution

00:44:26.320 --> 00:44:29.080
and 3,000 transmission
gives us the opportunity

00:44:29.080 --> 00:44:32.670
to assess kind of
your specific conditions

00:44:32.670 --> 00:44:36.510
that are emerging based
on fuel or weather patterns

00:44:36.510 --> 00:44:39.580
that we would determine
the scope in Q2 of this year,

00:44:39.580 --> 00:44:41.803
and then launch later on in the year.

00:44:43.290 --> 00:44:45.990
And lastly, we're
implementing technology

00:44:45.990 --> 00:44:48.250
to help increase the effectiveness

00:44:48.250 --> 00:44:50.440
and efficiency of our inspections,

00:44:50.440 --> 00:44:54.440
including mobile tools, data management

00:44:54.440 --> 00:44:58.300
and storage technologies,
where we can store the images

00:44:58.300 --> 00:44:59.430
and all the data that we're capturing,

00:44:59.430 --> 00:45:00.710
be able to access it,

00:45:00.710 --> 00:45:05.123
ultimately to assess the
condition of our assets.

00:45:07.170 --> 00:45:08.570
We can go to the next slide.

00:45:10.680 --> 00:45:12.770
So a little bit more detail
about how we're using risk

00:45:12.770 --> 00:45:13.840
for our inspections.

00:45:13.840 --> 00:45:16.700
So the chart in the upper
right, this four by four,

00:45:16.700 --> 00:45:18.830
has probability of
ignition on the y-axis

00:45:18.830 --> 00:45:22.650
and consequence on the x-axis.

00:45:22.650 --> 00:45:24.430
And so what we've done
is we've placed kind of all

00:45:24.430 --> 00:45:28.140
of our high fire structures
in boxes in this chart,

00:45:28.140 --> 00:45:31.760
and you can see the
percentage of structures in there.

00:45:31.760 --> 00:45:35.190
And so all the ones that
are highlighted in red there

00:45:35.190 --> 00:45:37.580
are the structures that we are intending

00:45:37.580 --> 00:45:40.210
to inspect in 2021.

00:45:40.210 --> 00:45:42.570
So that represents the
highest probability of ignition

00:45:42.570 --> 00:45:44.870
and the highest consequence structures,

00:45:44.870 --> 00:45:46.820
therefore, the highest risk structures.

00:45:48.840 --> 00:45:50.940
This chart is particular
to distribution,

00:45:50.940 --> 00:45:52.440
but we have one similar to that

00:45:52.440 --> 00:45:53.890
that exists for transmission.

00:45:54.948 --> 00:45:55.781
As I mentioned on the previous slide,

00:45:55.781 --> 00:45:57.250
we're using other technologies

00:45:57.250 --> 00:45:59.340
to perform inspections as well.

00:45:59.340 --> 00:46:02.250
So for distribution, we're
using infrared scanning

00:46:02.250 --> 00:46:05.260
and we do 50% of our distribution,

00:46:05.260 --> 00:46:07.160
high fire structures per year.

00:46:07.160 --> 00:46:11.176
So we did 1/2 of them last
year or 1/2 of them in 2020,

00:46:11.176 --> 00:46:14.140
and then the other
1/2 will happen in 2021.

00:46:14.140 --> 00:46:18.130
And again, we organize them
by the highest risk districts

00:46:18.130 --> 00:46:20.060
in the first year and
the lower risk districts

00:46:20.060 --> 00:46:21.943
in the second year.

00:46:21.943 --> 00:46:23.560
And then on the transmission side,

00:46:23.560 --> 00:46:26.220
we use aerial outfitted with infrared

00:46:26.220 --> 00:46:30.450
and corona scanning to
scan our transmission lines.

00:46:30.450 --> 00:46:33.730
And we did a little over
1,000 miles in 2020.

00:46:33.730 --> 00:46:38.120
And again, our goal in 2021
is to inspect 1,000 miles.

00:46:38.120 --> 00:46:40.880
Again, that scope is prioritized based

00:46:40.880 --> 00:46:43.050
on operational constraints,

00:46:43.050 --> 00:46:45.463
as well as the highest
risk circuit miles.

00:46:47.160 --> 00:46:50.190
And then again, as I
mentioned on the previous slide,

00:46:50.190 --> 00:46:54.410
we have areas of concern,
which are areas that, you know,

00:46:54.410 --> 00:46:57.130
because of fire history
or weather conditions

00:46:57.130 --> 00:47:01.940
or fuel type, egress,
various other considerations

00:47:01.940 --> 00:47:04.332
that are beyond our wildfire risk model,

00:47:04.332 --> 00:47:07.980
we'll evaluate and assess and determine

00:47:07.980 --> 00:47:10.610
if we need to do those
inspections within the year.

00:47:10.610 --> 00:47:12.710
Because these are all
conditions that change

00:47:12.710 --> 00:47:14.090
over the course of years.

00:47:14.090 --> 00:47:15.920
And so assessing them within the year

00:47:15.920 --> 00:47:18.180
gives us the best information on

00:47:18.180 --> 00:47:20.530
to what extent we need
to do these inspections.

00:47:23.050 --> 00:47:24.500
Okay, move to the next slide.

00:47:25.890 --> 00:47:28.020
Moving on to our third topic,

00:47:28.020 --> 00:47:31.040
which is emerging technologies.

00:47:31.040 --> 00:47:34.813
So as part of our plan
to mitigate ignition risk,

00:47:36.300 --> 00:47:38.870
not only are we deploying many of the,

00:47:38.870 --> 00:47:43.500
kind of more commercially
available system hardening

00:47:43.500 --> 00:47:45.380
mitigations that you
saw in a previous slide,

00:47:45.380 --> 00:47:49.460
but we're also exploring
new technologies

00:47:49.460 --> 00:47:51.953
and their ability to mitigate this risk.

00:47:53.550 --> 00:47:56.990
Our approach to evaluating
and adopting these technologies

00:47:56.990 --> 00:48:01.040
is shown there on the slide
where we typically evaluate them

00:48:01.040 --> 00:48:05.010
through a desktop analysis and evaluate

00:48:05.010 --> 00:48:09.420
what the potential risks that
can be mitigated by them,

00:48:09.420 --> 00:48:13.040
what the costs are, what the
availability of technology is,

00:48:13.040 --> 00:48:14.620
what the challenges are.

00:48:14.620 --> 00:48:17.070
Then we pilot it out in the field,

00:48:17.070 --> 00:48:18.630
once that pilot is successful,

00:48:18.630 --> 00:48:20.980
and we feel comfortable
with the technology

00:48:20.980 --> 00:48:22.700
and being able to operationalize it,

00:48:22.700 --> 00:48:24.750
we'll move to a small
scaled appointment.

00:48:26.270 --> 00:48:29.660
And then after that,
scale it up and implement it

00:48:29.660 --> 00:48:31.383
as a programmatic application.

00:48:32.236 --> 00:48:35.498
So in 2021, we're evaluating
various new technologies.

00:48:35.498 --> 00:48:37.648
And you've highlighted
three examples here,

00:48:38.920 --> 00:48:41.830
just to give some examples
of what we're deploying.

00:48:41.830 --> 00:48:45.660
The first one here is the Rapid
Earth Fault Current Limiter,

00:48:45.660 --> 00:48:46.673
REFCL for short.

00:48:47.600 --> 00:48:50.963
We're implementing three
versions of this across our system.

00:48:51.970 --> 00:48:54.163
The first is a ground fault neutralizer.

00:48:55.530 --> 00:48:57.340
The second is arc suppression coil.

00:48:57.340 --> 00:48:59.300
And the third is isolation transformer.

00:48:59.300 --> 00:49:00.787
The first two, the
ground fault neutralizer

00:49:00.787 --> 00:49:04.720
and arc suppression coil are
installed within a substation.

00:49:04.720 --> 00:49:09.050
And so that allows us
to reduce the fault current

00:49:09.050 --> 00:49:12.610
that is delivered to an
event across all of the circuits

00:49:12.610 --> 00:49:14.380
in that substation.

00:49:14.380 --> 00:49:17.300
Significantly, we
expect that both of these,

00:49:17.300 --> 00:49:19.680
the ground fault neutralizer
and arc suppression coil

00:49:19.680 --> 00:49:23.180
reduce the fault current
to just a few amps,

00:49:23.180 --> 00:49:27.920
which really reduces the
risk of starting at ignition

00:49:27.920 --> 00:49:29.630
when there is an event.

00:49:29.630 --> 00:49:33.570
And the isolation transformer
has a similar effect,

00:49:33.570 --> 00:49:36.410
but this is installed outside
of the substation fence

00:49:36.410 --> 00:49:39.710
on a single distribution
circuit and allows you

00:49:39.710 --> 00:49:42.380
to kind of isolate a single circuit

00:49:42.380 --> 00:49:43.900
and provide the same type of protection

00:49:43.900 --> 00:49:46.223
where you're reducing
the fault current delivery.

00:49:47.080 --> 00:49:48.510
Our system is designed in such a way

00:49:48.510 --> 00:49:52.040
where we have customer
served phased to neutral,

00:49:52.040 --> 00:49:56.913
and because of the way that
these protection devices work,

00:49:58.400 --> 00:49:59.820
in some cases, they're not compatible

00:49:59.820 --> 00:50:03.670
with that phase to neutral
serving our customers.

00:50:03.670 --> 00:50:06.610
And so isolation transformer
allows us to find circuits

00:50:06.610 --> 00:50:08.280
that are more compatible with this type

00:50:08.280 --> 00:50:10.020
of protection scheme, without having

00:50:10.020 --> 00:50:11.860
to completely change
out how all the customers

00:50:11.860 --> 00:50:12.693
on that are served.

00:50:12.693 --> 00:50:15.340
So by having these three flavors

00:50:15.340 --> 00:50:18.180
of the Rapid Earth
Fault Current Limiter,

00:50:18.180 --> 00:50:20.250
we can deploy them
in different scenarios

00:50:20.250 --> 00:50:22.670
where the existing
configuration of the circuits

00:50:22.670 --> 00:50:27.510
or the substations is compatible,
thereby reducing costs.

00:50:27.510 --> 00:50:29.820
If we had to upgrade or
change out all the ways

00:50:29.820 --> 00:50:32.030
in which customers are
served to support these,

00:50:32.030 --> 00:50:33.560
we'd be talking about really high costs.

00:50:33.560 --> 00:50:38.560
So again, we're just piloting
these, we expect in 2021,

00:50:39.460 --> 00:50:42.037
to be able to operationalize
the ground fault neutralizer

00:50:42.037 --> 00:50:43.710
and the arc suppression coil,

00:50:43.710 --> 00:50:45.810
and actually at the end of
2020, we were able to get

00:50:45.810 --> 00:50:50.517
the isolation transformer
installed and operationalized.

00:50:52.160 --> 00:50:56.660
So we're looking forward to
seeing how these devices react

00:50:56.660 --> 00:50:58.440
and respond during
the pilots and their ability

00:50:58.440 --> 00:50:59.913
to reduce fault current.

00:51:01.040 --> 00:51:03.850
Second on here is the
distribution open phase detection.

00:51:03.850 --> 00:51:07.560
And so this is again, out in
the field, not in a substation,

00:51:07.560 --> 00:51:09.430
but out along a circuit.

00:51:09.430 --> 00:51:14.400
We installed two devices
that are within three miles

00:51:14.400 --> 00:51:19.400
of each other, or even
closer in many cases.

00:51:19.540 --> 00:51:22.430
And they have high-speed
communication between them.

00:51:22.430 --> 00:51:27.430
And what they can detect is if
a conductor becomes separated

00:51:28.240 --> 00:51:29.950
or becomes an open phase.

00:51:29.950 --> 00:51:33.390
And so when that happens,
they can de-energize the line

00:51:34.390 --> 00:51:36.070
so quickly that it can be energized

00:51:36.070 --> 00:51:38.680
before the conductor touches the ground.

00:51:38.680 --> 00:51:43.680
And so it's a really effective
way to protect against

00:51:44.930 --> 00:51:47.133
an ignition or potential ignition.

00:51:48.070 --> 00:51:50.637
So we've piloted several
of these out there in 2020,

00:51:50.637 --> 00:51:54.270
and we'll continue to monitor those

00:51:54.270 --> 00:51:59.123
and you'll see how
they perform in the field.

00:52:00.018 --> 00:52:03.067
And then the last technology
on here is our EFD,

00:52:05.930 --> 00:52:07.363
the early fault detection.

00:52:08.708 --> 00:52:11.258
This is devices that we
install again on the field,

00:52:13.310 --> 00:52:17.230
but they're not necessarily
detecting voltage and current

00:52:17.230 --> 00:52:19.500
as a traditional electrical device,

00:52:19.500 --> 00:52:22.390
they're detecting kind of
radio signals that are sent

00:52:22.390 --> 00:52:27.000
when there's some kind
of issue out on the field.

00:52:27.000 --> 00:52:29.580
So many times what they're detect are,

00:52:29.580 --> 00:52:33.460
you might have a
conductor that has strands

00:52:33.460 --> 00:52:36.250
that are maybe deteriorated,
and then it causes

00:52:36.250 --> 00:52:38.320
a little bit of arcing
and emits a signal.

00:52:38.320 --> 00:52:40.020
And so these early fall detections

00:52:42.020 --> 00:52:44.603
discern what we call incipient faults.

00:52:45.919 --> 00:52:47.080
They're existing out there in the field,

00:52:47.080 --> 00:52:49.840
allowing us to go dispatch
folks to that location

00:52:49.840 --> 00:52:53.403
and fix that before it becomes
a bigger issue or before it,

00:52:54.629 --> 00:52:56.830
you know, comes down or, you know,

00:52:56.830 --> 00:53:00.320
is damaged in a, by a foreign object

00:53:00.320 --> 00:53:02.940
or during a high wind event.

00:53:02.940 --> 00:53:05.060
So this is an exciting
technology as well.

00:53:05.060 --> 00:53:07.750
We've seen, you know,
about half a dozen events

00:53:09.810 --> 00:53:12.270
that the detection picked
up and we've deployed crews

00:53:12.270 --> 00:53:15.640
to the location, and
we found places where

00:53:15.640 --> 00:53:18.310
the conductor itself was
deteriorated and we've been able

00:53:18.310 --> 00:53:19.390
to proactively fix it.

00:53:19.390 --> 00:53:24.390
So again, you know, this
is a technology that we think

00:53:24.690 --> 00:53:27.530
can a lot of benefits,
but still testing it out

00:53:27.530 --> 00:53:30.310
to make sure that
there's not false positives

00:53:30.310 --> 00:53:34.410
and that it can detect kind
of all the different events

00:53:34.410 --> 00:53:35.360
that are out there.

00:53:36.270 --> 00:53:38.590
I think the last slide is
more details on these three

00:53:38.590 --> 00:53:40.490
that I'll dive into, so let me get on.

00:53:42.520 --> 00:53:45.010
Yeah, again, maybe I'll
just summarize them here.

00:53:45.010 --> 00:53:48.010
Rapid Earth Fault Current
Limiter really reduces

00:53:48.010 --> 00:53:49.730
the amount of energy
that's delivered to a fault,

00:53:49.730 --> 00:53:52.240
thereby reducing the risk of ignition.

00:53:52.240 --> 00:53:57.240
Being able to interrupt the
fault before a fire can start.

00:53:57.250 --> 00:53:59.470
The distribution open
phase detection is sensing

00:53:59.470 --> 00:54:01.820
for when that conductor
kinda breaks apart

00:54:01.820 --> 00:54:05.060
and de-energizes in the
time it takes to hit the ground,

00:54:05.060 --> 00:54:06.540
thereby reducing that risk.

00:54:06.540 --> 00:54:09.990
And the early fault detection
is looking for not events,

00:54:12.010 --> 00:54:13.730
but scenarios on the system

00:54:13.730 --> 00:54:15.650
where you have something deteriorated.

00:54:15.650 --> 00:54:17.030
And because it's deteriorated,

00:54:17.030 --> 00:54:19.050
it's giving off some kind
of radio signal allows us

00:54:19.050 --> 00:54:22.300
to proactively dispatch
folks to the field

00:54:22.300 --> 00:54:24.140
to resolve that issue and make sure

00:54:24.140 --> 00:54:26.413
that doesn't get them a
bigger issue in the future.

00:54:28.080 --> 00:54:32.700
So with that, I think I
hit my time and be happy

00:54:32.700 --> 00:54:35.683
to accept any questions
when we get to the Q&amp;A portion.

00:54:39.840 --> 00:54:41.950
<v ->Thank you so much Russell.</v>

00:54:41.950 --> 00:54:44.950
And then we'll move
into our final presentation

00:54:44.950 --> 00:54:48.763
from SDG&amp;E, looks like
it's getting pulled up now.

00:54:54.600 --> 00:54:56.073
<v ->Okay, thanks Andie.</v>

00:54:57.990 --> 00:54:59.630
<v ->There you go.</v>

00:54:59.630 --> 00:55:02.357
<v ->All right, hi everyone,
I'm Tyson Swetek,</v>

00:55:02.357 --> 00:55:04.640
the director of electric
distribution operations

00:55:04.640 --> 00:55:07.750
for SDG&amp;E, and today
I'll be covering grid design

00:55:07.750 --> 00:55:09.950
and system hardening, and particularly

00:55:09.950 --> 00:55:12.216
the goals around hardening
and how we prioritize

00:55:12.216 --> 00:55:15.393
our hardening mitigations
based on our risk modeling.

00:55:16.370 --> 00:55:18.790
Today, I'm going to walk
us through some of the data

00:55:18.790 --> 00:55:21.980
that informs our risk models,
and then Jonathan Woldemariam,

00:55:21.980 --> 00:55:24.880
our director of wildfire
mitigation is going to get

00:55:24.880 --> 00:55:26.150
into our actual grid hardening

00:55:26.150 --> 00:55:28.103
and inspection mitigation programs.

00:55:29.500 --> 00:55:30.400
Next slide please.

00:55:33.857 --> 00:55:37.010
So this is a system level
view of how our risk event

00:55:37.010 --> 00:55:41.300
and ignition data, consequence
data and overhead exposure

00:55:42.250 --> 00:55:43.823
all look at the high level.

00:55:44.760 --> 00:55:46.650
As you can see, a risk event that occurs

00:55:46.650 --> 00:55:49.240
in the HFTD is twice as likely to result

00:55:49.240 --> 00:55:51.770
in an emission based
on our five-year average.

00:55:51.770 --> 00:55:53.980
And it was actually four
times more likely to result

00:55:53.980 --> 00:55:55.653
in admission in 2020.

00:55:56.740 --> 00:55:58.050
On the consequence side,

00:55:58.050 --> 00:56:00.620
SDG&amp;E's Technosylva
fire spread model showed

00:56:00.620 --> 00:56:03.150
the vast majority of
impacts from wildfire

00:56:03.150 --> 00:56:06.893
is located with it inside
the HFTD versus outside.

00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:10.050
So even though we're
reporting risk events

00:56:10.050 --> 00:56:13.460
at the system level, you
know, in WMP table seven,

00:56:13.460 --> 00:56:16.350
so that we can learn from
every event on the system,

00:56:16.350 --> 00:56:19.330
the work we are doing is
really about reducing risk events

00:56:19.330 --> 00:56:21.900
and ignition percentage within the HFTD,

00:56:21.900 --> 00:56:23.993
as that's how we
maximize risk reduction.

00:56:25.360 --> 00:56:28.160
The rest of the slide shows
that we did reduce risk events

00:56:28.160 --> 00:56:30.790
in the HTFD in 2020, however,

00:56:30.790 --> 00:56:34.990
ignition percentage
actually rose in 2020,

00:56:34.990 --> 00:56:37.700
we believe due to being
an extreme weather year

00:56:37.700 --> 00:56:40.143
in terms of FPI and red flags.

00:56:41.280 --> 00:56:43.970
We're currently 25% hardening the HFTD,

00:56:43.970 --> 00:56:46.190
and as that percentage
continues to rise,

00:56:46.190 --> 00:56:49.182
we expect risk events
to continue to trend down.

00:56:49.182 --> 00:56:51.480
With the ignitions following again,

00:56:51.480 --> 00:56:54.550
depending on weather adjustments.

00:56:54.550 --> 00:56:55.513
Next slide, please.

00:57:00.550 --> 00:57:03.110
So, this slide drills down even more

00:57:03.110 --> 00:57:05.110
to show the risk drivers within the HFTD

00:57:06.061 --> 00:57:08.010
with the highest average emission totals

00:57:08.010 --> 00:57:09.363
and associated risk events.

00:57:10.570 --> 00:57:13.930
SDG&amp;E has mitigation programs
that target every single one

00:57:13.930 --> 00:57:15.360
of these drivers.

00:57:15.360 --> 00:57:17.130
Parting programs like undergrounding

00:57:17.130 --> 00:57:19.640
and cover conductor
mitigate every single driver

00:57:19.640 --> 00:57:21.640
on this list, while mitigation such

00:57:21.640 --> 00:57:23.150
as our hand stretch management program

00:57:23.150 --> 00:57:26.240
that we discussed
yesterday are very specific

00:57:26.240 --> 00:57:30.073
to targeting vegetation related
risk events within the HFTD.

00:57:31.100 --> 00:57:33.010
There are some nuances
here like lightning arrester

00:57:33.010 --> 00:57:35.860
for example, they're
a little bit different.

00:57:35.860 --> 00:57:37.940
We have a program to
replace lightening arresters

00:57:37.940 --> 00:57:40.360
with a more fire safe version.

00:57:40.360 --> 00:57:42.780
These arresters won't reduce
the number of risk events

00:57:42.780 --> 00:57:45.850
on the system as lightning arresters

00:57:45.850 --> 00:57:47.300
are there to prevent over-voltage.

00:57:47.300 --> 00:57:50.160
And will fail as designed to protect

00:57:50.160 --> 00:57:51.623
the system from over-voltage.

00:57:52.460 --> 00:57:55.760
But these are designed to
fail in a way that's less violent,

00:57:55.760 --> 00:57:57.370
less prone to ignitions.

00:57:57.370 --> 00:57:58.260
So with lightning arresters,

00:57:58.260 --> 00:58:00.743
we're expecting to
reduce ignition percentage.

00:58:02.640 --> 00:58:05.140
Finally, while it's good to understand

00:58:05.140 --> 00:58:08.560
the individual risk drivers,
SDG&amp;E's hardening goals

00:58:08.560 --> 00:58:12.950
are really around reducing
risk events in general,

00:58:12.950 --> 00:58:14.850
for example, just
because animal contacts

00:58:14.850 --> 00:58:18.660
only has like a 1.87%
ignition rate, you know,

00:58:18.660 --> 00:58:21.850
we're not exactly sure
that there are less risky

00:58:21.850 --> 00:58:24.530
than vegetation contacts
because of the problems

00:58:24.530 --> 00:58:26.900
we have in small sample sizes.

00:58:26.900 --> 00:58:29.913
Every risk event has the
opportunity to lead to ignition.

00:58:31.130 --> 00:58:35.440
And it really depends on
the location and the weather

00:58:35.440 --> 00:58:36.830
at the time that it happens.

00:58:36.830 --> 00:58:40.150
And at this level, we
should expect high variance

00:58:40.150 --> 00:58:42.570
due to the small sample sizes.

00:58:42.570 --> 00:58:44.540
That said it is important
to know the drivers

00:58:44.540 --> 00:58:47.510
that are causing risk events
and ignitions on the system.

00:58:47.510 --> 00:58:49.570
So that we know we have mitigations

00:58:49.570 --> 00:58:51.570
that are targeting the specific drivers.

00:58:52.970 --> 00:58:53.920
Next slide, please.

00:58:57.326 --> 00:58:58.990
So in this slide, we
wanted to talk about some

00:58:58.990 --> 00:59:00.610
of the studies we performed this year

00:59:00.610 --> 00:59:04.250
that either measure or
model the risk produced,

00:59:04.250 --> 00:59:06.760
which then went on to
inform our RSE calculations

00:59:06.760 --> 00:59:09.800
and our risk reduction models that Mason

00:59:09.800 --> 00:59:11.300
and Sarah discussed yesterday.

00:59:12.610 --> 00:59:14.250
Today, I wanted to highlight

00:59:14.250 --> 00:59:16.130
our bare conductor hardening studies

00:59:16.130 --> 00:59:17.830
for transmission and distribution.

00:59:18.720 --> 00:59:21.150
For transmission, we
did see an 83% reduction

00:59:21.150 --> 00:59:24.490
in risk events going from
about six faults per year,

00:59:24.490 --> 00:59:27.210
per 100 circuit miles
to one after hardening.

00:59:27.210 --> 00:59:30.950
And for distribution,
we saw a 47% reduction

00:59:30.950 --> 00:59:33.430
going from around
12 faults to six faults

00:59:33.430 --> 00:59:35.423
per 100 circuit miles per year.

00:59:36.630 --> 00:59:37.910
When we looked at the system level,

00:59:37.910 --> 00:59:41.460
it's a little hard to tell how
effective the mitigations are

00:59:41.460 --> 00:59:44.110
because it's mixed with all
the unhardened infrastructure.

00:59:44.110 --> 00:59:46.130
But when we zoom in
on the completed work,

00:59:46.130 --> 00:59:48.723
we did see significant
reductions in risk events.

00:59:49.680 --> 00:59:52.470
To perform this study, we
looked at over 200 miles

00:59:52.470 --> 00:59:56.700
of complete distribution hardening jobs,

00:59:56.700 --> 00:59:59.120
where we had the completed poll numbers

00:59:59.120 --> 01:00:00.170
and completion dates.

01:00:01.120 --> 01:00:04.700
Utilizing the poll
number to relate datasets,

01:00:04.700 --> 01:00:06.560
we were able to look
at our risk event data

01:00:06.560 --> 01:00:09.460
from 2000 to 2019.

01:00:09.460 --> 01:00:12.270
Look at risk events that
happened to those structures

01:00:12.270 --> 01:00:16.010
before risk events that
happened to those structures after.

01:00:16.010 --> 01:00:18.610
And then we were able to
normalize by operating years

01:00:18.610 --> 01:00:21.033
and mileage to get the final results.

01:00:23.030 --> 01:00:23.993
Next slide please.

01:00:28.510 --> 01:00:33.200
So this slide shows our top
10 RSEs across all mitigations

01:00:33.200 --> 01:00:35.440
and the rankings of RSEs among

01:00:35.440 --> 01:00:37.433
our three primary system hardening.

01:00:39.780 --> 01:00:42.790
The two, the top two are controls.

01:00:42.790 --> 01:00:45.010
So we're not like
mitigating any additional risk

01:00:45.010 --> 01:00:47.450
by doing them, but we
believe they are saving us

01:00:47.450 --> 01:00:49.610
many ignitions per
year for variable costs,

01:00:49.610 --> 01:00:51.650
which is why they're at the top.

01:00:51.650 --> 01:00:53.740
The third mitigation is
kind of a key takeaway,

01:00:53.740 --> 01:00:56.030
it's something new in
our original WMP filing,

01:00:56.030 --> 01:00:59.370
we said that this mitigation
had an RSE of zero

01:00:59.370 --> 01:01:01.470
because it didn't
mitigate wildfire risks.

01:01:02.390 --> 01:01:05.640
With the wings model,
quantifying PSPS impacts,

01:01:05.640 --> 01:01:07.980
we can now quantify
and compare the benefits

01:01:07.980 --> 01:01:10.790
of PSPS specific mitigations

01:01:10.790 --> 01:01:13.000
and sectionalizing can be very good.

01:01:13.000 --> 01:01:15.550
A well-placed switch that
isolates underground customers

01:01:15.550 --> 01:01:17.390
from overhead customers can save impacts

01:01:17.390 --> 01:01:21.763
to hundreds of customers from
PSPS for relatively low costs.

01:01:23.660 --> 01:01:26.410
It is interesting to see
the equipment mitigations

01:01:26.410 --> 01:01:29.000
rose to the top, but it does make sense.

01:01:29.000 --> 01:01:31.830
Something like capacitors
causes an ignition

01:01:31.830 --> 01:01:34.690
just once every five
years within the HFTD,

01:01:34.690 --> 01:01:37.860
but because we only have
100 capacitors to target,

01:01:37.860 --> 01:01:39.770
we can mitigate, you
know, every one of them

01:01:39.770 --> 01:01:44.270
to reduce the risk down to,
you know, once every 25 years

01:01:44.270 --> 01:01:45.370
based on the effectiveness,

01:01:45.370 --> 01:01:47.550
we believe we'll get to mitigation.

01:01:47.550 --> 01:01:50.060
So it doesn't lose
a lot of risks overall,

01:01:50.060 --> 01:01:52.423
but it's very efficient.

01:01:54.010 --> 01:01:57.700
As you can see, the hardening
mitigations do show up lower,

01:01:57.700 --> 01:02:00.130
but they are critical to complete

01:02:00.130 --> 01:02:02.840
because the hardening
mitigations are the only mitigations

01:02:02.840 --> 01:02:05.150
that address kind of
our top risk drivers,

01:02:05.150 --> 01:02:07.950
the drivers that are
causing the majority

01:02:07.950 --> 01:02:09.950
of our risk events and ignitions.

01:02:09.950 --> 01:02:11.950
These are all the foreign object in line

01:02:11.950 --> 01:02:15.123
and equipment failures such
as wires and wire bounds.

01:02:18.370 --> 01:02:19.293
Next slide please.

01:02:21.680 --> 01:02:24.160
So, I'll go through these
next two slides quickly

01:02:24.160 --> 01:02:26.210
because they were covered
in yesterday's presentation,

01:02:26.210 --> 01:02:29.150
but they represent how we
prioritized our previous work

01:02:29.150 --> 01:02:30.570
and how we're gonna prioritize

01:02:30.570 --> 01:02:32.220
our hardening work in the future.

01:02:33.160 --> 01:02:35.640
All of our previous bare
conductor hardening projects

01:02:35.640 --> 01:02:39.230
have been prioritized, leveraging
SDG&amp;E's WRRM model,

01:02:39.230 --> 01:02:41.963
you know, an output
visually that you can see here.

01:02:43.110 --> 01:02:45.930
This strategy you're replacing
the highest risk assets

01:02:45.930 --> 01:02:49.850
led to lots of like 10 to 40
structure hardening projects

01:02:49.850 --> 01:02:54.020
across the HFTD, but it was
like to be asset risk based

01:02:54.020 --> 01:02:56.843
and not tied to the way we
operate our record system.

01:02:57.900 --> 01:03:00.060
The updated model, which
leverages the same data

01:03:00.060 --> 01:03:03.063
as the WRRM model, we
go to the next slide, please,

01:03:08.560 --> 01:03:11.050
reflects how we operate the system.

01:03:11.050 --> 01:03:13.110
So it's gonna prioritize
hardening in a way

01:03:13.110 --> 01:03:17.487
that all the way to the segment
level, which is, you know,

01:03:17.487 --> 01:03:20.610
the switches that we actually
operate in PSPS events,

01:03:20.610 --> 01:03:23.750
which is going to allow us
to realize both grid hardening

01:03:23.750 --> 01:03:25.510
or both wildfire risk reduction benefits

01:03:25.510 --> 01:03:27.780
along with the PSPS benefits.

01:03:27.780 --> 01:03:30.710
And as Jonathan goes through his updates

01:03:30.710 --> 01:03:33.160
on the hardening projects,
we're gonna see the shift

01:03:33.160 --> 01:03:36.930
in strategy going
forward as we shift away

01:03:36.930 --> 01:03:40.370
from some barbaric
conductor hardening programs

01:03:40.370 --> 01:03:43.010
and more towards cover
conductor and undergrounding

01:03:43.010 --> 01:03:44.910
because they provide the dual benefit

01:03:44.910 --> 01:03:48.833
of risk reduction along with
PSPS mitigation, next slide.

01:03:54.220 --> 01:03:55.670
<v ->Thank you Tyson.</v>

01:03:55.670 --> 01:03:56.997
So my name is Jonathan Woldemariam

01:03:56.997 --> 01:03:59.260
and I'm the wildfire mitigation

01:03:59.260 --> 01:04:01.613
and vegetation management
director with SDG&amp;E.

01:04:02.890 --> 01:04:05.480
I'm gonna continue
from where Tyson left off

01:04:05.480 --> 01:04:09.420
with the information
that allows us to rank

01:04:09.420 --> 01:04:14.420
and assess as well as
prioritize our hardening

01:04:15.230 --> 01:04:16.820
as well as designs.

01:04:16.820 --> 01:04:21.500
And it's important to note
that in SDG&amp;E service territory,

01:04:21.500 --> 01:04:25.823
64% of our service territory
area is within the HFTD.

01:04:27.340 --> 01:04:30.830
And that means that we not
only leverage the risk ranking

01:04:30.830 --> 01:04:35.260
and the RSE scores that
Tyson shared with you,

01:04:35.260 --> 01:04:39.150
but also leverage our
extensive weather data

01:04:39.150 --> 01:04:43.550
and fire science expertise that
we have internally developed

01:04:43.550 --> 01:04:47.780
over the years, including
the mapping of our areas,

01:04:47.780 --> 01:04:49.560
highlighting the highest wind areas

01:04:50.549 --> 01:04:54.560
so that we understand
how to design in particular,

01:04:54.560 --> 01:04:55.878
abnormal local conditions.

01:04:55.878 --> 01:04:58.100
And that was an important
early step that we took

01:04:58.100 --> 01:05:01.723
in order to design programs
that were more effective.

01:05:02.720 --> 01:05:07.230
An additional tool that, or
tactic that we use in highlights

01:05:07.230 --> 01:05:11.673
are efforts is that we
use LiDAR and PLS data

01:05:11.673 --> 01:05:15.280
that was mentioned by
Virginia and Addison as well

01:05:15.280 --> 01:05:20.200
in our design tools, so we
can then also be more effective

01:05:20.200 --> 01:05:23.140
in understanding a more
comprehensive program

01:05:23.140 --> 01:05:26.250
rather than kind of an
asset by asset approach.

01:05:26.250 --> 01:05:30.510
And then finally, the
post-construction QA QC checks,

01:05:30.510 --> 01:05:34.210
so quality assurance that we
have to do post-construction

01:05:34.210 --> 01:05:36.620
using LiDAR and using other tools

01:05:36.620 --> 01:05:38.730
is also been very effective to make sure

01:05:38.730 --> 01:05:41.920
that our construction
meets the design standards

01:05:41.920 --> 01:05:44.190
and addresses the high wind speeds

01:05:44.190 --> 01:05:47.900
that we're trying to mitigate
against in our hardening.

01:05:47.900 --> 01:05:49.470
So with this first slide here,

01:05:49.470 --> 01:05:52.947
we have those various
programs that have been in place

01:05:52.947 --> 01:05:56.070
for many years in SDG&amp;E, the FiRM,

01:05:56.070 --> 01:06:01.070
the fire risk management
program, and the PRiME program,

01:06:02.780 --> 01:06:05.150
which is mostly focused on pole loading.

01:06:05.150 --> 01:06:08.050
And then our Cleveland
National Forest focused hardening,

01:06:08.050 --> 01:06:10.926
which went in and
looked at our transmission

01:06:10.926 --> 01:06:15.135
and distribution lines and is
going to be almost completed.

01:06:15.135 --> 01:06:17.000
It was almost completed
in turn turning in

01:06:17.000 --> 01:06:18.610
for some additional
work that we're gonna do

01:06:18.610 --> 01:06:21.643
in 2021 first quarter to complete that.

01:06:21.643 --> 01:06:25.220
And that really helped us to harden one

01:06:25.220 --> 01:06:26.830
of our highest risk areas

01:06:26.830 --> 01:06:29.620
within the Cleveland
National Forest in San Diego.

01:06:29.620 --> 01:06:31.950
And so this was a
really important project.

01:06:31.950 --> 01:06:36.110
In fact, we have taken
other from the service,

01:06:36.110 --> 01:06:38.150
any transmission line that goes directly

01:06:38.150 --> 01:06:40.170
through the middle of the
Cleveland National Forest

01:06:40.170 --> 01:06:42.547
as a result of this project.

01:06:42.547 --> 01:06:44.810
And then finally our
transmission hardening effort

01:06:44.810 --> 01:06:48.740
has been in place since the 2007 fires,

01:06:48.740 --> 01:06:52.650
which has led to us being
able to be more surgical

01:06:52.650 --> 01:06:57.630
with our PSPS events and
not take out as many customers

01:06:57.630 --> 01:07:02.110
with over 400 miles of
hardening of transmission.

01:07:02.110 --> 01:07:03.600
So those were some key steps.

01:07:03.600 --> 01:07:08.410
So in 2020, we achieved
over 220 miles of hardening.

01:07:08.410 --> 01:07:09.990
We'll continue to use the bare conductor

01:07:09.990 --> 01:07:13.940
of the traditional cover,
traditional hardening approach

01:07:13.940 --> 01:07:16.380
for 2021 and 2022.

01:07:16.380 --> 01:07:20.680
Beyond 2022, we're
going to shift our hardening

01:07:20.680 --> 01:07:23.977
from the bare conductor to
modern covered conductor

01:07:23.977 --> 01:07:27.630
and undergrounding, as
we'll see in the coming slides.

01:07:27.630 --> 01:07:30.303
So go to our next slide now, please.

01:07:31.137 --> 01:07:34.450
And I'd like to highlight
additional things

01:07:34.450 --> 01:07:38.770
that were part of our
program inspections, of course,

01:07:38.770 --> 01:07:40.720
that we do for compliance

01:07:40.720 --> 01:07:44.030
and our regular maintenance
programs that we do

01:07:44.030 --> 01:07:47.020
as well as some special focus programs

01:07:47.020 --> 01:07:51.310
that we have for inspections
in the high fire district.

01:07:51.310 --> 01:07:53.510
So for example, annual patrols

01:07:53.510 --> 01:07:57.937
of over 86,000 poles each year.

01:07:57.937 --> 01:08:01.903
And we have a five-year
cycle for detailed inspections

01:08:01.903 --> 01:08:05.900
that we conduct for over
17,000 poles each year.

01:08:05.900 --> 01:08:09.550
And then we have the
HFTD specific inspections

01:08:09.550 --> 01:08:14.550
that we conduct every
year or the three-year cycle,

01:08:14.590 --> 01:08:19.260
and we do close to
12,000 poles each year.

01:08:19.260 --> 01:08:22.000
And this will continue into 2021.

01:08:22.000 --> 01:08:24.630
We also have a wood poles
and choose inspection program

01:08:24.630 --> 01:08:28.690
that does over 14,000 poles last year.

01:08:28.690 --> 01:08:30.840
And we will continue that.

01:08:30.840 --> 01:08:33.930
Here, we're just highlighting
two of our newest programs

01:08:33.930 --> 01:08:35.423
that we added in 2020,

01:08:36.480 --> 01:08:40.520
one is the drone investigation
assessment repairs,

01:08:40.520 --> 01:08:42.480
which is the drone inspections program

01:08:42.480 --> 01:08:45.060
over our tier three distribution system

01:08:45.060 --> 01:08:48.350
where we inspected over 37,000 poles.

01:08:48.350 --> 01:08:51.180
And what we did there was we took in

01:08:51.180 --> 01:08:54.560
more detailed photos using drones.

01:08:54.560 --> 01:08:59.020
And sometimes it led to
over 40 pictures per pole,

01:08:59.020 --> 01:09:00.640
where these photos were then taken

01:09:00.640 --> 01:09:03.960
and reviewed by qualified
workers and assessed

01:09:03.960 --> 01:09:07.483
to identify any management
issues and follow-up.

01:09:08.690 --> 01:09:11.230
That would have been
a very effective program,

01:09:11.230 --> 01:09:15.553
and we will continue
that in 2021 and 2022

01:09:15.553 --> 01:09:18.563
to also inspect all of the tier
two within those two years.

01:09:19.890 --> 01:09:21.590
The distribution infrared inspection

01:09:21.590 --> 01:09:23.230
is also in the program.

01:09:23.230 --> 01:09:27.790
We've always conducted
transmission infrared inspections,

01:09:27.790 --> 01:09:31.090
but now this distribution
focused on private inspection

01:09:31.090 --> 01:09:35.350
that began last year
will continue into tier two.

01:09:35.350 --> 01:09:39.940
We did about 17,000 poles in tier three.

01:09:39.940 --> 01:09:43.970
Now we're going to move to
tier two and see what differences

01:09:43.970 --> 01:09:48.480
we can identify and
what benefits or things

01:09:48.480 --> 01:09:51.460
that we might learn different
from the tier two inspections.

01:09:51.460 --> 01:09:54.380
And so those are things
that I wanted to highlight

01:09:54.380 --> 01:09:58.020
as some new tools and
technology that we're using.

01:09:58.020 --> 01:10:01.050
One more thing I'd like to express about

01:10:01.050 --> 01:10:02.230
the drone inspections is that

01:10:02.230 --> 01:10:03.840
we're leveraging machine learning

01:10:03.840 --> 01:10:08.400
in order to use it to identify
or assess the photos,

01:10:08.400 --> 01:10:11.270
instead of having a person, you know,

01:10:11.270 --> 01:10:13.690
go through thousands of photos,

01:10:13.690 --> 01:10:18.690
sometimes millions of images
than having a machine learning

01:10:18.820 --> 01:10:21.240
and being able to identify
more quickly will lead

01:10:21.240 --> 01:10:23.527
to faster remediation as well.

01:10:23.527 --> 01:10:27.050
So that's how we're
highlighting the use of AI

01:10:27.050 --> 01:10:28.220
or machine learning as well.

01:10:28.220 --> 01:10:31.027
So our next slide, we'll talk about some

01:10:31.027 --> 01:10:34.050
of the asset based specific programs

01:10:34.050 --> 01:10:37.030
of hardening that have expulsion fuses.

01:10:37.030 --> 01:10:40.290
We've conducted replacements for those

01:10:40.290 --> 01:10:43.823
for several years now, we
expect to complete that in 2022.

01:10:45.220 --> 01:10:46.520
Hotline clamp replacements,

01:10:46.520 --> 01:10:49.154
these are connectors
that have been a problem

01:10:49.154 --> 01:10:52.060
for us in the past where the connectors

01:10:52.060 --> 01:10:55.730
to put wires together have failed

01:10:55.730 --> 01:10:58.040
in the past ignitions.

01:10:58.040 --> 01:11:01.400
So we've addressed
quite a bit over the years,

01:11:01.400 --> 01:11:03.513
but we continue with this program.

01:11:06.293 --> 01:11:07.500
And then SCADA capacitors,

01:11:07.500 --> 01:11:11.470
Tyson mentioned,
those were fewer events,

01:11:11.470 --> 01:11:13.010
but they were high risk.

01:11:13.010 --> 01:11:16.560
So what we're doing by
going to more remote controlled

01:11:16.560 --> 01:11:20.670
and state controlled capacitors
in the HFTD is being able

01:11:20.670 --> 01:11:23.840
to learn earlier for any
issues that may come up,

01:11:23.840 --> 01:11:26.710
but also safer operations
for our importance

01:11:26.710 --> 01:11:29.080
and then less ignitions as it results

01:11:29.080 --> 01:11:31.157
to better monitoring
and better equipment

01:11:31.157 --> 01:11:32.910
in the system.

01:11:32.910 --> 01:11:34.340
Lightening arresters is something new

01:11:34.340 --> 01:11:36.730
that we're going to start this year.

01:11:36.730 --> 01:11:39.166
And this is a result of our risk ranking

01:11:39.166 --> 01:11:41.310
and recognizing the lightening arresters

01:11:41.310 --> 01:11:42.870
could be up in this.

01:11:42.870 --> 01:11:46.890
And so we're going to do a lot this year

01:11:46.890 --> 01:11:48.980
over 900 and then continue that program

01:11:48.980 --> 01:11:50.920
until we resolve it.

01:11:50.920 --> 01:11:54.170
Now, something to keep
in mind with these assets

01:11:54.170 --> 01:11:57.070
is these are highlights of some

01:11:57.070 --> 01:11:59.550
of the assets specific
programs that we have,

01:11:59.550 --> 01:12:04.550
but then we also have
technologies that we are utilizing

01:12:04.560 --> 01:12:06.970
like volume conductive
production, right?

01:12:06.970 --> 01:12:11.430
And enhancing our
communications platform

01:12:11.430 --> 01:12:13.240
to enable high-speed communications,

01:12:13.240 --> 01:12:15.330
as well as the early fault detection

01:12:15.330 --> 01:12:17.400
that Tyson shared with you.

01:12:17.400 --> 01:12:20.910
We're also pursuing these
high technology solutions

01:12:20.910 --> 01:12:23.250
along with the equipment
that we're installing

01:12:23.250 --> 01:12:26.600
and making sure that we're
staying top on the technology

01:12:26.600 --> 01:12:30.290
to advance safety,
wildfire safety in particular.

01:12:30.290 --> 01:12:32.470
So with all of this,

01:12:32.470 --> 01:12:35.750
to say that we're evolving
into the technology

01:12:35.750 --> 01:12:38.570
with the technology,
as well as our approach

01:12:38.570 --> 01:12:40.090
as different risks we've had.

01:12:40.090 --> 01:12:43.260
And then one final thing I
want to mention regarding assets

01:12:43.260 --> 01:12:45.860
in the program is that
we're not just addressing

01:12:45.860 --> 01:12:49.860
these assets as part of
these specific programs,

01:12:49.860 --> 01:12:52.093
but also in the comprehensive
over at hardening

01:12:52.093 --> 01:12:54.540
that we talked about
in the earlier slide,

01:12:54.540 --> 01:12:55.960
the divisional hardening, and as well

01:12:55.960 --> 01:12:56.840
as the covered conductor
and undergrounding

01:12:56.840 --> 01:12:59.603
that we have the next few slides.

01:13:00.470 --> 01:13:01.440
But here in the next slide,

01:13:01.440 --> 01:13:04.673
we'll talk about the covered
conductor, next slide, please.

01:13:07.500 --> 01:13:10.290
And so our shift from
the bare conductor,

01:13:10.290 --> 01:13:12.730
which we also refer to
as traditional hardening

01:13:12.730 --> 01:13:16.210
over to the cover
conductor started in 2020

01:13:16.210 --> 01:13:19.357
with only about two miles
worth of cover conductor.

01:13:19.357 --> 01:13:23.110
And we took a slower approach
because we were learning

01:13:23.110 --> 01:13:25.220
how the work methods and the standards

01:13:25.220 --> 01:13:27.540
that we wanted to apply and the tools

01:13:27.540 --> 01:13:29.190
that we needed for our field employees

01:13:29.190 --> 01:13:31.920
to make sure we got the job done right.

01:13:31.920 --> 01:13:34.990
And so in 2021 and
2022, we're gonna leverage

01:13:34.990 --> 01:13:36.640
the learnings from 2020

01:13:36.640 --> 01:13:40.430
and ask if we should
a covered conductor.

01:13:40.430 --> 01:13:43.830
The covered conductor
helps to reduce risks

01:13:43.830 --> 01:13:48.830
and really with the benefits
for covered conductor,

01:13:49.050 --> 01:13:54.050
avoiding animal contact,
definitely will help with that.

01:13:54.490 --> 01:13:56.850
And then we're going to
learn more as we deployed

01:13:56.850 --> 01:13:59.543
more of the covered
conductor in future years.

01:14:00.679 --> 01:14:01.980
In our next slide, we'll talk about

01:14:01.980 --> 01:14:04.850
the undergrounding
strategy that we have.

01:14:04.850 --> 01:14:08.460
And a strategy for
undergrounding here really tries

01:14:08.460 --> 01:14:09.920
to address two risks, right?

01:14:09.920 --> 01:14:12.526
The wildfire risk which
involves wildfire risk

01:14:12.526 --> 01:14:13.730
through our hardening program.

01:14:13.730 --> 01:14:16.530
But also the PSPS events risk.

01:14:16.530 --> 01:14:20.560
What we're trying to do to see
if we can reduce the number

01:14:20.560 --> 01:14:25.375
of events impacts from the
events by undergrounding,

01:14:25.375 --> 01:14:30.210
strategic areas that
are highest exposure.

01:14:30.210 --> 01:14:34.500
So with this year in
2021, we're going to focus

01:14:34.500 --> 01:14:37.340
on Alpine Boulevard,
Cameron and Descanso.

01:14:37.340 --> 01:14:38.890
These part areas are areas

01:14:38.890 --> 01:14:40.740
where we're scoping
out some undergrounding.

01:14:40.740 --> 01:14:44.160
We completed 30 miles
of the highest completion

01:14:44.160 --> 01:14:46.230
of undergrounding in the HFTD,

01:14:46.230 --> 01:14:48.000
specifically for wildfire mitigation

01:14:48.000 --> 01:14:50.460
that will be all from previous years.

01:14:50.460 --> 01:14:54.370
And then we're gonna
continue in 2021 and 2022

01:14:54.370 --> 01:14:56.366
to grow the program even more.

01:14:56.366 --> 01:14:59.930
And then beyond 2022,
we'll scale up as well.

01:14:59.930 --> 01:15:02.220
One of the things that we're doing,

01:15:02.220 --> 01:15:05.550
and we have learned
in the first year in 2020,

01:15:05.550 --> 01:15:09.360
is that the workings with the counties,

01:15:09.360 --> 01:15:13.280
the other jurisdictions that
are within HFTD the area

01:15:13.280 --> 01:15:16.150
to make sure that we
work out some processes

01:15:16.150 --> 01:15:18.220
to increase our productivity

01:15:18.220 --> 01:15:21.470
in undergrounding and
make processes faster.

01:15:21.470 --> 01:15:24.470
But we're also looking at the
easements that are needed,

01:15:24.470 --> 01:15:28.220
right, when you can't really
follow them overhead lines

01:15:29.147 --> 01:15:30.760
to route to the undergrounding.

01:15:30.760 --> 01:15:32.330
So most of the underground

01:15:32.330 --> 01:15:33.910
will probably go to roads.

01:15:33.910 --> 01:15:35.740
And so the routing and the easements

01:15:35.740 --> 01:15:37.840
that you have to acquire takes longer.

01:15:37.840 --> 01:15:42.620
So finding a hat and
putting that in place earlier

01:15:42.620 --> 01:15:46.380
than you would with the
public inspection and planning.

01:15:46.380 --> 01:15:48.430
So with that, let's
go to the next slide.

01:15:49.971 --> 01:15:53.880
And here, I want to highlight
the microgrid technology

01:15:53.880 --> 01:15:55.310
that we're using.

01:15:55.310 --> 01:16:00.310
As I mentioned, we're not
only shifting our strategy

01:16:00.350 --> 01:16:04.443
or the wildfire hardening,
but also in making sure

01:16:04.443 --> 01:16:06.520
that we address the SPS attached

01:16:06.520 --> 01:16:08.270
to our customers and our community.

01:16:09.920 --> 01:16:14.920
Microgrid sites were put
into service this past year.

01:16:15.000 --> 01:16:19.010
The technology that we
used and that is displayed here

01:16:19.010 --> 01:16:21.730
is different than technology that we use

01:16:21.730 --> 01:16:25.700
to deploy the generators for the sites

01:16:25.700 --> 01:16:29.807
was dimensional
technology going forward.

01:16:29.807 --> 01:16:31.710
And this year we will put in service

01:16:31.710 --> 01:16:34.180
that we will build solutions
for each of the sites,

01:16:34.180 --> 01:16:37.240
the sites, the four sites on the left

01:16:37.240 --> 01:16:40.050
near the Ramona Air Attack
based, Cameron Corners,

01:16:40.050 --> 01:16:44.060
Butterfield/Agua Caliente
and Shelter Valley

01:16:44.060 --> 01:16:45.803
are the four sites
that I'm talking about

01:16:45.803 --> 01:16:48.530
that we're putting service in 2020

01:16:48.530 --> 01:16:50.030
with the conventional technology.

01:16:50.030 --> 01:16:52.630
But now in 2021 we'll have the solar

01:16:52.630 --> 01:16:55.220
and energy storage for
most sites except Ramona,

01:16:55.220 --> 01:16:56.970
which will have energy storage.

01:16:56.970 --> 01:17:00.823
And just to share with you the benefits,

01:17:02.280 --> 01:17:06.070
these communities,
especially Cameron Corners,

01:17:06.070 --> 01:17:07.800
Shelter Valley and Butterfield ranch,

01:17:07.800 --> 01:17:10.750
are in the desert area
of San Diego County.

01:17:10.750 --> 01:17:13.890
So the transmission
lines and distribution lines

01:17:13.890 --> 01:17:18.660
that these circuits are traversing

01:17:18.660 --> 01:17:21.810
through the high fire per
district and high risk areas.

01:17:21.810 --> 01:17:24.290
So we de-energize
these distribution lines,

01:17:24.290 --> 01:17:25.790
especially during PSPS events.

01:17:27.190 --> 01:17:31.230
Therefore the microgrids
will keep these communities

01:17:31.230 --> 01:17:34.793
in the desert energized
through the PSPS events.

01:17:36.750 --> 01:17:41.750
So with that, they all were
able to keep 119 customers,

01:17:42.610 --> 01:17:44.980
for example, on Butterfield ranch

01:17:44.980 --> 01:17:49.500
and 219 customers in
Shelter Valley energized

01:17:49.500 --> 01:17:52.080
during these last PSPS events

01:17:52.080 --> 01:17:54.337
for December 2nd and December 7th.

01:17:56.700 --> 01:18:00.530
Ramona Air Attack Base
is a strategic microgrid site

01:18:00.530 --> 01:18:04.100
because of the CAL FIRE
air support importance,

01:18:04.100 --> 01:18:06.250
and that resources that are
grown out of their brand buyers.

01:18:06.250 --> 01:18:10.940
So that is a key area
kind of critical area

01:18:10.940 --> 01:18:13.500
for energy storage backup power.

01:18:13.500 --> 01:18:15.620
New sites that will be reviewed

01:18:15.620 --> 01:18:19.860
and implemented by
2022 are the two sites

01:18:19.860 --> 01:18:22.714
on the right South
Campo and Shelton Valley.

01:18:22.714 --> 01:18:24.530
And some of these sites are not just

01:18:24.530 --> 01:18:27.663
to keep customers
energized during PSPS events,

01:18:28.943 --> 01:18:33.823
but also to keep the convenience
and the essential stores

01:18:34.780 --> 01:18:38.190
and convenient stores
and essential services,

01:18:38.190 --> 01:18:41.470
hot or powered during the PSPS events.

01:18:41.470 --> 01:18:44.280
So people can get
their cell phones charged

01:18:44.280 --> 01:18:49.280
or go to get water or buy
essential services from stores.

01:18:49.470 --> 01:18:53.437
So those are some of the
goals for some of these site,

01:18:53.437 --> 01:18:56.270
and not just keeping entire communities

01:18:56.270 --> 01:18:57.620
powered during PSPS events.

01:18:58.622 --> 01:19:02.010
On this next slide, we'll
talk about the generators

01:19:02.850 --> 01:19:05.690
that we have also deployed to customers.

01:19:05.690 --> 01:19:07.450
Next slide please.

01:19:07.450 --> 01:19:11.420
So our customer generated
program, starting from left,

01:19:11.420 --> 01:19:13.666
it's a generate a grant program

01:19:13.666 --> 01:19:18.666
that provides customers
with a Goal Zero Yeti solution,

01:19:18.840 --> 01:19:21.300
which is a battery that helps customers

01:19:21.300 --> 01:19:23.700
keep medical baseline
customers in particular,

01:19:23.700 --> 01:19:26.361
keep their equipment energized,

01:19:26.361 --> 01:19:27.920
their equipment in the home.

01:19:27.920 --> 01:19:30.174
On the next to that on the right,

01:19:30.174 --> 01:19:32.510
mobile home park of the project,

01:19:32.510 --> 01:19:36.337
we did not complete any projects in 2020

01:19:36.337 --> 01:19:39.480
but in 2021 we have
a few sites identified.

01:19:39.480 --> 01:19:44.480
And this is to energize
essential community centers

01:19:44.610 --> 01:19:46.900
within the mobile home
parks, so that communities

01:19:46.900 --> 01:19:50.060
can have a place to
go during PSPS events.

01:19:50.060 --> 01:19:52.150
And then the generator
assistance program

01:19:52.150 --> 01:19:55.140
is a rebate program that
was provided to customers

01:19:55.140 --> 01:20:00.140
where over 1,274 customers
were able to take advantage

01:20:00.180 --> 01:20:03.050
of the rebates and get generators

01:20:03.050 --> 01:20:06.670
to help them like to
be power PSPS events.

01:20:06.670 --> 01:20:09.200
And then finally to fix
backup power program

01:20:09.200 --> 01:20:13.130
is a program that provides
customers with fixed solutions.

01:20:13.130 --> 01:20:15.410
So it's generator that
is installed permanently

01:20:15.410 --> 01:20:18.450
on their property with their permission,

01:20:18.450 --> 01:20:21.120
and they will then
operate it and control

01:20:21.120 --> 01:20:22.630
that generator going forward

01:20:22.630 --> 01:20:25.547
to help them also like the PSPS events.

01:20:25.547 --> 01:20:29.270
And so these four solutions
are part of our grid hardening,

01:20:29.270 --> 01:20:31.847
not just because we were looking at it

01:20:31.847 --> 01:20:33.850
from a system hardening point of view,

01:20:33.850 --> 01:20:35.800
but also providing solutions

01:20:35.800 --> 01:20:38.760
to customers for PSPS
events as I mentioned,

01:20:38.760 --> 01:20:41.050
that the goal solution
that we're looking at.

01:20:41.050 --> 01:20:45.300
So I'll wrap up with just
saying that our risk ranking

01:20:45.300 --> 01:20:47.600
and efficacy programs have informed

01:20:47.600 --> 01:20:51.010
how we do our grid hardening
and how we're planning

01:20:51.010 --> 01:20:52.900
for future grid hardening as well.

01:20:52.900 --> 01:20:55.910
But also the programs that have evolved

01:20:55.910 --> 01:21:00.910
due to not just having
a look at our assets,

01:21:01.290 --> 01:21:03.543
Tyson talk regularly about
a lot of what we were doing

01:21:03.543 --> 01:21:08.380
as part of spans that were
smaller wire or longer spans.

01:21:08.380 --> 01:21:10.540
Now we're shifting to more
of a programmatic approach

01:21:10.540 --> 01:21:13.340
where we do pull segments
as Sarah and Mason

01:21:13.340 --> 01:21:17.140
also highlighted through
our risk modeling approach.

01:21:17.140 --> 01:21:21.070
And then finally the dual
effort that we're trying to do

01:21:21.070 --> 01:21:24.307
and achieve by reducing
wildfire risk as well as PSPS.

01:21:25.543 --> 01:21:28.921
So thank you for your
attention and I'll conclude there,

01:21:28.921 --> 01:21:33.780
I look forward to your question.

01:21:33.780 --> 01:21:36.960
<v ->Great, thank you so
much Jonathan and Tyson.</v>

01:21:36.960 --> 01:21:39.910
So thought we're
gonna take a short break

01:21:39.910 --> 01:21:41.830
and meet back here at 11:00 AM,

01:21:41.830 --> 01:21:46.053
so we can go into the Q&amp;A portion.

01:22:05.560 --> 01:22:08.750
I'll start off with a question
from both our safety division

01:22:08.750 --> 01:22:11.180
and move on to the panelists.

01:22:11.180 --> 01:22:14.330
And then once we get through
the first round of panelists,

01:22:14.330 --> 01:22:17.180
we'll move on to the chat
and kind of repeat the pattern.

01:22:19.420 --> 01:22:22.580
So with that, the first question I had

01:22:22.580 --> 01:22:27.580
was directed mostly at
PG&amp;E since their presentation

01:22:28.080 --> 01:22:31.030
focused primarily on
the grid hardening aspect

01:22:31.030 --> 01:22:32.740
and not so much the asset management

01:22:32.740 --> 01:22:34.460
or emerging technologies.

01:22:34.460 --> 01:22:38.550
But some of these questions
also get into more specifics

01:22:38.550 --> 01:22:40.790
for SDG&amp;E and SCE.

01:22:40.790 --> 01:22:44.140
I wanted to know how the
utility is using risk modeling

01:22:44.140 --> 01:22:48.500
to inform and prioritize its
increased inspection efforts.

01:22:48.500 --> 01:22:49.940
And also wanted more details

01:22:49.940 --> 01:22:51.790
on how those increased
inspections differ

01:22:51.790 --> 01:22:55.300
from routine inspections,
both in scope and content.

01:22:55.300 --> 01:22:57.950
And also sort of building
on that was curious

01:22:57.950 --> 01:23:01.030
how mitigations were being
implemented as a direct result

01:23:01.030 --> 01:23:02.793
of improved inspections.

01:23:10.321 --> 01:23:11.740
<v Mark>Hey Andie,
this is Mark Esguerra.</v>

01:23:11.740 --> 01:23:14.890
So there's a lot to unpack
there in that questionnaire,

01:23:14.890 --> 01:23:18.960
so I'll try to answer kind
of the things that I heard

01:23:18.960 --> 01:23:21.913
and we could have
some follow ups on that.

01:23:23.230 --> 01:23:25.760
So from a inspections perspective,

01:23:25.760 --> 01:23:29.550
our approach for where
we're at right now is like

01:23:29.550 --> 01:23:32.600
in tier three, with
our higher tire tier,

01:23:32.600 --> 01:23:34.900
we have tier two,
tier three or tier three,

01:23:34.900 --> 01:23:37.750
we are still continuing
to inspect that annually.

01:23:37.750 --> 01:23:41.133
So we're doing a detailed
inspection of all our TND

01:23:41.989 --> 01:23:45.250
and assets in those areas.

01:23:45.250 --> 01:23:47.920
For tier two we're moving, you know,

01:23:47.920 --> 01:23:51.330
we had a cycle that looked
at all the assets in tier two,

01:23:51.330 --> 01:23:54.270
we're moving to a 1/3 cycle on that one.

01:23:54.270 --> 01:23:58.250
And what we're looking at
there is from a risk-based view,

01:23:58.250 --> 01:24:00.750
we're kinda understand
where the highest risks

01:24:00.750 --> 01:24:04.270
in those areas and
really trying to prioritize

01:24:04.270 --> 01:24:06.800
those to be inspected,
but factoring in that

01:24:07.730 --> 01:24:11.270
we just inspected a group of
those assets at the prior year.

01:24:11.270 --> 01:24:16.270
So trying to get the top
33% each year to assess,

01:24:16.560 --> 01:24:21.370
and then, you know, moving
to a three year cadence

01:24:22.220 --> 01:24:24.570
from that perspective.

01:24:24.570 --> 01:24:28.660
How our inspections informing
our asset management

01:24:28.660 --> 01:24:32.840
and other cycles there,
definitely what we're doing,

01:24:32.840 --> 01:24:36.030
you know, part of like some
of the work that we are doing

01:24:36.030 --> 01:24:38.860
in terms of scoping out for PSPS events

01:24:38.860 --> 01:24:41.880
is that we actually
factor in the condition

01:24:41.880 --> 01:24:45.810
of the asset based off of
some of the nonconformances

01:24:45.810 --> 01:24:47.740
that are identified on our facility.

01:24:47.740 --> 01:24:51.410
So, facilities that
have higher risk tags,

01:24:51.410 --> 01:24:54.750
we definitely prioritize
to have those repaired

01:24:54.750 --> 01:24:56.300
before fire season.

01:24:56.300 --> 01:24:59.210
And if we're not able
to get to all those,

01:24:59.210 --> 01:25:02.260
those are items there that we factor

01:25:02.260 --> 01:25:07.260
into our decision-making for
when we conduct our PSPS.

01:25:08.640 --> 01:25:11.247
As well as those
nonconformances that we identified

01:25:11.247 --> 01:25:13.630
that have a longer lead time,

01:25:13.630 --> 01:25:15.160
we really try to bundle all that work

01:25:15.160 --> 01:25:17.880
into a larger system hardening project,

01:25:17.880 --> 01:25:20.340
particularly if it has more time

01:25:20.340 --> 01:25:23.620
before it has to be addressed,
we really try to optimize

01:25:23.620 --> 01:25:26.200
our resources or views
or inspection information

01:25:26.200 --> 01:25:29.610
to develop our system hardening plans

01:25:29.610 --> 01:25:34.610
and really try to prioritize
those in an optimized fashion.

01:25:35.900 --> 01:25:37.880
So that's kinda what I heard generally

01:25:37.880 --> 01:25:40.100
with some of the questions
that you brought up,

01:25:40.100 --> 01:25:41.930
but I know I didn't cover all of them.

01:25:41.930 --> 01:25:43.870
So if there's any
others that I didn't cover,

01:25:43.870 --> 01:25:46.413
feel free to kind of restate those.

01:25:50.280 --> 01:25:52.240
<v ->I was wondering if
you had any details</v>

01:25:52.240 --> 01:25:56.920
on how the inspections
differed from your routine

01:25:56.920 --> 01:25:59.253
that you just described
a part from timing.

01:26:01.754 --> 01:26:05.100
<v Mark>So, I think for our
areas, we're moving more</v>

01:26:05.100 --> 01:26:10.100
to using the detailed enhanced
inspections, in general.

01:26:11.060 --> 01:26:14.300
I'd say our substations have
kind of the regular routine

01:26:14.300 --> 01:26:17.360
where we're checking our
substations out on a monthly basis.

01:26:17.360 --> 01:26:19.540
And then the other type
of inspection we have

01:26:19.540 --> 01:26:24.540
is on the patrols and the
patrols are not as enhanced

01:26:24.930 --> 01:26:28.120
as the details where
we're really just trying

01:26:28.120 --> 01:26:33.120
to capture things that are
kind of visible from the eye.

01:26:33.160 --> 01:26:35.690
And the other kind of
our detailed inspection

01:26:35.690 --> 01:26:38.300
is really looking at, you know,

01:26:38.300 --> 01:26:40.370
what are all the different failure modes

01:26:40.370 --> 01:26:41.790
that we're concerned about

01:26:41.790 --> 01:26:44.200
from an ignition risk perspective,

01:26:44.200 --> 01:26:47.470
and then for a non-tier,
non to wildfire risk

01:26:47.470 --> 01:26:49.450
from a public safety perspective.

01:26:49.450 --> 01:26:53.810
So it's a more enhanced
view of items that we look for.

01:26:53.810 --> 01:26:56.620
And then, so you had
your enhanced inspections

01:26:56.620 --> 01:26:57.990
and then we have our patrols,

01:26:57.990 --> 01:27:01.460
which are really trying
to capture those things

01:27:01.460 --> 01:27:03.180
that could be visibly seen.

01:27:03.180 --> 01:27:06.310
And then what we also
have is for those locations

01:27:06.310 --> 01:27:08.500
where we have an open maintenance tag

01:27:08.500 --> 01:27:12.190
that is projected to go
close to it's due date,

01:27:12.190 --> 01:27:16.570
or it's a timeline, we'll do
a field safety reassessment

01:27:16.570 --> 01:27:20.120
of those assets that's
for that particular structure

01:27:20.120 --> 01:27:23.020
to see if the reason for that asset

01:27:23.020 --> 01:27:25.720
has degraded in any fashion.

01:27:25.720 --> 01:27:29.300
And if it is, then it gets
escalated to be dealt with,

01:27:29.300 --> 01:27:32.040
whether through a repair or replacement,

01:27:32.040 --> 01:27:35.243
or it gets reassessed and
we can continue to monitor it.

01:27:41.460 --> 01:27:42.560
<v ->Thanks so much Mark.</v>

01:27:43.680 --> 01:27:46.613
I guess, with that, we
move into SCE with Russell.

01:27:52.503 --> 01:27:55.420
<v ->Towards the same
question, Andie?</v>

01:27:56.961 --> 01:27:58.310
Or do you have a different question?

01:27:58.310 --> 01:28:01.850
<v ->Oh no, it's the same question
going through the difference</v>

01:28:01.850 --> 01:28:06.060
between the enhanced
inspections and how results

01:28:06.060 --> 01:28:08.120
from those inspections are prioritizing

01:28:08.120 --> 01:28:10.900
for being done in certain metigations?

01:28:13.720 --> 01:28:16.453
<v ->Yeah, so in our
high fire areas,</v>

01:28:17.750 --> 01:28:21.010
our enhanced inspections and our,

01:28:21.010 --> 01:28:23.060
I'll call them compliance
based inspections

01:28:23.060 --> 01:28:24.300
are really done the same way.

01:28:24.300 --> 01:28:27.770
So we're now capturing more information

01:28:27.770 --> 01:28:29.020
when we do the inspections,

01:28:29.020 --> 01:28:31.750
there's a mobile application
that we've deployed

01:28:31.750 --> 01:28:35.150
to our inspectors and
they have a survey in there

01:28:35.150 --> 01:28:36.380
it's kind of a smart survey.

01:28:36.380 --> 01:28:39.360
So based on what they see on the pole,

01:28:39.360 --> 01:28:41.180
the survey, they'll answer a question

01:28:41.180 --> 01:28:44.720
and we'll kinda give
them different questions.

01:28:44.720 --> 01:28:47.260
And it's really intended to
capture not only the condition

01:28:47.260 --> 01:28:49.740
of the infrastructure and
identify any hazardous conditions,

01:28:49.740 --> 01:28:53.230
but also to capture
information about our assets

01:28:53.230 --> 01:28:54.990
so that we can use
that information later

01:28:54.990 --> 01:28:57.680
to assess the condition of the assets

01:28:57.680 --> 01:29:01.610
and make some decisions
on maybe proactive work

01:29:01.610 --> 01:29:03.253
that we need to do accordingly.

01:29:04.660 --> 01:29:07.190
Typically, a compliance
based inspections

01:29:07.190 --> 01:29:11.020
in overhead systems
distribution are every five years

01:29:12.331 --> 01:29:14.393
and transmission it's every three years.

01:29:16.170 --> 01:29:18.840
So these enhanced
inspections now are increasing

01:29:18.840 --> 01:29:21.660
the frequency, at least
for the higher risk assets.

01:29:21.660 --> 01:29:22.510
If you remember, I showed you

01:29:22.510 --> 01:29:24.840
that kind of four by four table.

01:29:24.840 --> 01:29:28.253
So for the higher risk assets,
we're doing them annually.

01:29:29.410 --> 01:29:32.570
So increasing the
frequency by which we see,

01:29:32.570 --> 01:29:35.040
by which we get our eyes on the assets.

01:29:35.040 --> 01:29:37.530
We're also combining ground with error,

01:29:37.530 --> 01:29:41.670
so prior to deploying
these enhanced inspections,

01:29:41.670 --> 01:29:43.863
we were only doing ground inspections,

01:29:44.870 --> 01:29:46.670
but now we've combined
that with the aerial

01:29:46.670 --> 01:29:49.630
to get that 360 degree
view and has allowed us

01:29:49.630 --> 01:29:51.840
to identify some things
that you cannot identify

01:29:51.840 --> 01:29:52.673
from the ground.

01:29:54.310 --> 01:29:57.110
Deterioration on the top of across arm

01:29:57.110 --> 01:29:58.510
or on the top of a pole.

01:29:58.510 --> 01:30:02.780
So we see some areas,
actually many instances

01:30:02.780 --> 01:30:04.890
where that's been an
issue, and we've been able

01:30:04.890 --> 01:30:07.243
to catch that from aerial inspections.

01:30:08.790 --> 01:30:13.790
In terms of how we
apply risk to the priority.

01:30:14.860 --> 01:30:19.550
So as we identify hazardous
conditions in the field,

01:30:19.550 --> 01:30:21.890
we categorize them as
priority one and priority two

01:30:21.890 --> 01:30:23.380
and priority three.

01:30:23.380 --> 01:30:26.800
Priority one is an issue that needs

01:30:26.800 --> 01:30:28.270
to be addressed immediately.

01:30:28.270 --> 01:30:30.433
And it's typically
dress within 24 hours,

01:30:33.500 --> 01:30:35.600
or at least made safe.

01:30:35.600 --> 01:30:39.360
And then priority two
conditions, typically,

01:30:39.360 --> 01:30:42.220
like 24 months to
address, but in high fire,

01:30:42.220 --> 01:30:44.720
tier two, we address them at 12 months

01:30:44.720 --> 01:30:46.670
and then high fire tier three,

01:30:46.670 --> 01:30:48.570
we address them in six months.

01:30:48.570 --> 01:30:50.543
And then the priority three conditions,

01:30:51.850 --> 01:30:53.700
we address in 60 months.

01:30:53.700 --> 01:30:57.480
And so, as I described, we
are determining what we're going

01:30:57.480 --> 01:31:00.950
to inspect based on
that probability of failure

01:31:00.950 --> 01:31:03.593
and the consequence
chart that I showed earlier.

01:31:04.720 --> 01:31:08.710
And then throughout the
course of the year we're looking

01:31:08.710 --> 01:31:12.033
to inspect the higher risk
assets earlier in the year,

01:31:13.136 --> 01:31:14.860
and kinda work down that risk curve,

01:31:14.860 --> 01:31:17.220
so that when we identify
those hazardous conditions,

01:31:17.220 --> 01:31:20.220
they're remediated earlier in the year

01:31:20.220 --> 01:31:21.563
ahead of the fire season.

01:31:23.440 --> 01:31:26.440
Did I address everything or
was there any other parts of it?

01:31:29.060 --> 01:31:32.093
<v ->I think that covers it
for now, thanks so much.</v>

01:31:33.100 --> 01:31:38.100
And then moving on to SDG&amp;E,
either Jonathan or Tyson.

01:31:39.700 --> 01:31:43.990
<v ->Sure, yeah, so for our
enhanced inspections</v>

01:31:45.309 --> 01:31:48.003
and how they differ from
our compliance inspections,

01:31:50.610 --> 01:31:52.370
they differ based on
essentially the cycles

01:31:52.370 --> 01:31:55.380
and the technology used
to complete the inspections.

01:31:55.380 --> 01:31:58.000
So our compliance based inspections

01:31:58.000 --> 01:32:00.730
are like the other utilities,

01:32:00.730 --> 01:32:03.810
detailed inspections
once every five years,

01:32:03.810 --> 01:32:06.950
inspect our wood poles
intrusively once every 10 years.

01:32:06.950 --> 01:32:08.580
And we do an annual patrol

01:32:09.790 --> 01:32:12.530
once a year for the entire system.

01:32:12.530 --> 01:32:16.090
So, our enhanced
inspections or the inspections

01:32:16.090 --> 01:32:18.070
that are additional or incremental

01:32:18.070 --> 01:32:22.050
to the compliance inspections
include a ground inspection

01:32:22.050 --> 01:32:26.370
of the tier three structures,
once every three years.

01:32:26.370 --> 01:32:30.050
So it's essentially increased
cycle times to make sure

01:32:30.050 --> 01:32:33.180
that we're looking at
those polls more frequently.

01:32:33.180 --> 01:32:37.300
And also as part of that,
they're specifically looking

01:32:37.300 --> 01:32:40.210
at condition codes that
are related to risk events.

01:32:40.210 --> 01:32:44.010
So it's a more specific
inspection looking at the types

01:32:44.010 --> 01:32:47.200
of conditions that
could lead to failures

01:32:47.200 --> 01:32:49.150
that would result in risk event,

01:32:49.150 --> 01:32:51.900
which we define the same
way as like a spark on system.

01:32:53.400 --> 01:32:56.420
In addition, we have our
drone inspection program,

01:32:56.420 --> 01:32:59.830
which is leveraging
the technology top down,

01:32:59.830 --> 01:33:02.390
360 views of the structure.

01:33:02.390 --> 01:33:06.010
We've seen a lot of
success from this program.

01:33:06.010 --> 01:33:06.910
A lot of conditions turned in

01:33:06.910 --> 01:33:09.340
that had not been seen previously

01:33:09.340 --> 01:33:10.953
given the different perspective.

01:33:12.130 --> 01:33:17.130
So a lot of value there, and
then we leveraged infrared

01:33:17.790 --> 01:33:20.140
as well so you're able to
see things like connections.

01:33:20.140 --> 01:33:21.853
So leveraging different
technologies to see things

01:33:21.853 --> 01:33:24.503
that you can't see from
the normal inspections.

01:33:26.090 --> 01:33:29.860
We also then have a
priority system in how we go

01:33:29.860 --> 01:33:32.570
about repairing what has been identified

01:33:32.570 --> 01:33:34.370
on these various inspection programs.

01:33:34.370 --> 01:33:39.370
We have emergency where we
believe that the failures eminent

01:33:40.170 --> 01:33:43.240
based on what we found
and we set, you know,

01:33:43.240 --> 01:33:46.650
essentially a same day of
zero to two days timeframe

01:33:46.650 --> 01:33:48.930
to get that issue repaired.

01:33:48.930 --> 01:33:52.840
We have a priority,
which is a goal of replacing

01:33:52.840 --> 01:33:57.840
or remediating the
issue within one month.

01:33:58.240 --> 01:34:01.230
And then we have what
we would consider normal,

01:34:01.230 --> 01:34:03.980
which is we do believe that, you know,

01:34:03.980 --> 01:34:06.260
if were cared within one year timeframe,

01:34:06.260 --> 01:34:09.040
it would not fail until
the next, you know,

01:34:09.040 --> 01:34:10.680
it wouldn't fail before that timeframe.

01:34:10.680 --> 01:34:15.680
So we will now one year for
all of the normal type bindings,

01:34:16.940 --> 01:34:20.313
unless it's in the tier three
HFTD and then six months.

01:34:24.720 --> 01:34:28.210
<v ->Right, thanks, that
should covered it for now.</v>

01:34:28.210 --> 01:34:31.410
Moving on to the panelist,
I'm gonna give it over

01:34:31.410 --> 01:34:35.563
to TURN with either Marcel
Hawiger or Katie Morsony.

01:34:36.540 --> 01:34:39.673
<v Katie>Hi, yeah, I think
Marcel was gonna go first.</v>

01:34:40.680 --> 01:34:41.883
<v Marcel>Can you hear me?</v>

01:34:43.810 --> 01:34:45.413
Yes, okay, thank you very much.

01:34:46.490 --> 01:34:50.993
So I have a few questions
and I'll just start with one,

01:34:52.040 --> 01:34:54.430
although it's about the scope of work

01:34:54.430 --> 01:34:57.530
for the covered conductor
grid hardening work.

01:34:57.530 --> 01:35:02.530
But, before I ask that, I
need to get a clarification

01:35:03.020 --> 01:35:05.470
from the panelists about the units

01:35:05.470 --> 01:35:07.383
that are used in their WMPs,

01:35:10.270 --> 01:35:13.110
so that we know how to
look at compare their work.

01:35:13.110 --> 01:35:17.580
And the table 12 that
showed for example,

01:35:17.580 --> 01:35:20.210
the historic and forecast spending

01:35:20.210 --> 01:35:25.210
and the work looked
like PG&amp;E used line miles

01:35:27.360 --> 01:35:32.360
and SDG&amp;E use not line miles,
but Edison used circuit miles,

01:35:33.700 --> 01:35:36.090
specifically for the item

01:35:36.090 --> 01:35:38.880
on the covered conductor installation.

01:35:38.880 --> 01:35:41.780
I wonder if the panelists
could just explain

01:35:41.780 --> 01:35:45.260
whether those units
are comparable or not.

01:35:45.260 --> 01:35:49.070
And now more specifically, PG&amp;E for 2020

01:35:49.070 --> 01:35:54.070
showed 460 million for 342 line miles

01:35:54.780 --> 01:35:59.780
and Edison showed 546
million for 965 circuit miles.

01:36:00.820 --> 01:36:03.350
I'm wondering if those are comparable

01:36:03.350 --> 01:36:06.693
or if, how one can compare those units.

01:36:11.810 --> 01:36:16.530
<v ->Yeah, I can start and
explain what a circuit mile is</v>

01:36:16.530 --> 01:36:19.030
for us and then maybe PG&amp;E can explain

01:36:19.030 --> 01:36:20.330
what a line mile is for them.

01:36:20.330 --> 01:36:25.290
So a circuit mile, so typically
when you run a circuit,

01:36:25.290 --> 01:36:30.290
you may have one to three
phases running down the circuit

01:36:30.670 --> 01:36:31.890
on your main line, you'll typically

01:36:31.890 --> 01:36:35.010
have all three conductors,
three phases running,

01:36:35.010 --> 01:36:38.600
and then you may branch
off and have two phases going

01:36:38.600 --> 01:36:40.810
or one phase neutral going.

01:36:40.810 --> 01:36:43.830
And so we use circuit
mile to represent a mile

01:36:43.830 --> 01:36:47.003
of that conductor that
includes the multiple phases.

01:36:48.030 --> 01:36:50.500
Now you can break it up
and say, conductor miles,

01:36:50.500 --> 01:36:52.250
that's another term that we use.

01:36:52.250 --> 01:36:55.540
And then if, for example,
you had a one circuit mile,

01:36:55.540 --> 01:36:57.550
but it had three phases,
then you would call

01:36:57.550 --> 01:36:59.080
that three conductor miles.

01:36:59.080 --> 01:37:02.830
But for us a circuit mile is
that one mile of the circuit

01:37:02.830 --> 01:37:05.113
that includes the multiple phases.

01:37:10.010 --> 01:37:15.010
<v Marcel>Fine, one circuit
mile would involve three miles</v>

01:37:15.120 --> 01:37:19.170
of conductor, but that
would be one circuit mile

01:37:19.170 --> 01:37:21.623
in your table, is that
correct, approximately?

01:37:23.092 --> 01:37:25.490
<v ->If that portion of the circuit
was a three-phase portion</v>

01:37:25.490 --> 01:37:27.373
of the circuit, then yes.
<v ->Okay.</v>

01:37:30.711 --> 01:37:35.711
And so that PG&amp;E, how
is your line miles units

01:37:37.120 --> 01:37:38.220
the same or different?

01:37:53.730 --> 01:37:57.067
<v ->So, I think I've got
my audio back on,</v>

01:37:57.067 --> 01:37:59.310
can you hear me?
<v ->Yes.</v>

01:37:59.310 --> 01:38:04.310
<v ->Okay, all right, so the
way we're looking at it here</v>

01:38:05.900 --> 01:38:09.060
is that there is the
miles of the distance

01:38:09.060 --> 01:38:13.240
of just the stretch of the
run, where folks are looking

01:38:13.240 --> 01:38:15.790
at some line miles, when
we're looking at it more

01:38:15.790 --> 01:38:17.670
from a circuit perspective,

01:38:17.670 --> 01:38:20.040
it is looking at all three conductors

01:38:20.040 --> 01:38:25.040
that are gonna be
placed into service there.

01:38:25.170 --> 01:38:27.640
I know that we're also
preparing a data request

01:38:27.640 --> 01:38:29.430
for response on this.

01:38:29.430 --> 01:38:32.820
So, one thing I need to do is
I actually wanna get aligned

01:38:32.820 --> 01:38:34.650
also internally to make sure

01:38:34.650 --> 01:38:36.640
that we were consistent on that.

01:38:36.640 --> 01:38:41.300
So, just to kinda get back
to you there on Marcel

01:38:41.300 --> 01:38:44.330
is that we'll have to validate
on how we're counting that

01:38:44.330 --> 01:38:47.213
in our data requests,
'cause I see the question

01:38:47.213 --> 01:38:49.777
that you have there, and
I've got to go back to the WMP

01:38:49.777 --> 01:38:52.463
and understand how
we referred out on it.

01:38:53.354 --> 01:38:56.310
<v Marcel>Okay, and
I guess, I'm sorry.</v>

01:38:56.310 --> 01:39:00.373
I know SDG&amp;E well,
SDG&amp;E, do you have anything,

01:39:01.240 --> 01:39:04.100
are your line miles similarly,

01:39:04.100 --> 01:39:08.780
the actual linear distance
of the entire span?

01:39:08.780 --> 01:39:11.470
<v ->Yeah, it's the size
as Edison described,</v>

01:39:11.470 --> 01:39:14.103
we're going the distance
between two structures,

01:39:15.380 --> 01:39:18.670
all acquainted replacements,
conductor replacements

01:39:19.947 --> 01:39:24.400
within that span, so we're
measuring circuit miles.

01:39:24.400 --> 01:39:27.030
<v Marcel>Thank you, well,
so with that explanation,</v>

01:39:27.030 --> 01:39:29.230
my actual, let me ask my question,

01:39:29.230 --> 01:39:31.520
which is that looking at those numbers,

01:39:31.520 --> 01:39:36.520
it seems that Edison's
circuit covered conductor work

01:39:38.040 --> 01:39:42.520
is much less expensive
per the same, you know,

01:39:42.520 --> 01:39:47.520
total spent line mile than
PG&amp;E's or SDG&amp;E are,

01:39:50.820 --> 01:39:52.550
you know, very roughly it looks like

01:39:52.550 --> 01:39:57.430
it's about 1/2 to 1/3, the cost.

01:39:57.430 --> 01:40:01.530
And I'm wondering if you
could all sort of discuss

01:40:01.530 --> 01:40:04.520
a little bit, what might
be any differences

01:40:04.520 --> 01:40:08.570
in the scope of work for
covered conductor installation

01:40:08.570 --> 01:40:13.423
that explain the
difference in price per mile.

01:40:16.720 --> 01:40:19.130
<v ->I can start off for PG&amp;E,</v>

01:40:19.130 --> 01:40:22.650
maybe the bigger
difference is that as we put on

01:40:22.650 --> 01:40:26.560
the covered conductor,
there's a lot more replacement

01:40:26.560 --> 01:40:30.370
of poles that we're
gonna have to include

01:40:30.370 --> 01:40:33.480
because our poles
aren't necessarily sized

01:40:33.480 --> 01:40:35.780
to handle not only the weight
that the cover conductor,

01:40:35.780 --> 01:40:38.157
but when you factor
in the cover conductor

01:40:38.157 --> 01:40:41.423
and the expected winds
in those high-risk areas,

01:40:41.423 --> 01:40:44.700
adds a lot more pressure on those poles

01:40:44.700 --> 01:40:47.860
and the necessary equipment
holding up the conductor.

01:40:47.860 --> 01:40:50.480
So I believe our costs
will be a little bit higher

01:40:50.480 --> 01:40:53.580
'cause it factors in
more of the retrofit

01:40:53.580 --> 01:40:55.053
and replacement of the poles.

01:40:57.698 --> 01:41:01.360
<v ->Yeah, this is
Jonathan Woldemariam,</v>

01:41:01.360 --> 01:41:04.730
just like to add that, you
know, whether you replace

01:41:04.730 --> 01:41:07.120
the poles or not,
could make a difference

01:41:07.120 --> 01:41:08.790
on the cost per mile.

01:41:08.790 --> 01:41:11.931
But also the type of structures
that you're placing with.

01:41:11.931 --> 01:41:14.728
So if you're to install poles,

01:41:14.728 --> 01:41:16.680
could make a difference as well.

01:41:16.680 --> 01:41:20.030
Also terrain and other
permitting and other issues

01:41:20.030 --> 01:41:21.030
that may come along,

01:41:21.030 --> 01:41:23.227
depending on where
you're doing your work.

01:41:28.910 --> 01:41:32.700
<v ->Yeah, just echoing the
comments of Mark and Jonathan,</v>

01:41:32.700 --> 01:41:36.000
I think the assumption
around pole replacements

01:41:36.000 --> 01:41:38.580
and what types of
poles you replace with,

01:41:38.580 --> 01:41:40.620
makes a big difference on the unit cost.

01:41:40.620 --> 01:41:41.650
There's probably other factors,

01:41:41.650 --> 01:41:44.286
but I think the number of
poles that are being replaced

01:41:44.286 --> 01:41:45.619
is a big factor.

01:41:47.367 --> 01:41:50.770
<v ->And if I may follow up
on that, I guess, you know,</v>

01:41:50.770 --> 01:41:55.580
we continue to sort
of try to investigate

01:41:55.580 --> 01:41:58.343
why is there such a difference
in the number of poles

01:41:58.343 --> 01:42:02.100
that need to be replaced
between the utilities,

01:42:02.100 --> 01:42:06.360
and I confess the data
we've seen regarding

01:42:06.360 --> 01:42:11.360
the existing poles is confusing.

01:42:11.610 --> 01:42:16.610
And with respect to
the issue of, you know,

01:42:16.700 --> 01:42:19.060
supporting the weight of
their covered conductor,

01:42:19.060 --> 01:42:22.610
I guess we've been unable to obtain sort

01:42:22.610 --> 01:42:27.360
of pole loading data from
PG&amp;E that would support the need

01:42:27.360 --> 01:42:28.520
to replace all the polls,

01:42:28.520 --> 01:42:30.143
just due to the weight of the conductor.

01:42:30.143 --> 01:42:33.160
And I'm wondering if you
have any additional information

01:42:33.160 --> 01:42:35.263
or thoughts you can share about that.

01:42:38.130 --> 01:42:40.240
<v ->We're willing to share
also our standards</v>

01:42:40.240 --> 01:42:44.280
for system hardening that
get into how we're sizing poles

01:42:44.280 --> 01:42:47.820
in our high fire risk areas,
as well as, you know,

01:42:47.820 --> 01:42:52.170
the pole types that we're including.

01:42:52.170 --> 01:42:54.491
So, we'll welcome to
show that information

01:42:54.491 --> 01:42:57.901
if that'll be helpful.

01:42:57.901 --> 01:43:00.184
And we also included
some of this information

01:43:00.184 --> 01:43:02.872
in terms of pole
loading data in our GRC.

01:43:02.872 --> 01:43:06.710
So if that'll be helpful
to package that up

01:43:06.710 --> 01:43:11.373
and then share with this
group, we'll gladly do so.

01:43:22.160 --> 01:43:24.310
<v ->Thanks Marcel, do
you think that covered</v>

01:43:24.310 --> 01:43:25.410
your question for now?

01:43:28.740 --> 01:43:32.010
<v Marcel>Well, it's, I think there,</v>

01:43:32.010 --> 01:43:35.550
I still have some additional questions,

01:43:35.550 --> 01:43:38.930
but I think that is sufficient
for now, thank you very much.

01:43:38.930 --> 01:43:40.930
And I'll have some
questions on microgrids,

01:43:40.930 --> 01:43:43.030
but I'll come, please
just come back to me later

01:43:43.030 --> 01:43:45.593
when after other people
have asked questions.

01:43:46.960 --> 01:43:51.283
<v ->Great, so moving
on to Joseph Mitchell.</v>

01:43:54.330 --> 01:43:56.803
<v Joseph>Hi, this is
Joseph Mitchell, MGRA,</v>

01:43:57.970 --> 01:44:01.533
just follow up on the covered conductor.

01:44:03.640 --> 01:44:08.640
It seems that SCE has really relied

01:44:09.750 --> 01:44:12.820
on covered conductor
as a hardening technique,

01:44:12.820 --> 01:44:17.820
whereas PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E are significantly

01:44:20.000 --> 01:44:21.387
further behind on that.

01:44:21.387 --> 01:44:26.387
And it's rather striking
in that there's a overlap

01:44:26.520 --> 01:44:29.230
of service territory between, you know,

01:44:29.230 --> 01:44:33.350
where the conditions are
very similar between SCE

01:44:33.350 --> 01:44:37.220
and PG&amp;E areas in certain areas of,

01:44:37.220 --> 01:44:42.010
in the North of SCE, South of
PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E service area,

01:44:42.010 --> 01:44:44.260
very similar to the Southern parts

01:44:44.260 --> 01:44:47.133
of SCE's service territory.

01:44:48.740 --> 01:44:53.740
Why is it that covered conductor
is so compelling for SCE,

01:44:56.141 --> 01:45:01.141
but not so compelling
for SDG&amp;E and PG&amp;E,

01:45:01.170 --> 01:45:02.803
why is there such a difference?

01:45:03.650 --> 01:45:07.880
And a related question, 'cause
I think that's gonna be part

01:45:07.880 --> 01:45:12.880
of the answer for SDG&amp;E
is what fraction of hardening

01:45:15.060 --> 01:45:20.060
in the high fire threat
districts is already complete.

01:45:23.080 --> 01:45:28.080
And, I'll just present
that to all the utilities.

01:45:28.740 --> 01:45:31.760
And this is sort of
historical and going forward

01:45:31.760 --> 01:45:35.280
in the sense that how did
we get to this particular place

01:45:35.280 --> 01:45:39.010
where covered conductor
is compelling for one utility,

01:45:39.010 --> 01:45:40.930
but not for the others.

01:45:40.930 --> 01:45:43.750
And is it going to be compelling

01:45:43.750 --> 01:45:45.810
for all utilities going forward?

01:45:45.810 --> 01:45:46.643
Thank you.

01:45:50.440 --> 01:45:55.440
<v ->I can start, I can't
speak for the other utilities</v>

01:45:55.870 --> 01:45:57.980
because we do have
different configurations,

01:45:57.980 --> 01:46:01.690
different service territory,
different voltage levels,

01:46:01.690 --> 01:46:04.500
but for Southern California Edison,

01:46:04.500 --> 01:46:07.750
our decision to use cover
conductor is really tied

01:46:07.750 --> 01:46:08.770
to the risk analysis.

01:46:08.770 --> 01:46:11.480
As I mentioned in the presentation,

01:46:11.480 --> 01:46:16.040
when we look at the
major drivers of events

01:46:16.040 --> 01:46:18.660
that could potentially
lead to ignition contact

01:46:18.660 --> 01:46:21.100
from foreign object and wire to wire

01:46:21.100 --> 01:46:25.610
represents approximately
60% of the events.

01:46:25.610 --> 01:46:30.610
And cover conductor is, you
know, a great solution for that

01:46:31.630 --> 01:46:35.590
by covering the conductor,
you mitigate that impact

01:46:35.590 --> 01:46:37.710
when something else hit your lines,

01:46:37.710 --> 01:46:41.080
as long as it's not like a
tree falling on the lines.

01:46:41.080 --> 01:46:43.180
And you also mitigate
that wire to wire contact.

01:46:43.180 --> 01:46:46.720
And so because it's
highly effective at mitigating

01:46:46.720 --> 01:46:50.060
our major drivers, that's
why we have identified it

01:46:50.060 --> 01:46:52.803
as the primary mitigation alternative.

01:46:57.620 --> 01:47:01.033
<v ->Thanks, for us, and I'll
jump in here for PG&amp;E.</v>

01:47:02.620 --> 01:47:06.350
I'd say it is a compelling
mitigation for us.

01:47:06.350 --> 01:47:09.820
It's definitely something
that we are working towards

01:47:10.750 --> 01:47:13.820
in 2020, a number of system hardening,

01:47:13.820 --> 01:47:16.010
I think we've reached slightly over 300.

01:47:16.010 --> 01:47:19.690
We exceeded the target that
we had set out for ourselves.

01:47:19.690 --> 01:47:21.340
This year, the targets are lower

01:47:21.340 --> 01:47:24.730
because we've made some
changes to our risk model

01:47:24.730 --> 01:47:28.040
to improve it and really
trying to target the highest risk.

01:47:28.040 --> 01:47:30.540
And so covered
conductor will play a role

01:47:30.540 --> 01:47:33.720
in the 180 miles from there.

01:47:33.720 --> 01:47:37.760
And, you know, when you
look at our plans going forward,

01:47:37.760 --> 01:47:39.573
we're actually looking to spend.

01:47:47.450 --> 01:47:52.053
<v ->I think we lost
connection with Mark.</v>

01:47:58.670 --> 01:48:00.507
I think you're back now.

01:48:01.628 --> 01:48:04.040
<v ->Okay, I'm back, sorry.</v>

01:48:04.040 --> 01:48:05.540
Sorry for the connection here.

01:48:07.051 --> 01:48:08.780
One of our reasons,
some of our challenges

01:48:08.780 --> 01:48:10.430
that we're working
through is really getting

01:48:10.430 --> 01:48:13.930
through the ramp up phase
of getting our cover conductor

01:48:13.930 --> 01:48:16.560
and our system hardening
program into the pace

01:48:16.560 --> 01:48:17.810
that we were talking about,

01:48:17.810 --> 01:48:21.960
which is about 450
to 500 miles per year,

01:48:21.960 --> 01:48:23.497
so that we can harden our areas.

01:48:23.497 --> 01:48:25.410
And some of the challenges
we've had, as I mentioned,

01:48:25.410 --> 01:48:27.700
is that a lot of our infrastructure,

01:48:27.700 --> 01:48:29.830
we can't move as quick
as a pace as we want

01:48:29.830 --> 01:48:31.590
in the earlier year.

01:48:31.590 --> 01:48:35.100
So as was one, it was a new
program that we were launching.

01:48:35.100 --> 01:48:37.060
There's a understanding
that there would be

01:48:37.060 --> 01:48:39.260
a significant amount
of retrofit with our poles,

01:48:39.260 --> 01:48:43.750
so that our pace is not as
been as quick as we'd like,

01:48:43.750 --> 01:48:46.960
but we're working to
improve on upon that.

01:48:46.960 --> 01:48:49.680
And also, you know, so cover conductor

01:48:49.680 --> 01:48:52.760
is definitely something
that we are moving towards

01:48:52.760 --> 01:48:54.200
and really want to embrace.

01:48:54.200 --> 01:48:56.480
But also some of the
lessons that we've learned

01:48:56.480 --> 01:49:01.480
from the last two cycles
of PSPS is, you know,

01:49:02.310 --> 01:49:04.690
we also wanna factor
in how we could make

01:49:04.690 --> 01:49:07.150
the solutions work for
us to not only address

01:49:07.150 --> 01:49:11.940
the wildfire risk, but also
mitigate the impacts of PSPS.

01:49:11.940 --> 01:49:15.853
And in some cases where
you have heavy tree density,

01:49:17.680 --> 01:49:21.270
strike very heavy strike
potential, covered conductors

01:49:21.270 --> 01:49:24.310
is not gonna prevent
some of those incidents

01:49:24.310 --> 01:49:25.397
that you have in those areas.

01:49:25.397 --> 01:49:28.123
And we're really taking
a closer look to see,

01:49:29.080 --> 01:49:31.610
are there other areas where
we could further increase

01:49:31.610 --> 01:49:34.830
the amount of undergrounding
that we can accomplish?

01:49:34.830 --> 01:49:37.363
So, I'd say cover
conductor is a big part of it.

01:49:38.649 --> 01:49:41.470
We're planning to spend
significant resources in there,

01:49:41.470 --> 01:49:43.890
but we also are really
trying to understand

01:49:43.890 --> 01:49:48.480
how we can address the
PSPS mitigations and, you know,

01:49:48.480 --> 01:49:49.480
finding more opportunities

01:49:49.480 --> 01:49:51.960
where we could
underground our facilities.

01:49:51.960 --> 01:49:53.760
And that'll take a little more time

01:49:53.760 --> 01:49:55.180
and we wanna be very strategic.

01:49:55.180 --> 01:49:57.580
As you've seen San Diego,
we're really taking a look

01:49:57.580 --> 01:49:59.320
to see how they're managing things.

01:49:59.320 --> 01:50:01.410
And I think they've got a good approach

01:50:01.410 --> 01:50:03.880
on being very targeted and strategic

01:50:03.880 --> 01:50:05.440
to not only address the wildfire risk,

01:50:05.440 --> 01:50:08.187
but mitigate the PSPS impact.

01:50:12.430 --> 01:50:15.140
<v ->This is Jonathan,
I'll take a stab</v>

01:50:15.140 --> 01:50:15.973
at answering the question about

01:50:15.973 --> 01:50:18.203
the cover conductor from Jo.

01:50:19.120 --> 01:50:23.440
So for SDG&amp;E, it was
just like Mark mentioned

01:50:23.440 --> 01:50:27.970
that it was an effort to take it slow

01:50:27.970 --> 01:50:32.570
with cover conductor to
make sure that we understood

01:50:32.570 --> 01:50:35.500
how much on undergrounding
versus covered conductor

01:50:35.500 --> 01:50:36.600
we were going to do as well

01:50:36.600 --> 01:50:40.420
as the bare conductor ramped out.

01:50:40.420 --> 01:50:45.210
So we have projects in
flight for bare conductor,

01:50:45.210 --> 01:50:48.580
that had been already
identified in flight.

01:50:48.580 --> 01:50:51.810
So making sure that we
understood how to, you know,

01:50:51.810 --> 01:50:53.910
a lab that well and shift strategy,

01:50:53.910 --> 01:50:56.410
as well as how what's the
balance, the right balance

01:50:56.410 --> 01:50:59.460
for conducting work use,
undergrounding and figuring out

01:50:59.460 --> 01:51:02.440
where to best apply that
using our risk modeling,

01:51:02.440 --> 01:51:06.070
using our risk ranking and
understand the whole picture

01:51:06.070 --> 01:51:09.740
versus just directly going
into covered conductor

01:51:09.740 --> 01:51:11.637
replacement for the
conventional hardening

01:51:11.637 --> 01:51:13.093
that we were doing.

01:51:15.330 --> 01:51:16.320
Coupled with that though,

01:51:16.320 --> 01:51:19.410
we were also developing
work methods and standards

01:51:19.410 --> 01:51:23.420
internally to figure out
the best way to go out

01:51:23.420 --> 01:51:25.680
and install the cover conductor.

01:51:25.680 --> 01:51:29.350
It wasn't just a matter of
purchasing the covered conductor

01:51:29.350 --> 01:51:32.790
and applying it in the same
way that other utilities would,

01:51:32.790 --> 01:51:36.460
but really figuring out what
is the most efficient best way

01:51:36.460 --> 01:51:41.460
for employees to install
the covered conductor.

01:51:41.750 --> 01:51:45.880
One for example, technology
that we're able to leverage

01:51:45.880 --> 01:51:49.430
is the fact that we don't have
to strip the cover conductor.

01:51:49.430 --> 01:51:53.500
We have a Pearson connector
that can make the connection

01:51:53.500 --> 01:51:58.400
of the covered conducted to
our structures easier, right?

01:51:58.400 --> 01:52:01.050
And using the right connectors too.

01:52:01.050 --> 01:52:04.570
So those types of things helped
us to enhance our approach

01:52:04.570 --> 01:52:06.993
a little bit better in the field

01:52:06.993 --> 01:52:09.950
about a balanced approach
on the whole strategy

01:52:09.950 --> 01:52:13.543
on the versus covered conductor.

01:52:13.543 --> 01:52:14.850
And then finally, you
asked about the percentage

01:52:14.850 --> 01:52:18.560
of hardening that we have
so far with over 800 miles

01:52:18.560 --> 01:52:21.409
of distribution hardening
within the HFTD.

01:52:21.409 --> 01:52:23.580
HFTD is about 3,500 miles.

01:52:23.580 --> 01:52:27.140
We have a 23%
hardening in our distribution.

01:52:27.140 --> 01:52:28.770
On the transmission
side, it's much higher,

01:52:28.770 --> 01:52:33.470
it's over 60% in transmission
because we have been

01:52:33.470 --> 01:52:36.370
at it longer on the
transmission side, but also,

01:52:36.370 --> 01:52:41.041
and I've been doing, you
know, there's less mile

01:52:41.041 --> 01:52:43.541
in terms of transmission side.

01:52:45.782 --> 01:52:48.190
<v Marcel>And what do you
see as your long-term goal</v>

01:52:48.190 --> 01:52:52.240
as far as, are you going
for 100% in the HFTD

01:52:52.240 --> 01:52:54.383
or what do you see as final target?

01:52:57.480 --> 01:53:02.127
<v ->Yeah, so for the
HFTD, we're still using</v>

01:53:02.127 --> 01:53:06.740
our risk modeling, but not 100%
high percentage of hardening

01:53:06.740 --> 01:53:09.513
whether the covered conductor only.

01:53:12.163 --> 01:53:13.913
<v Marcel>Thank you.</v>

01:53:18.257 --> 01:53:20.250
<v ->Great, thanks so much.</v>

01:53:20.250 --> 01:53:24.233
Next step, we're gonna
have Zoe Harold with GPI.

01:53:28.330 --> 01:53:31.380
<v Zoe>Hi, thank you, so my
question for all the utilities</v>

01:53:31.380 --> 01:53:33.800
is how has egress and ingress included

01:53:33.800 --> 01:53:36.710
into the locational prioritization

01:53:36.710 --> 01:53:38.453
for the grid hardening activities?

01:53:48.190 --> 01:53:51.700
<v ->I can start, one of the
ways in which we're looking</v>

01:53:51.700 --> 01:53:54.743
at egress is when we're
evaluating underground.

01:53:56.790 --> 01:53:59.130
So we have some parts of the territory

01:53:59.130 --> 01:54:02.310
where there may be only a single road in

01:54:02.310 --> 01:54:03.950
or out of our community.

01:54:03.950 --> 01:54:07.280
And while, you know,
the risks for that scenario

01:54:07.280 --> 01:54:09.890
may be still maybe contact from object

01:54:09.890 --> 01:54:12.200
or wire to wire contact,

01:54:12.200 --> 01:54:15.960
which would identify cover
conductor over solution,

01:54:15.960 --> 01:54:19.070
we consider that egress
when kind of comparing

01:54:19.070 --> 01:54:22.343
that mitigation with
undergrounding as a mitigation.

01:54:24.003 --> 01:54:25.070
You know, there's many other factors

01:54:25.070 --> 01:54:27.023
to consider cost being one of them,

01:54:28.770 --> 01:54:30.480
also whether or not there's large trees

01:54:30.480 --> 01:54:35.480
in the area that could lead
to events, potential ignitions.

01:54:37.450 --> 01:54:39.760
So there's a lot of pieces
that go into an analysis,

01:54:39.760 --> 01:54:43.280
but that is one place in
which you're using egress.

01:54:43.280 --> 01:54:45.420
Another place in which we've looked at,

01:54:45.420 --> 01:54:50.320
it was when we did our areas
of concern inspections in 2020.

01:54:50.320 --> 01:54:53.550
We identified 17 areas of
concern, as I mentioned earlier,

01:54:53.550 --> 01:54:55.220
we looked at fuel conditions,

01:54:55.220 --> 01:54:59.900
weather conditions, wind
conditions, history of fire.

01:54:59.900 --> 01:55:02.520
But we also looked at
egress as part of that,

01:55:02.520 --> 01:55:06.430
to determine if those were
areas that rose to the top

01:55:06.430 --> 01:55:08.783
in terms of where we
should be doing inspections.

01:55:12.753 --> 01:55:17.120
<v ->And for PG&amp;E, just wanna
add on the egress side,</v>

01:55:17.120 --> 01:55:20.340
we also factored in
more on the scoping side,

01:55:20.340 --> 01:55:22.540
once we've identified
our high-risk areas

01:55:23.600 --> 01:55:26.470
as part of our alternative
assessment, we do factor in,

01:55:26.470 --> 01:55:29.660
we bring in our public
field safety specialists

01:55:29.660 --> 01:55:32.640
to come in and others to give their view

01:55:32.640 --> 01:55:36.170
and perspective on what the
egress ingress is in that area

01:55:36.170 --> 01:55:37.990
to help us better, you know,

01:55:37.990 --> 01:55:39.760
select the appropriate alternative,

01:55:39.760 --> 01:55:41.670
whether undergrounding
would be a better alternative

01:55:41.670 --> 01:55:45.210
or relocating some of our facilities

01:55:45.210 --> 01:55:48.980
out of kinda major highways,
roadways is one of them.

01:55:48.980 --> 01:55:50.660
A future improvement, which is something

01:55:50.660 --> 01:55:54.250
that we wanna improve
on is how do you build that

01:55:54.250 --> 01:55:56.490
into our risk model?

01:55:56.490 --> 01:56:00.140
Our earlier risk models had
an egress model in there.

01:56:00.140 --> 01:56:02.410
And after we did a deeper dive with it

01:56:02.410 --> 01:56:05.830
and brought in some
additional experts in that area,

01:56:05.830 --> 01:56:07.660
we found out that there
was a lot of opportunity

01:56:07.660 --> 01:56:10.090
to improve on that, so
where we're now looking

01:56:10.090 --> 01:56:12.530
to kind of build, you know, bring in

01:56:12.530 --> 01:56:15.470
a more informed egress/ingress wall

01:56:15.470 --> 01:56:16.913
to be part of our principle.

01:56:16.913 --> 01:56:18.270
So not only be part of the risk model,

01:56:18.270 --> 01:56:20.470
but also part of the scoping process,

01:56:20.470 --> 01:56:23.093
when we're developing our projects.

01:56:25.560 --> 01:56:30.470
<v ->Yeah, SDG&amp;E is the
same way, it's considered</v>

01:56:30.470 --> 01:56:32.850
in the scoping as we're doing kind of

01:56:32.850 --> 01:56:35.740
the alternatives analysis
on financial projects.

01:56:35.740 --> 01:56:38.660
It really gets factored in two ways,

01:56:38.660 --> 01:56:42.130
the, you know, wildfire
spread impact analysis,

01:56:42.130 --> 01:56:44.920
there's gonna be more impacts
in your near communities.

01:56:44.920 --> 01:56:47.260
So a lot of the
prioritization, like you'll see,

01:56:47.260 --> 01:56:49.520
it's a lot of the hardening
work we're doing

01:56:49.520 --> 01:56:51.313
are around our rural communities.

01:56:53.550 --> 01:56:57.260
So a lot of the work is
kinda focused there anyway,

01:56:57.260 --> 01:56:59.870
and we look at specifically
ingress and egress,

01:56:59.870 --> 01:57:03.730
it's the same type of
conversations that we have

01:57:03.730 --> 01:57:08.730
as far as one more data point
to potentially push something

01:57:09.220 --> 01:57:12.753
towards undergrounding
versus cover conductor,

01:57:13.610 --> 01:57:15.180
especially typically when we're talking

01:57:15.180 --> 01:57:16.280
about ingress egress concerns,

01:57:16.280 --> 01:57:20.500
where I was talking about
more concentrated populations

01:57:20.500 --> 01:57:25.500
and some benefits around
PSPS mitigation as well,

01:57:25.810 --> 01:57:29.023
by going with the
undergrounding mitigation.

01:57:33.490 --> 01:57:34.410
<v Zoe>Great, thanks everyone.</v>

01:57:34.410 --> 01:57:36.740
So it sounds like it's not integrated

01:57:36.740 --> 01:57:40.230
into the initial risk model.

01:57:40.230 --> 01:57:44.110
And then it's basically
integrated in specifically

01:57:44.110 --> 01:57:47.290
for undergrounding
or different mitigation

01:57:47.290 --> 01:57:50.200
after the risk model kind of determines

01:57:50.200 --> 01:57:52.923
the highest risk
circuits, is that correct?

01:57:57.440 --> 01:58:01.673
<v ->Yeah, for us, I think that's
appropriate characterization.</v>

01:58:02.520 --> 01:58:05.540
<v Mark>Yeah, for PG&amp;E it's similar.</v>

01:58:05.540 --> 01:58:09.180
It's once we've identified
our high risk areas

01:58:09.180 --> 01:58:11.090
and then we start
developing our alternatives

01:58:11.090 --> 01:58:14.740
and scoping out the
project egress/ingress issues

01:58:14.740 --> 01:58:18.253
are factored in there and
forms the preferred alternative.

01:58:21.150 --> 01:58:24.000
<v Tyson>Yeah, and that's the
same for SDG&amp;E as well.</v>

01:58:25.260 --> 01:58:27.343
<v Zoe>Great, thank you.</v>

01:58:28.597 --> 01:58:31.900
<v ->I have a clarifying
question for PG&amp;E.</v>

01:58:35.160 --> 01:58:37.540
From what I remember, I
think egress used to be a factor

01:58:37.540 --> 01:58:40.193
within calculating risks and
now it's sort of decoupled

01:58:40.193 --> 01:58:45.193
and was sort of curious as
to why that was the choice

01:58:45.530 --> 01:58:47.270
or why that occurred.

01:58:47.270 --> 01:58:51.050
<v ->Yeah, earlier risk model
did factor in egress/ingress.</v>

01:58:51.050 --> 01:58:54.630
And what we did is we started
doing some benchmarking

01:58:54.630 --> 01:58:58.800
and brought in other folks,
other experts in that field

01:58:58.800 --> 01:59:00.060
of egress ingress.

01:59:00.060 --> 01:59:02.530
And they took a look at
and reviewed the model

01:59:02.530 --> 01:59:05.260
and gave us some really good feedback

01:59:05.260 --> 01:59:07.330
that there are really
a lot of opportunities

01:59:07.330 --> 01:59:10.210
that we could take on
improving that model.

01:59:10.210 --> 01:59:14.240
And so that's been kind
of a, we took it off the,

01:59:14.240 --> 01:59:18.510
off of our models while we work
to get a more informed model

01:59:18.510 --> 01:59:20.930
that better reflects the
egress ingress issues.

01:59:20.930 --> 01:59:23.210
So that's kind of the reason for it.

01:59:23.210 --> 01:59:26.010
We took it out because
we're working towards

01:59:26.010 --> 01:59:28.810
kind of find some
additional help in that space

01:59:28.810 --> 01:59:31.113
to build up an egress ingress model.

01:59:35.272 --> 01:59:36.572
<v ->Okay, thank you so much.</v>

01:59:37.582 --> 01:59:40.510
With that, we're going to
move on to Henry Burton

01:59:40.510 --> 01:59:41.997
with Cal Advocates.

01:59:46.002 --> 01:59:49.669
<v ->Okay, good morning,
everyone hear me okay?</v>

01:59:51.190 --> 01:59:55.170
Okay, thanks, I think the
first question I wanna ask

01:59:55.170 --> 02:00:00.170
is for your asset inspections,
how do you determine

02:00:01.430 --> 02:00:06.260
which asset inspections
to perform in the earlier part

02:00:06.260 --> 02:00:08.090
of the year before the wildfire season?

02:00:08.090 --> 02:00:10.910
So let's say January through July,

02:00:10.910 --> 02:00:14.690
before the really peak
wildfire risk period.

02:00:14.690 --> 02:00:17.270
How do you sort of
sequence and prioritize

02:00:17.270 --> 02:00:20.380
your asset inspections and determine

02:00:20.380 --> 02:00:21.780
which one should come first?

02:00:22.850 --> 02:00:24.180
Let's start with PG&amp;E.

02:00:27.040 --> 02:00:30.180
<v ->So I think one of
the things we look at,</v>

02:00:30.180 --> 02:00:32.360
I think you touched on it
is we really wanna get all

02:00:32.360 --> 02:00:35.630
our inspections done
before the peak fire season.

02:00:35.630 --> 02:00:37.970
And I think we're aiming for, you know,

02:00:37.970 --> 02:00:40.630
by before the end of July or sooner,

02:00:40.630 --> 02:00:44.230
this allows us to address
any of the nonconformances

02:00:44.230 --> 02:00:46.230
that if there's an immediate repairs,

02:00:46.230 --> 02:00:48.850
we have enough time to deal with them

02:00:48.850 --> 02:00:50.490
before peak fire season occurs.

02:00:50.490 --> 02:00:54.140
So definitely from that perspective,

02:00:54.140 --> 02:00:57.920
we've talked about, you
know, for the different tiers,

02:00:57.920 --> 02:01:00.230
we're looking at 100%
of our assets in tier three

02:01:00.230 --> 02:01:03.960
and the top third for
that year for tier two.

02:01:03.960 --> 02:01:06.380
And I think as we
start to prioritize that,

02:01:06.380 --> 02:01:08.870
I think we factor in, you
know, what are the assets

02:01:08.870 --> 02:01:11.090
that have kind of the
highest worst conditions,

02:01:11.090 --> 02:01:14.950
but it's also working with
our work execution teams of,

02:01:14.950 --> 02:01:17.210
you know, where we could, you know,

02:01:17.210 --> 02:01:21.320
efficiently deploy our resources
out to do the inspection.

02:01:21.320 --> 02:01:24.280
So we wanna make sure when we're sending

02:01:24.280 --> 02:01:26.750
our teams out there,
that if they could look

02:01:26.750 --> 02:01:29.130
at more than one set
of assets at that time,

02:01:29.130 --> 02:01:31.950
we wanna make sure
we factored that in there,

02:01:31.950 --> 02:01:34.770
so that we're not just
going a purely risk base,

02:01:34.770 --> 02:01:37.260
we're in a way that it sends resources

02:01:37.260 --> 02:01:40.297
to a multiple from
really better utilizing

02:01:47.810 --> 02:01:48.670
your resources and time.

02:01:48.670 --> 02:01:50.530
So really looking at what all the assets

02:01:50.530 --> 02:01:51.917
in that particular area, and
trying to prioritize kind of

02:01:51.917 --> 02:01:54.790
the highest risks for
those assets and then,

02:01:54.790 --> 02:01:57.761
you know, assigning
them all to kinda coincide.

02:01:57.761 --> 02:02:01.300
So it's kind of a blend of all
those different items there.

02:02:01.300 --> 02:02:03.530
And I think the key there is
that we wanna accomplish

02:02:03.530 --> 02:02:07.550
all those before July,
or if there's assets

02:02:07.550 --> 02:02:10.020
that we know have a higher risk profile,

02:02:10.020 --> 02:02:12.970
really trying to attack
those areas of the map

02:02:12.970 --> 02:02:13.870
sooner than later.

02:02:18.500 --> 02:02:21.040
<v ->Okay, but you are
doing inspections</v>

02:02:21.040 --> 02:02:22.220
throughout the year, right?

02:02:22.220 --> 02:02:24.000
So, I mean, you're
not able to complete all

02:02:24.000 --> 02:02:27.283
of your inspections by July, am I wrong?

02:02:37.310 --> 02:02:38.233
Did we lose Mark?

02:02:46.490 --> 02:02:47.323
What's that?

02:02:49.090 --> 02:02:51.553
<v Mark>So I'm not sure
how much you heard there.</v>

02:02:58.160 --> 02:03:01.410
<v ->Mark, it may help if you turn
off your background effects,</v>

02:03:01.410 --> 02:03:04.130
'cause I think we're
having bandwidth issues.

02:03:04.130 --> 02:03:05.610
<v Mark>All right, can
you hear me now?</v>

02:03:05.610 --> 02:03:06.760
<v ->Yes, that's better.</v>

02:03:06.760 --> 02:03:09.100
<v Mark>Okay, I'll just turn
off the camera in general.</v>

02:03:09.100 --> 02:03:11.880
I think it's easier for me
to manage it that way.

02:03:11.880 --> 02:03:15.537
So all our high fire
threat areas are tiers two

02:03:15.537 --> 02:03:17.310
and tier three will be done.

02:03:17.310 --> 02:03:21.070
Our plan is to complete all
those before the end of July.

02:03:21.070 --> 02:03:23.460
So that one's pretty
clear, but to balance

02:03:23.460 --> 02:03:28.460
in the non wildfire areas,
tier one, I think those we have

02:03:30.170 --> 02:03:31.280
the bounce of the year.

02:03:31.280 --> 02:03:34.850
So those get prioritized
in a different timeframe.

02:03:34.850 --> 02:03:36.987
I don't know if that helps-
<v ->Yeah, it helps.</v>

02:03:36.987 --> 02:03:38.980
<v Mark>About the tier ones.</v>

02:03:38.980 --> 02:03:41.533
<v ->No, that's helpful
clarification, thank you.</v>

02:03:42.493 --> 02:03:45.273
Okay, SCE, could you
answer the same question?

02:03:46.270 --> 02:03:49.330
<v ->Yes, I took off my
background affects,</v>

02:03:49.330 --> 02:03:51.883
so hopefully that helps.

02:03:51.883 --> 02:03:56.240
In a similar, we're
focused on high fire parts

02:03:56.240 --> 02:03:57.910
of the service territory
early in the year,

02:03:57.910 --> 02:03:59.710
so our plan is to finish

02:03:59.710 --> 02:04:01.593
over high fire inspections in August.

02:04:03.441 --> 02:04:06.350
And then after that, then
we move on to the parts

02:04:06.350 --> 02:04:09.820
of the service territory that's
outside of high fire areas.

02:04:09.820 --> 02:04:14.100
But within the high fire,
we're also look to prioritize,

02:04:14.100 --> 02:04:15.740
you know, I showed you that four by four

02:04:15.740 --> 02:04:19.160
that we have that has probability

02:04:19.160 --> 02:04:21.030
and consequence on the axes.

02:04:21.030 --> 02:04:23.150
And so we're looking
to do earlier in the year,

02:04:23.150 --> 02:04:25.240
the ones with higher probability
and higher consequences

02:04:25.240 --> 02:04:26.370
in the upper right.

02:04:26.370 --> 02:04:28.980
And then kinda ride that risk curve down

02:04:28.980 --> 02:04:30.770
as we do inspections
throughout the year.

02:04:30.770 --> 02:04:33.170
Now that is subject to
operational efficiencies.

02:04:34.530 --> 02:04:36.610
You wanna make sure that
when we send inspectors out,

02:04:36.610 --> 02:04:38.530
they're not like, you
know, jumping around

02:04:38.530 --> 02:04:41.033
the whole territory, can be inefficient.

02:04:41.880 --> 02:04:45.620
But, you know, looking
to the highest risk early on

02:04:45.620 --> 02:04:48.233
while accounting for
operational efficiencies.

02:04:51.780 --> 02:04:53.220
<v ->Thank you, and SDG&amp;E.</v>

02:04:55.310 --> 02:04:58.573
<v ->Yeah, so for our
inspections again,</v>

02:04:59.560 --> 02:05:01.350
the compliance-based inspections,

02:05:01.350 --> 02:05:03.550
we're just gonna be
doing throughout the year

02:05:03.550 --> 02:05:08.030
on our normal schedule
using the interval process.

02:05:08.030 --> 02:05:11.570
But for the specific
tier three inspections

02:05:11.570 --> 02:05:16.370
that are specifically designed
to reduce wildfire risk,

02:05:16.370 --> 02:05:20.020
those are done by 3.31 every year.

02:05:20.020 --> 02:05:24.040
So again, with the goal of
getting them done very early

02:05:24.040 --> 02:05:26.270
in the year to have
the time to complete all

02:05:26.270 --> 02:05:29.630
of the emergency or priority findings

02:05:29.630 --> 02:05:31.680
that come out of that
before fire season.

02:05:34.290 --> 02:05:38.070
<v ->So that's the tier
three HFTD areas?</v>

02:05:38.070 --> 02:05:41.950
<v ->Yeah, the tier three
HFTD ground inspections,</v>

02:05:41.950 --> 02:05:45.220
the additional incremental
ones we do every year.

02:05:45.220 --> 02:05:47.513
<v ->Okay, and what
about tier two areas?</v>

02:05:49.000 --> 02:05:53.180
<v ->Tier two areas, we have
the drone program this year,</v>

02:05:53.180 --> 02:05:56.383
but no, we don't have
any specific programs

02:05:56.383 --> 02:05:59.876
that are targeting the
tier two in the same way

02:05:59.876 --> 02:06:01.730
that we're doing in tier three.

02:06:01.730 --> 02:06:02.680
<v ->Great, thank you.</v>

02:06:10.367 --> 02:06:14.493
<v ->So next we'll have Will
Abrams with any question.</v>

02:06:16.030 --> 02:06:20.950
<v ->Thanks very much,
very helpful presentation,</v>

02:06:20.950 --> 02:06:22.540
very informative.

02:06:22.540 --> 02:06:24.990
I had just two points I
was hoping to follow up

02:06:24.990 --> 02:06:29.500
with PG&amp;E on if you could
just clarify it within your WMP.

02:06:29.500 --> 02:06:33.040
And then I had one
question for all panelists.

02:06:33.040 --> 02:06:38.040
So for PG&amp;E, in your WMP
you describe relative risk

02:06:38.780 --> 02:06:43.330
prioritization scores,
but in your presentation

02:06:43.330 --> 02:06:48.330
you identified a risk reduction
of 198 over 120 miles.

02:06:50.520 --> 02:06:52.900
So just try and understand
that because usually

02:06:52.900 --> 02:06:57.540
I see a risk reduction
stated as a ratio.

02:06:57.540 --> 02:07:00.520
And just wanted to see if
you could clarify that along

02:07:00.520 --> 02:07:04.180
with, in your WMP it
says there's a section

02:07:04.180 --> 02:07:07.210
on 106 that says finding fault

02:07:07.210 --> 02:07:10.520
with PG&amp;E's historical
equipment maintenance,

02:07:10.520 --> 02:07:12.300
but I didn't see in your presentation

02:07:12.300 --> 02:07:16.020
where you were
identifying infrastructure

02:07:16.020 --> 02:07:18.430
that caused problems in the past

02:07:18.430 --> 02:07:20.790
that you fixed in the future.

02:07:20.790 --> 02:07:23.790
As an example, with the
Kincade fire, I understand

02:07:23.790 --> 02:07:26.150
that there was infrastructure

02:07:26.150 --> 02:07:28.650
that was abandoned or decommissioned.

02:07:28.650 --> 02:07:32.830
And just trying to understand
if from that you went out

02:07:32.830 --> 02:07:36.220
and sort of made sure
that other infrastructure

02:07:36.220 --> 02:07:38.950
that was decommissioned
was not, you know,

02:07:38.950 --> 02:07:40.580
not still energized.

02:07:40.580 --> 02:07:44.560
And then the question for all the panels

02:07:44.560 --> 02:07:47.040
to follow up on Dr. Mitchell's question,

02:07:47.040 --> 02:07:49.280
which is around the cover conductors,

02:07:49.280 --> 02:07:51.410
and just wanting to know specifically

02:07:51.410 --> 02:07:55.750
after a catastrophic
wildfire, if it is your practice

02:07:55.750 --> 02:07:58.530
to make sure that covered conductors

02:07:58.530 --> 02:08:01.980
are installed throughout
or after a wildfire,

02:08:01.980 --> 02:08:05.050
or do you install non-covered conductors

02:08:05.050 --> 02:08:07.280
and then sort of later assess

02:08:07.280 --> 02:08:11.200
where a covered
conductor might be situated.

02:08:11.200 --> 02:08:12.303
Thank you very much.

02:08:15.530 --> 02:08:17.370
<v Mark>All right, thank
you, Mr. Abrams.</v>

02:08:17.370 --> 02:08:20.030
This is Mark Esguerra for PG&amp;E,

02:08:20.030 --> 02:08:22.420
I think I got all three questions there.

02:08:22.420 --> 02:08:25.230
So the first question
on the relative risk

02:08:25.230 --> 02:08:29.020
versus what I reported out
on in terms of absolute risk.

02:08:29.020 --> 02:08:33.180
So one of the changes that
we made in this year's WMP

02:08:33.180 --> 02:08:35.190
was on our distribution risk model.

02:08:35.190 --> 02:08:37.880
I think I talked about the
various enhancements,

02:08:37.880 --> 02:08:40.250
but one of the improvements that we made

02:08:40.250 --> 02:08:41.810
is that we were able to move away

02:08:41.810 --> 02:08:45.600
from a relative risk
ranking, basically ranking

02:08:45.600 --> 02:08:49.623
our facilities relative to each other.

02:08:50.850 --> 02:08:53.430
And then, you know, so that
was more of a relative ranking

02:08:53.430 --> 02:08:55.320
where you didn't really
have an absolute score,

02:08:55.320 --> 02:08:57.930
a risk score for those facilities,

02:08:57.930 --> 02:09:01.150
but it was more relative to, you know,

02:09:01.150 --> 02:09:05.120
this facility is higher
risk than facility X or Y.

02:09:05.120 --> 02:09:07.350
Where this year, our
model that we've done

02:09:07.350 --> 02:09:10.240
is that we've actually been
able to enhance it to a point

02:09:10.240 --> 02:09:12.990
where now we're moving
away from the relative risk

02:09:12.990 --> 02:09:16.210
and getting into an absolute risk score

02:09:16.210 --> 02:09:19.210
where we can actually have, you know,

02:09:19.210 --> 02:09:21.900
a point score where
you can actually add them

02:09:21.900 --> 02:09:23.690
or subtract them for that matter,

02:09:23.690 --> 02:09:26.940
or before using that
relative risk ranking,

02:09:26.940 --> 02:09:30.730
it wasn't quite as precise as that.

02:09:30.730 --> 02:09:34.540
So that was why this year we, you know,

02:09:34.540 --> 02:09:37.850
we were able to with
a lot more information,

02:09:37.850 --> 02:09:41.100
be able to show the absolute
risk score than we were

02:09:41.100 --> 02:09:43.990
in previous past where he was not quite

02:09:43.990 --> 02:09:45.200
as precise back then.

02:09:45.200 --> 02:09:47.680
So I'm not sure if
that helps Mr. Abram's

02:09:47.680 --> 02:09:49.350
on that first question?

02:09:49.350 --> 02:09:53.623
<v ->Yeah, just, is there a
denominator there to that 198?</v>

02:09:55.370 --> 02:09:58.680
<v Mark>That's based
off the multi attribute</v>

02:09:58.680 --> 02:10:00.983
value function units, so...

02:10:18.420 --> 02:10:23.166
All the information we could
provide that as a follow-up.

02:10:23.166 --> 02:10:26.937
And then the, oh, can you hear me now?

02:10:30.570 --> 02:10:33.540
<v ->I just caught the last
part, but I understand,</v>

02:10:33.540 --> 02:10:36.210
I guess we can follow up
after, that's fine, thank you.

02:10:36.210 --> 02:10:39.610
<v ->Yeah, so just to
restate, there's a formula</v>

02:10:39.610 --> 02:10:42.440
for the MAVF that we can provide and,

02:10:42.440 --> 02:10:44.833
you know, you can see
how that is computed.

02:10:46.160 --> 02:10:50.060
On the second part
here, to your question on,

02:10:50.060 --> 02:10:51.740
I think you were referring to, you know,

02:10:51.740 --> 02:10:53.710
the items that you
brought up the Kincade fire.

02:10:53.710 --> 02:10:55.420
So, you know, for those when we look

02:10:55.420 --> 02:10:59.500
at these investigations, as
well as when we have failures

02:10:59.500 --> 02:11:03.210
of our assets, we do
work to try to understand,

02:11:03.210 --> 02:11:04.630
you know, what failed, how it failed,

02:11:04.630 --> 02:11:05.800
what's the extent of condition.

02:11:05.800 --> 02:11:07.870
And for that particular scenario,

02:11:07.870 --> 02:11:11.350
it was dealing with idle lines,

02:11:11.350 --> 02:11:14.890
as well as a configuration
of how we've set up

02:11:14.890 --> 02:11:18.040
on our structures, a dead
end on our structures.

02:11:18.040 --> 02:11:19.920
And so we've identified, you know,

02:11:19.920 --> 02:11:21.990
where are all the idle facilities

02:11:21.990 --> 02:11:24.860
within the service character
within high-five third areas

02:11:24.860 --> 02:11:28.170
and have developed our
plan to not only ensure

02:11:28.170 --> 02:11:31.250
that they're de-energized,
but also making sure

02:11:31.250 --> 02:11:33.310
that they're grounded
appropriately and in a plan

02:11:33.310 --> 02:11:38.310
to effectively remove
those facilities to address,

02:11:38.930 --> 02:11:41.350
you know, any risks that are out there

02:11:41.350 --> 02:11:42.580
with those facilities.

02:11:42.580 --> 02:11:44.070
So those were kind of like-

02:11:45.260 --> 02:11:47.960
<v ->Sorry, and just, is
that within your plan?</v>

02:11:47.960 --> 02:11:49.680
<v Mark>That's within our plan</v>

02:11:49.680 --> 02:11:51.280
on the idle facilities, correct.

02:11:52.310 --> 02:11:54.133
<v ->That's in the WMP, thank you.</v>

02:11:58.140 --> 02:12:00.350
<v Mark>And then the
third question, I'm sorry,</v>

02:12:00.350 --> 02:12:01.980
I forgot what the third question was,

02:12:01.980 --> 02:12:03.470
but I know it was general to all panels,

02:12:03.470 --> 02:12:05.240
if you could restate that.

02:12:05.240 --> 02:12:06.913
<v ->Sure, sorry about that.</v>

02:12:07.754 --> 02:12:09.960
So, trying to understand following up

02:12:09.960 --> 02:12:12.100
on Dr. Mitchell's question,

02:12:12.100 --> 02:12:17.100
if after a catastrophic wildfire
occurs and you are getting

02:12:18.940 --> 02:12:23.940
the lines back up, are you
installing covered conductors

02:12:25.060 --> 02:12:29.300
right away or are you just
installing regular conductors

02:12:29.300 --> 02:12:31.560
and then later going
back and identifying

02:12:31.560 --> 02:12:34.300
whether a cover
conductor is appropriate?

02:12:34.300 --> 02:12:38.390
<v Mark>Oh yeah, no, we went
through this last year with,</v>

02:12:38.390 --> 02:12:41.360
when we had the
lightning induced wildfires

02:12:41.360 --> 02:12:43.180
in a significant modern
facilities were damaged

02:12:43.180 --> 02:12:47.260
and we have a fire rebuild
standard that we deploy.

02:12:47.260 --> 02:12:50.870
So it's provided to our teams.

02:12:50.870 --> 02:12:54.060
And in fact, when we, this past year,

02:12:54.060 --> 02:12:57.400
we set up a dedicated branch to support

02:12:57.400 --> 02:13:02.070
the team providing restoration
on the rebuildable facility.

02:13:02.070 --> 02:13:04.490
'Cause some of those
times we've already prepared

02:13:04.490 --> 02:13:08.210
job packages that align with kind

02:13:08.210 --> 02:13:10.170
of our system hardening
plans and a lot of ways

02:13:10.170 --> 02:13:13.740
that we provide that to
help the field move forward.

02:13:13.740 --> 02:13:16.240
But to answer your
question, in the high fire areas

02:13:16.240 --> 02:13:17.760
that had been damaged by actual fires,

02:13:17.760 --> 02:13:19.570
we're going back with
our fire rebuild standard,

02:13:19.570 --> 02:13:21.670
which would call for covered conductor,

02:13:21.670 --> 02:13:24.270
more resilient poles, the change out

02:13:24.270 --> 02:13:27.130
of the various equipment to make them,

02:13:27.130 --> 02:13:28.850
you know, fire safe.

02:13:28.850 --> 02:13:31.280
So that the answer is yes for PG&amp;E.

02:13:35.510 --> 02:13:36.343
<v ->Thank you.</v>

02:13:38.460 --> 02:13:41.720
<v ->For Southern
California, similar,</v>

02:13:41.720 --> 02:13:46.040
our standard in high fire
now is to use cover conductor.

02:13:46.040 --> 02:13:49.640
So after a fire event,
when we're rebuilding,

02:13:49.640 --> 02:13:51.470
we're using cover conductor.

02:13:51.470 --> 02:13:52.940
There may be some
scenarios where there's

02:13:52.940 --> 02:13:57.940
like a small event or
outage that happens

02:13:58.650 --> 02:14:00.710
and to get customers
back up or, you know,

02:14:00.710 --> 02:14:03.690
replacing with bare
wire in a small scenario.

02:14:03.690 --> 02:14:06.300
But the standard is to
go with cover conductors.

02:14:06.300 --> 02:14:08.397
So for large rebuilds or after fire,

02:14:08.397 --> 02:14:10.397
that's what we're doing.

02:14:13.470 --> 02:14:15.140
<v ->For SDG&amp;E, this is Jonathan,</v>

02:14:15.140 --> 02:14:18.530
we would be similar, right
where if it was depending

02:14:18.530 --> 02:14:21.260
on the scale of the fire,
if it was extensive enough

02:14:21.260 --> 02:14:24.250
where it burned down
much of the structures

02:14:24.250 --> 02:14:26.660
and much of the wires
and equipment with it,

02:14:26.660 --> 02:14:30.610
the full rebuild would
take place in this standard,

02:14:30.610 --> 02:14:32.540
using covered conductor.

02:14:32.540 --> 02:14:35.690
If it was a much smaller
impact where the poles,

02:14:35.690 --> 02:14:40.230
or poles that was already
hardened previously,

02:14:40.230 --> 02:14:42.970
and then we might put back the conductor

02:14:42.970 --> 02:14:46.880
just because the loading may not take

02:14:46.880 --> 02:14:48.220
the cover conductor, right?

02:14:48.220 --> 02:14:51.310
However, we would also
consider how long the customers

02:14:51.310 --> 02:14:52.143
have been out, right?

02:14:52.143 --> 02:14:56.560
So the priority would be
the balanced with the fact

02:14:56.560 --> 02:14:58.590
that customers need
to have power back on.

02:14:58.590 --> 02:15:02.600
And that we would come
back and revisit the area

02:15:02.600 --> 02:15:05.660
to the covered conductor down the road.

02:15:05.660 --> 02:15:07.790
So depending on how fast we are.

02:15:07.790 --> 02:15:08.850
So we just have to restored,

02:15:08.850 --> 02:15:11.203
how much extensive the damage was.

02:15:12.850 --> 02:15:13.683
<v ->Thank you.</v>

02:15:19.460 --> 02:15:21.150
<v ->Okay, thanks so much.</v>

02:15:21.150 --> 02:15:24.483
Going into some of the chat questions.

02:15:25.594 --> 02:15:29.263
Question from Jacqueline
Ayer with the Acton town council.

02:15:30.100 --> 02:15:34.753
So this is directed primarily
to SCE to begin with,

02:15:36.400 --> 02:15:41.400
dealing with the 41 46
mile per hour threshold

02:15:41.470 --> 02:15:46.350
for windblown debris is apparently

02:15:46.350 --> 02:15:47.860
for a covered conductor circuits.

02:15:47.860 --> 02:15:49.550
You're still using that threshold

02:15:50.650 --> 02:15:52.480
and not taking
advantage of the benefits.

02:15:52.480 --> 02:15:55.850
And so I wanted clarification
as to why that threshold

02:15:55.850 --> 02:15:58.730
is not being raised
since covered conductor

02:15:58.730 --> 02:16:01.950
should protect against windblown debris.

02:16:01.950 --> 02:16:06.340
And then moving on to PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E,

02:16:06.340 --> 02:16:10.010
just wanted to kind of
lead into the question

02:16:10.010 --> 02:16:14.330
of how are thresholds for
PSPS events changing due

02:16:14.330 --> 02:16:16.380
to the installation of
covered conductor.

02:16:18.100 --> 02:16:21.290
<v ->Yeah, thank you Andie
and thank you Jacqueline</v>

02:16:21.290 --> 02:16:22.223
for the question.

02:16:23.608 --> 02:16:26.910
So I think the section in
the WMP that's referenced

02:16:26.910 --> 02:16:30.650
says that we consider national
service wind advisory levels,

02:16:30.650 --> 02:16:33.180
which is the 31 46.

02:16:33.180 --> 02:16:36.070
However, when we deploy cover conductor,

02:16:36.070 --> 02:16:38.840
the threshold we use
is the national service

02:16:38.840 --> 02:16:41.093
high wind advisory
level, which is 40 58.

02:16:43.915 --> 02:16:46.710
And so that does get
bumped up, you know,

02:16:46.710 --> 02:16:48.240
of course there's other considerations

02:16:48.240 --> 02:16:51.640
when we set the thresholds, you know,

02:16:51.640 --> 02:16:54.620
based on that particular
circuit in question

02:16:54.620 --> 02:16:56.850
and the factors around
that particular circuit,

02:16:56.850 --> 02:17:01.083
but generally speaking, it
moves up to the 40 58 level.

02:17:05.360 --> 02:17:07.820
<v Koko>Russell, but
before we move on Andie</v>

02:17:07.820 --> 02:17:08.740
to the other questions,

02:17:08.740 --> 02:17:11.670
I think there was one
other leading question

02:17:11.670 --> 02:17:15.920
to Jacqueline's, which was, I
believe in your presentation,

02:17:15.920 --> 02:17:20.920
you had indicated a
SCE microgrid project.

02:17:21.390 --> 02:17:23.130
And I believe the question was

02:17:23.130 --> 02:17:25.013
where that project was located.

02:17:26.450 --> 02:17:28.940
<v ->Yeah, I'm not at
liberty to share exactly</v>

02:17:28.940 --> 02:17:32.150
where it's located, but I
can say it's in tier three,

02:17:32.150 --> 02:17:35.250
it includes 189 residential customers,

02:17:35.250 --> 02:17:39.433
26 low-income customers and
16 non-residential customers.

02:17:40.315 --> 02:17:41.500
We're not ready to
share it 'cause we're right

02:17:41.500 --> 02:17:43.260
in the middle of the RFP.

02:17:43.260 --> 02:17:47.590
And, you know, we're
about to make the final award.

02:17:47.590 --> 02:17:50.240
And so once we do that, I
think we can be more public

02:17:50.240 --> 02:17:51.580
about where it's located.

02:17:51.580 --> 02:17:53.860
But it is in a tier three area,

02:17:53.860 --> 02:17:56.760
an area that has been impacted by PSPS.

02:17:56.760 --> 02:17:58.940
When we looked at
the microgrid location,

02:17:58.940 --> 02:18:00.430
we looked at PSPS history,

02:18:00.430 --> 02:18:02.030
we looked at circuit configuration,

02:18:02.030 --> 02:18:04.210
planned wildfire mitigation work,

02:18:04.210 --> 02:18:05.690
customer profiles in the area.

02:18:05.690 --> 02:18:07.700
So all of that factored in costs,

02:18:07.700 --> 02:18:10.230
all of that factored
into kind of the location

02:18:10.230 --> 02:18:13.910
that we wanted to try and pilot this.

02:18:13.910 --> 02:18:16.210
And like I said, soon we should be able

02:18:16.210 --> 02:18:18.500
to kind of go public with the location,

02:18:18.500 --> 02:18:20.387
but we're right in the
middle of that RFP.

02:18:30.470 --> 02:18:32.803
<v ->Yeah, thanks so much
for catching that Koko.</v>

02:18:33.680 --> 02:18:38.270
I guess, going into PG&amp;E and
SDG&amp;E curious how thresholds

02:18:38.270 --> 02:18:40.510
would be changing due
to the implementation

02:18:40.510 --> 02:18:42.603
of cover conductor for PSPS purposes.

02:18:46.430 --> 02:18:48.760
<v ->This is SDG&amp;E, Jonathan.</v>

02:18:48.760 --> 02:18:51.637
So just wanted to
highlight the fact that,

02:18:51.637 --> 02:18:53.713
you know, we're still
early in our experience

02:18:53.713 --> 02:18:57.260
for the cover conductor,
but we do expect

02:18:57.260 --> 02:18:59.810
that our thresholds would be higher

02:18:59.810 --> 02:19:02.550
as we gain more experience
with the cover conductor

02:19:02.550 --> 02:19:06.250
and through PSPS
events to how it performs.

02:19:06.250 --> 02:19:08.750
As well as, you know,
depending on the PSPS event

02:19:08.750 --> 02:19:11.700
and area and other
considerations, right?

02:19:11.700 --> 02:19:15.970
With what may happen, we may come up

02:19:15.970 --> 02:19:19.800
with varied PSPS events,
we just wanna, you know,

02:19:19.800 --> 02:19:24.800
make sure we learn and then
apply the learnings carefully.

02:19:25.360 --> 02:19:28.983
So but we do see probably
an improved PSPS impact.

02:19:34.570 --> 02:19:37.130
<v Mark>Yeah, and this
is Mark for PG&amp;E.</v>

02:19:37.130 --> 02:19:41.170
Very similar, we're in
our early stages of seeing

02:19:41.170 --> 02:19:43.520
how the covered conductor performs.

02:19:43.520 --> 02:19:44.860
We all recognize that directionally

02:19:44.860 --> 02:19:48.170
it will raise the threshold.

02:19:48.170 --> 02:19:51.780
And, you know, we
have a lot of our models

02:19:51.780 --> 02:19:54.230
and information that
we've compiled over time.

02:19:54.230 --> 02:19:56.730
We have our outage
producing winds threshold,

02:19:56.730 --> 02:19:58.570
but it was based off
non-covered conductor.

02:19:58.570 --> 02:20:01.940
And so we're trying to
understand how that'll change,

02:20:01.940 --> 02:20:03.210
which we believe it'll directionally

02:20:03.210 --> 02:20:06.780
go higher as they perform.

02:20:06.780 --> 02:20:09.090
What some of the
learnings that we did get

02:20:09.090 --> 02:20:11.640
through this past year, particularly

02:20:11.640 --> 02:20:14.013
when we had the major winds events.

02:20:14.930 --> 02:20:17.770
What we did notice
here is our facilities

02:20:17.770 --> 02:20:19.980
that had the covered
conductor versus the facilities

02:20:19.980 --> 02:20:23.550
that didn't, we definitely
saw that, you know,

02:20:23.550 --> 02:20:26.290
the ability to restore the ones
that had covered conductor

02:20:26.290 --> 02:20:28.700
and the damage that
the hazards and damage

02:20:28.700 --> 02:20:32.350
that were inflicted upon
those were significantly less

02:20:32.350 --> 02:20:36.290
than what we saw for
other areas that were not,

02:20:36.290 --> 02:20:37.690
did not have the system hardening.

02:20:37.690 --> 02:20:40.890
So, you know, it was
just more a qualitative

02:20:40.890 --> 02:20:42.580
and we're working
towards quantifying that

02:20:42.580 --> 02:20:45.310
to be able to build
that in our risk models,

02:20:45.310 --> 02:20:48.430
as well as how we
incorporate those thresholds

02:20:48.430 --> 02:20:50.403
into our PSPS decisions.

02:20:55.160 --> 02:20:56.360
<v ->Great, thanks so much.</v>

02:20:57.680 --> 02:21:00.743
Okay, are there any
other questions in the chat?

02:21:02.710 --> 02:21:06.800
<v Koko>There is one
specific question</v>

02:21:06.800 --> 02:21:11.800
for PG&amp;E that I think would
be hopefully a quick response.

02:21:12.550 --> 02:21:15.710
It comes from Martin Kurtovich

02:21:15.710 --> 02:21:19.090
of the safety policy division.

02:21:19.090 --> 02:21:24.080
And the question is how
does PG&amp;E's WMP relate

02:21:24.080 --> 02:21:26.440
to its current FERC proceeding

02:21:26.440 --> 02:21:28.720
and the proposed wildfire project

02:21:28.720 --> 02:21:31.083
in PG&amp;E's application
in that proceeding?

02:21:33.240 --> 02:21:35.300
<v Maark>It's all right, I
believe this is dealing</v>

02:21:35.300 --> 02:21:36.960
with the TO rate case if it's dealing

02:21:36.960 --> 02:21:41.830
with the TO rate case,
I'd say that the investments

02:21:41.830 --> 02:21:43.850
we have in our WMP are captured

02:21:43.850 --> 02:21:47.023
in our going forward TO rate case.

02:21:48.397 --> 02:21:50.580
I'm not sure if that
answers the question.

02:21:50.580 --> 02:21:51.630
<v Koko>Thanks Mark.</v>

02:21:56.620 --> 02:21:59.520
<v ->There's another
question in there for SCE</v>

02:21:59.520 --> 02:22:00.710
that I can address quickly.

02:22:00.710 --> 02:22:03.190
It was about the vertical switches

02:22:03.190 --> 02:22:06.943
'cause I had them on a
slide in both ongoing and new.

02:22:07.827 --> 02:22:10.340
I think it was a little confusing.

02:22:10.340 --> 02:22:12.890
The reason we had them
an ongoing is initially did

02:22:12.890 --> 02:22:16.640
the inspection efforts for
vertical switches back in 2019,

02:22:16.640 --> 02:22:20.090
and then in 2020, that's
when we were kind of selecting

02:22:20.090 --> 02:22:22.580
which scope we wanted to do in 2021.

02:22:22.580 --> 02:22:26.700
So ongoing and that
moved in assessing them

02:22:26.700 --> 02:22:28.650
and kind of planning to do the work new

02:22:28.650 --> 02:22:32.050
and that we haven't actually
replaced any until 2021.

02:22:32.050 --> 02:22:33.823
So, sorry for that confusion.

02:22:38.140 --> 02:22:40.903
<v ->Yeah, thanks so much
for covering that quickly.</v>

02:22:42.890 --> 02:22:44.890
So going into more
of the wildfire safety

02:22:44.890 --> 02:22:49.890
division questions, this is
again, mostly directed at PG&amp;E,

02:22:50.170 --> 02:22:53.380
but was hoping to get
sort of a brief explanation

02:22:53.380 --> 02:22:56.950
as to the status of any
pilots on emerging technology

02:22:56.950 --> 02:23:01.017
that are being utilized and what PG&amp;E

02:23:02.350 --> 02:23:04.660
is moving forward to in that regard.

02:23:04.660 --> 02:23:09.660
And then also had a question
for SDG&amp;E about the lack

02:23:10.310 --> 02:23:14.640
of continuous monitoring
sensors being used

02:23:14.640 --> 02:23:17.350
and wanted more information as to why

02:23:17.350 --> 02:23:21.243
that sort of technology wasn't
being utilized at this time.

02:23:24.210 --> 02:23:27.150
<v Mark>Okay, I'll
start off for PG&amp;E.</v>

02:23:27.150 --> 02:23:28.820
As far as emerging technologies,

02:23:28.820 --> 02:23:31.500
we have a few of the
one more notable one

02:23:31.500 --> 02:23:36.500
that we're working towards is
the REFCL emerging technology.

02:23:36.790 --> 02:23:39.550
I think you heard Edison
is also exploring that.

02:23:39.550 --> 02:23:44.550
We have deployed,
we're at one station feeding

02:23:45.510 --> 02:23:50.510
a few distribution circuits
in our Calistoga area.

02:23:51.790 --> 02:23:55.160
So we've had the ground
fault neutralizer installed

02:23:55.160 --> 02:23:59.000
as well as the suppression
coil and it's interesting.

02:23:59.000 --> 02:24:02.680
And SCE, they also had the
isolation transformers as well,

02:24:02.680 --> 02:24:05.560
and we have that all kind
of in wrapped in one pilot,

02:24:05.560 --> 02:24:07.340
we had those isolation
transformers installed

02:24:07.340 --> 02:24:09.050
on the distribution circuits.

02:24:09.050 --> 02:24:10.660
The kind of status word is right now,

02:24:10.660 --> 02:24:12.810
the equipment all been installed.

02:24:12.810 --> 02:24:14.773
We are doing our commissioning and...

02:24:22.890 --> 02:24:25.083
<v ->Mark, I think
we lost you again.</v>

02:24:30.450 --> 02:24:31.503
<v Mark>Can you hear me now?</v>

02:24:34.660 --> 02:24:35.650
<v ->Okay, you're back.</v>

02:24:35.650 --> 02:24:37.530
<v ->Can you hear me now?</v>
<v ->Yeah.</v>

02:24:37.530 --> 02:24:39.360
<v Mark>Yeah, I'm not
sure what's going on.</v>

02:24:39.360 --> 02:24:41.240
Yeah, sorry for the
bandwidth issues here.

02:24:41.240 --> 02:24:44.350
So we're in the middle of
commissioning the REFCL system

02:24:44.350 --> 02:24:46.510
and hopefully pretty
soon, we're gonna be able

02:24:46.510 --> 02:24:50.910
to stress test it with
applying, you know,

02:24:50.910 --> 02:24:52.970
test faults onto the system.

02:24:52.970 --> 02:24:56.160
And then we could see how
the devices are responding

02:24:56.160 --> 02:24:57.670
to get again, better learning.

02:24:57.670 --> 02:25:00.420
So that's moving along pretty well.

02:25:00.420 --> 02:25:02.480
We were hoping to
have that up and running

02:25:02.480 --> 02:25:05.920
and have a final
report later on this year,

02:25:05.920 --> 02:25:07.890
but really start to
get results, you know,

02:25:07.890 --> 02:25:08.920
this first half of the year.

02:25:08.920 --> 02:25:12.440
And then the other pilot
that we are engaging in

02:25:12.440 --> 02:25:16.410
is the DTS fast pilot that
we've listed in our WMP.

02:25:16.410 --> 02:25:20.100
And effectively, that pilot
is really trying to catch,

02:25:20.100 --> 02:25:23.120
you know, objects that
are flying into the lines.

02:25:23.120 --> 02:25:26.940
Or even if the line is
to fail, trying to catch it,

02:25:26.940 --> 02:25:29.780
catch it before it
actually hits the ground

02:25:29.780 --> 02:25:32.980
or before the object hits the lines.

02:25:32.980 --> 02:25:36.620
So it's working off of a laser
technology to kind of see

02:25:36.620 --> 02:25:40.570
if we can catch those concerns,

02:25:40.570 --> 02:25:42.260
and then quickly de-energized the line.

02:25:42.260 --> 02:25:46.810
So we're in early stages of
doing engineering and design.

02:25:46.810 --> 02:25:49.410
We have a pilot location
that we've tested out

02:25:49.410 --> 02:25:52.820
in a non wildfire area,
and now we're moving it up

02:25:52.820 --> 02:25:56.170
to an area that's in
higher wildfire areas

02:25:56.170 --> 02:25:58.570
and we're piloting a transmission

02:25:58.570 --> 02:25:59.440
and distribution circuit.

02:25:59.440 --> 02:26:01.700
I think for this year, we're
looking to get maybe more

02:26:01.700 --> 02:26:04.240
of the engineering and
planning done this year

02:26:04.240 --> 02:26:07.350
and really have those
deployed for next year.

02:26:07.350 --> 02:26:09.660
So that's kinda an emerging technology

02:26:09.660 --> 02:26:11.433
that we're really focusing in on.

02:26:23.680 --> 02:26:26.020
<v ->Yeah, go ahead, thank you.</v>

02:26:26.020 --> 02:26:29.393
<v ->Thanks Andie, for
STG&amp;E, I wanted to highlight</v>

02:26:29.393 --> 02:26:32.570
the fact that we are
continuing to evaluate

02:26:32.570 --> 02:26:35.350
these emerging technologies and some

02:26:35.350 --> 02:26:39.760
of the continuous monitoring
technologies that are available

02:26:39.760 --> 02:26:41.940
because there are various
stages of development

02:26:41.940 --> 02:26:45.070
that we wanna make
sure that we understand

02:26:45.070 --> 02:26:48.720
what technologies can do and, you know,

02:26:48.720 --> 02:26:50.630
pull out time information.

02:26:50.630 --> 02:26:52.950
But we have the falling
conducted production

02:26:52.950 --> 02:26:56.650
and other protection
equipment that we use

02:26:56.650 --> 02:27:00.570
to identify and monitor
emphasis, continuous monitoring

02:27:00.570 --> 02:27:04.570
of our electric system and, you know,

02:27:04.570 --> 02:27:05.950
the attributes and characteristics

02:27:05.950 --> 02:27:08.897
upon our collective system,
like voltage and current

02:27:08.897 --> 02:27:13.150
and faults that would
monitor and trip accordingly

02:27:13.150 --> 02:27:14.740
and especially with
cover conductor defection,

02:27:14.740 --> 02:27:17.000
being enable to
de-energize the power line,

02:27:17.000 --> 02:27:19.420
or, you know, it falls to the ground

02:27:19.420 --> 02:27:20.633
is something that we're leveraging.

02:27:20.633 --> 02:27:25.350
And we are also trying
to make sure that we wait

02:27:25.350 --> 02:27:28.870
for our high-speed
communications initiative

02:27:28.870 --> 02:27:32.700
our project distribution
communication reliability

02:27:32.700 --> 02:27:34.600
initiative, or our improvement project

02:27:34.600 --> 02:27:39.240
that will have a live area
network that will help us,

02:27:39.240 --> 02:27:41.960
or wide area high-speed
network that will help us

02:27:41.960 --> 02:27:45.280
to put on more devices
for higher throughput,

02:27:45.280 --> 02:27:49.010
but also higher speed in communications

02:27:49.010 --> 02:27:52.220
and responding in the field.

02:27:52.220 --> 02:27:54.850
So it's important to
have that, you know,

02:27:54.850 --> 02:27:57.870
platform and being able
to leverage technology.

02:27:57.870 --> 02:28:00.830
Now, we have the cameras that we have

02:28:00.830 --> 02:28:03.120
for situational awareness,
as well as the weather stations

02:28:03.120 --> 02:28:05.236
that are providing us monitoring.

02:28:05.236 --> 02:28:08.127
So we feel like, within
the territory that we have

02:28:08.127 --> 02:28:11.880
and the ability to collaborate
with our, you know,

02:28:11.880 --> 02:28:14.910
community safety partners
with our different fire agencies,

02:28:14.910 --> 02:28:17.490
we have that collaborative effort

02:28:17.490 --> 02:28:20.480
that can keep an eye
on our system, on fire

02:28:20.480 --> 02:28:23.000
and emissions and internal resources,

02:28:23.000 --> 02:28:25.440
as well as community resources.

02:28:25.440 --> 02:28:27.990
But also the continuous
monitoring mentioned

02:28:27.990 --> 02:28:31.933
that we have from our system devices,

02:28:32.820 --> 02:28:34.080
as well as the section switches

02:28:34.080 --> 02:28:35.830
that are smart devices out there,

02:28:35.830 --> 02:28:39.587
at the various small
key locations mid circuit

02:28:39.587 --> 02:28:41.510
and at the substations,

02:28:41.510 --> 02:28:43.553
that can help us with the monitoring.

02:28:49.570 --> 02:28:54.570
<v ->Thanks so much,
circling back to TURN</v>

02:28:54.570 --> 02:28:57.210
either Katie Morsony or Marcel,

02:28:57.210 --> 02:29:00.823
how would do you wanna
ask another question?

02:29:01.730 --> 02:29:03.493
<v Katie>This is Katie for TURN.</v>

02:29:05.520 --> 02:29:09.180
I was hoping that Mark
could walk us through,

02:29:09.180 --> 02:29:13.060
there was two different risk
charts showing risk curves

02:29:13.060 --> 02:29:17.200
on slide four of the PG&amp;E presentation.

02:29:17.200 --> 02:29:22.200
And from my perspective, looking at it,

02:29:22.380 --> 02:29:26.457
it was showing basically that
the risk model previously used

02:29:26.457 --> 02:29:29.560
and the risk model used for this WMP

02:29:29.560 --> 02:29:34.150
prioritize completely
different circuits for mitigation.

02:29:35.130 --> 02:29:38.400
And I was hoping that Mark
could talk a little more about

02:29:40.300 --> 02:29:44.297
that divergence between
the two models and kind of

02:29:47.480 --> 02:29:52.060
how that impacted their
thinking, planning this WMP filing,

02:29:54.980 --> 02:29:59.380
you know, given that
maybe it was undermining

02:29:59.380 --> 02:30:04.380
the previous findings or risk
findings from previous WMPs.

02:30:08.240 --> 02:30:11.150
<v Mark>Yeah, well, thank
you for the question</v>

02:30:11.150 --> 02:30:16.150
and indefinitely when you,
that is the one you identified

02:30:16.340 --> 02:30:19.890
is actually, you know, you're spot on.

02:30:19.890 --> 02:30:23.130
When you look at a couple of
things here to point out again,

02:30:23.130 --> 02:30:26.180
when you look at the one,
the shape of the risk model

02:30:27.140 --> 02:30:30.610
versus the, you know,
the shape is different.

02:30:30.610 --> 02:30:32.890
I mean, they look the
same, but you know,

02:30:32.890 --> 02:30:36.680
the risk model in a, what
we're calling the 2018 model,

02:30:36.680 --> 02:30:41.133
the top curve, is a lot
sharper or chose, you know,

02:30:41.133 --> 02:30:45.160
that a fair amount
of the risk is only kind

02:30:45.160 --> 02:30:49.310
of the top portions of circuits
or circuit protection zones.

02:30:49.310 --> 02:30:52.000
And then when you look
at the shape on the bottom,

02:30:52.000 --> 02:30:54.050
it's not as steep, it's still steep,

02:30:54.050 --> 02:30:56.090
but not as steep as before.

02:30:56.090 --> 02:30:57.723
We're not that same level.

02:31:08.030 --> 02:31:10.140
<v ->Mark, I think we lost you.</v>

02:31:10.140 --> 02:31:12.530
<v Mark>Oh, okay,
let me see if it's...</v>

02:31:18.190 --> 02:31:19.703
<v ->But I think you might be back.</v>

02:31:38.038 --> 02:31:40.205
Mark, are you still there?

02:31:41.727 --> 02:31:43.518
<v Mark>I'm hear, can
you can hear me?</v>

02:31:43.518 --> 02:31:44.600
Can you hear me?
<v ->Okay.</v>

02:31:44.600 --> 02:31:47.860
<v ->All right.</v>
<v ->I can hear you now.</v>

02:31:47.860 --> 02:31:50.170
<v Mark>I can hear the
folks loud and clear,</v>

02:31:50.170 --> 02:31:53.080
I guess it might be on
my end where it's creating

02:31:53.080 --> 02:31:58.080
the bandwidth issue, but
definitely this change has,

02:31:59.140 --> 02:32:02.700
was definitely something
that caught a lot of our team.

02:32:02.700 --> 02:32:04.380
We didn't wanna take this lightly.

02:32:04.380 --> 02:32:07.760
We took a closer look at all
these, and as you can see,

02:32:07.760 --> 02:32:10.120
the colors have been
shifted meeting, you know,

02:32:10.120 --> 02:32:12.340
the items that were
blue, the top risk miles

02:32:12.340 --> 02:32:15.510
based on these
enhancements on our risk model

02:32:15.510 --> 02:32:16.990
has shown that, you
know, they're really,

02:32:16.990 --> 02:32:19.460
we're not really dealing
with the highest risk

02:32:19.460 --> 02:32:22.781
and that wasn't something that we wanted

02:32:22.781 --> 02:32:23.614
to go to take lightly.

02:32:23.614 --> 02:32:28.590
So, we did a lot of work
to pivot our portfolio prior

02:32:29.480 --> 02:32:32.210
to the filing to really, you know,

02:32:32.210 --> 02:32:34.270
be able to deal with
the highest risk items,

02:32:34.270 --> 02:32:35.840
'cause then what we're really focused on

02:32:35.840 --> 02:32:38.760
is trying to limit,
mitigate the highest risk

02:32:38.760 --> 02:32:41.180
and mitigate, you know,
catastrophic wildfire.

02:32:41.180 --> 02:32:43.960
So, we had to do a
lot of work to pivot that

02:32:43.960 --> 02:32:45.830
over to our portfolio.

02:32:45.830 --> 02:32:48.980
And that actually was some
of the challenges that we had,

02:32:48.980 --> 02:32:52.130
which is why we have a
lower production output

02:32:52.130 --> 02:32:54.090
that we're aiming for for this year.

02:32:54.090 --> 02:32:57.210
I think we, you know,
prior year we had over 300,

02:32:57.210 --> 02:33:00.570
we had to tamp that
down to 180, 180 miles,

02:33:00.570 --> 02:33:02.820
but our plan is, would
this enhance risk models

02:33:02.820 --> 02:33:06.020
that we'd be able to build
that pipeline to get it in

02:33:06.020 --> 02:33:07.463
for the future years.

02:33:08.560 --> 02:33:11.470
But we believe this model is
much more of an improvement

02:33:11.470 --> 02:33:14.380
factoring in a lot of the
different enhancements

02:33:14.380 --> 02:33:16.330
that we're learning from our equipment.

02:33:17.666 --> 02:33:21.370
And in feedback from other models

02:33:21.370 --> 02:33:23.370
and benchmark with
other folks that we believe

02:33:23.370 --> 02:33:26.370
were capturing the risk
a much more appropriate

02:33:26.370 --> 02:33:28.503
than we were before
in our earlier model.

02:33:35.370 --> 02:33:36.970
<v Katie>Is it the machine learning</v>

02:33:36.970 --> 02:33:39.430
that caused the big shift?

02:33:39.430 --> 02:33:41.760
I mean, I guess I'm trying to understand

02:33:41.760 --> 02:33:44.273
why we're seeing such a change now.

02:33:45.130 --> 02:33:48.190
<v Mark>Yeah, I'd say, and
I know we, unfortunately,</v>

02:33:48.190 --> 02:33:51.020
I wasn't a part of the presentation

02:33:51.020 --> 02:33:52.210
from yesterday's discussion.

02:33:52.210 --> 02:33:54.080
I know that Paul McGregor and team,

02:33:54.080 --> 02:33:56.480
they kinda went
through a lot of the details

02:33:56.480 --> 02:34:00.600
of the risk model there,
but I would say one

02:34:00.600 --> 02:34:04.480
of the big changes there
was on the fuel burnings

02:34:04.480 --> 02:34:07.230
on where we were
expecting the biggest risks.

02:34:07.230 --> 02:34:12.230
And so this had more of a
much more the revised model

02:34:12.550 --> 02:34:14.650
factoring in a lot more of the input

02:34:14.650 --> 02:34:16.570
and the modeling is focused more

02:34:16.570 --> 02:34:20.150
on where the fuels
are more likely to burn

02:34:20.150 --> 02:34:21.970
and kinda create this lateral effect

02:34:21.970 --> 02:34:24.620
and really cascading to other fuels.

02:34:24.620 --> 02:34:28.860
So I'd say that was probably
one of the bigger differences

02:34:29.730 --> 02:34:31.853
that really shifted our risk model.

02:34:37.170 --> 02:34:40.740
<v Katie>I have one other
quick follow-up on the PG&amp;E,</v>

02:34:40.740 --> 02:34:42.300
and this is just a clarification.

02:34:42.300 --> 02:34:47.300
On slide six you referred
to, does the in-flight projects

02:34:49.390 --> 02:34:54.210
being authorized, does
that mean that it's regulatory,

02:34:54.210 --> 02:34:57.010
like the CTC has authorized the project,

02:34:57.010 --> 02:35:00.633
or is it authorization by the WFRG?

02:35:01.600 --> 02:35:03.950
<v Mark>Yeah, it was
a more authorization</v>

02:35:03.950 --> 02:35:06.900
with our wildfire risk
governance committee.

02:35:06.900 --> 02:35:09.100
And typically, maybe
how that can also be said

02:35:09.100 --> 02:35:11.780
is that we've had authorization.

02:35:11.780 --> 02:35:15.360
And so our teams that
actually build out the pipeline

02:35:15.360 --> 02:35:17.170
for system hardening projects,

02:35:17.170 --> 02:35:21.030
they have it in their
hands and they're able

02:35:21.030 --> 02:35:23.830
to work on those and they've
gone through the engineering,

02:35:23.830 --> 02:35:26.750
or they're going through the
engineering design execution,

02:35:26.750 --> 02:35:29.160
the coordination
process to make it happen

02:35:29.160 --> 02:35:30.550
to get it built in the field.

02:35:30.550 --> 02:35:32.100
So we call it, those are in-flight

02:35:32.100 --> 02:35:34.440
that they're ongoing and
they're moving forward.

02:35:34.440 --> 02:35:37.930
And those have like the
highest likelihood of making

02:35:37.930 --> 02:35:40.880
their timeline in 2021 this year,

02:35:40.880 --> 02:35:43.230
because they've cleared
some of those early stages

02:35:43.230 --> 02:35:47.170
where the new projects
were really starting, you know,

02:35:47.170 --> 02:35:49.680
early on when those early
phases where we're feeding

02:35:49.680 --> 02:35:52.300
that pipeline of projects
through our scoping,

02:35:52.300 --> 02:35:55.460
engineering design,
kind of like the permitting

02:35:55.460 --> 02:35:57.650
review processes,
they're just starting that.

02:35:57.650 --> 02:35:59.280
And so we know that it's
gonna take time to build

02:35:59.280 --> 02:36:01.310
the inertia to get
those projects in there.

02:36:01.310 --> 02:36:04.360
So, we actually have a higher volume

02:36:04.360 --> 02:36:06.110
than the 99 miles in there,

02:36:06.110 --> 02:36:08.550
but we've discounted some of those miles

02:36:08.550 --> 02:36:11.020
because of just based
on our understanding

02:36:12.117 --> 02:36:13.767
of how long the process can take.

02:36:14.692 --> 02:36:17.180
So then what you're
seeing here is 180 miles,

02:36:17.180 --> 02:36:20.000
which reflects the miles were discounted

02:36:20.000 --> 02:36:23.030
for the, primarily under
the category B new projects,

02:36:23.030 --> 02:36:28.030
because the likelihood of
those all getting built, you know,

02:36:28.120 --> 02:36:31.272
without having some
risks that'll slow it down.

02:36:31.272 --> 02:36:33.030
You know, we felt that it would be kind

02:36:33.030 --> 02:36:35.910
of over too optimistic, so
what we're showing here

02:36:35.910 --> 02:36:38.200
is one that reflects kind
of the discounted miles

02:36:38.200 --> 02:36:40.133
of what will go through that pipeline.

02:36:44.620 --> 02:36:46.920
<v ->So we are out of
time, I do have one</v>

02:36:46.920 --> 02:36:49.110
quick clarification question involved

02:36:49.110 --> 02:36:50.350
with the inflight projects,

02:36:50.350 --> 02:36:53.773
and then we'll take
off for a lunch break.

02:36:55.210 --> 02:36:59.300
Do the inflight projects
consist of the original

02:36:59.300 --> 02:37:02.410
risk ranking the top
100 CPZ or is it based off

02:37:02.410 --> 02:37:04.323
of the new risk ranking?

02:37:06.560 --> 02:37:08.810
<v Mark>So the inflight projects</v>

02:37:08.810 --> 02:37:11.310
where some of those
projects that were in between,

02:37:12.640 --> 02:37:14.530
and they also were also projects

02:37:14.530 --> 02:37:18.880
that were maybe previously
identified in other models

02:37:18.880 --> 02:37:21.760
that we've had a fair
amount of engineering that,

02:37:21.760 --> 02:37:23.320
or work that was done.

02:37:23.320 --> 02:37:25.990
So when the new risk model came in,

02:37:25.990 --> 02:37:28.290
it didn't take much to
kinda package them up

02:37:28.290 --> 02:37:29.300
and move them forward.

02:37:29.300 --> 02:37:33.400
So it was a lot of work
that was already done,

02:37:33.400 --> 02:37:35.730
you know, as part of the previous model,

02:37:35.730 --> 02:37:37.860
as well as other
programs that had worked

02:37:37.860 --> 02:37:38.920
that maybe were paused.

02:37:38.920 --> 02:37:41.680
And we picked them
up to advance them over

02:37:42.520 --> 02:37:44.000
as the new risk model showed there

02:37:44.000 --> 02:37:45.600
that they had a higher priority.

02:37:51.580 --> 02:37:54.770
<v ->Thanks so much to all
the panelists for questions</v>

02:37:54.770 --> 02:37:56.883
and to the utilities for the responses.

02:37:57.800 --> 02:38:00.110
For all the remaining
questions, unfortunately,

02:38:00.110 --> 02:38:01.520
we won't be able to get to it now,

02:38:01.520 --> 02:38:06.420
but we suggest sending it
and encourage sending data

02:38:06.420 --> 02:38:09.838
across the utilities so you
could get your responses.

02:38:09.838 --> 02:38:12.790
And with that, we'll
meet back up at 1:15

02:38:12.790 --> 02:38:15.320
and folks, everyone
has a great lunch, thanks.

02:38:35.730 --> 02:38:38.960
<v ->That the February sunshine.</v>

02:38:38.960 --> 02:38:41.370
One more round to go and we're through.

02:38:41.370 --> 02:38:46.340
Hopefully it's been a productive
and beneficial two days.

02:38:46.340 --> 02:38:47.990
My name is Kevin Miller, I'm an analyst

02:38:47.990 --> 02:38:50.713
with the Wildfire State
Division of the CPUC.

02:38:51.590 --> 02:38:53.710
Our remaining topic area today

02:38:53.710 --> 02:38:57.420
is public safety power shutoff,
reducing the scale scope

02:38:57.420 --> 02:38:59.440
and frequency, which is an important one

02:38:59.440 --> 02:39:02.980
as demonstrated by
how PSPS is interwoven

02:39:02.980 --> 02:39:04.430
through previous discussions.

02:39:05.360 --> 02:39:07.210
Because they touch so many people,

02:39:07.210 --> 02:39:10.640
there are many aspects to
consider about de-energizing.

02:39:10.640 --> 02:39:13.430
And the issue is
certainly a primary concern

02:39:13.430 --> 02:39:15.890
of the minds of many Californians.

02:39:15.890 --> 02:39:18.610
Last year, discussions of
PSPS were somewhat distributed

02:39:18.610 --> 02:39:21.120
through the WMPs that were submitted.

02:39:21.120 --> 02:39:23.710
They included intent to
continue implementing

02:39:23.710 --> 02:39:25.930
without fully discussing how initiatives

02:39:25.930 --> 02:39:28.890
could mitigate and need to de-energize.

02:39:28.890 --> 02:39:31.670
They counted PSPS itself
as a wildfire mitigation tool

02:39:31.670 --> 02:39:34.350
without fully focusing
on PSPS consequences

02:39:34.350 --> 02:39:37.020
to vulnerable and broader communities,

02:39:37.020 --> 02:39:39.578
as well as the response partners.

02:39:39.578 --> 02:39:42.510
In the 2021 WMP's utilities were asked

02:39:42.510 --> 02:39:45.070
their directional vision for PSPS,

02:39:45.070 --> 02:39:49.083
their protocols, projected
changes to PSPS impact,

02:39:50.080 --> 02:39:52.140
engaging in vulnerable communities

02:39:52.140 --> 02:39:54.660
and PSPS specific metrics.

02:39:54.660 --> 02:39:59.660
We know that PSPS has
evolved significantly since 2019

02:40:00.000 --> 02:40:04.640
and even 2020 in terms
of decision to de-energize,

02:40:04.640 --> 02:40:07.260
implement, notification practices,

02:40:07.260 --> 02:40:11.110
understanding of implications
and acknowledgement of PSPS

02:40:11.110 --> 02:40:12.900
as a last resort.

02:40:12.900 --> 02:40:14.870
This has come about
through a combination

02:40:14.870 --> 02:40:18.740
of use additional rulemaking
and lessons learned

02:40:18.740 --> 02:40:23.403
from utility, regulatory
and customer's perspective.

02:40:24.350 --> 02:40:26.880
In today's PSPS discussion,
we're hoping to narrow in

02:40:26.880 --> 02:40:29.890
a little focusing in on
how utility is intended

02:40:29.890 --> 02:40:32.950
diminish usage and
consequences of PSPS centered

02:40:32.950 --> 02:40:35.693
around three areas, potentially,

02:40:37.957 --> 02:40:41.090
buckets of how each utility
is improving its accuracy

02:40:41.090 --> 02:40:43.220
to predict PSPS events,

02:40:43.220 --> 02:40:47.310
what utilities are doing to
reduce scale scope and frequency

02:40:47.310 --> 02:40:51.270
of individual events
and how WMP initiatives

02:40:51.270 --> 02:40:55.403
are driving towards eliminating
PSPS as a mitigation tactic.

02:40:56.260 --> 02:41:00.930
So with that, we have from
the Pacific Gas and electric,

02:41:00.930 --> 02:41:03.310
Aaron Johnson, today.

02:41:03.310 --> 02:41:08.310
From Southern California
Edison, Erik Takayesu.

02:41:08.420 --> 02:41:13.420
And from SDG&amp;E Brian D'Agostino
and Jonathan Woldemariam.

02:41:14.990 --> 02:41:17.680
And we'll go in the same
order we've been going

02:41:17.680 --> 02:41:22.680
to not surprise any of our
panelists, PG&amp;E, SCE and SDG&amp;E.

02:41:22.850 --> 02:41:26.343
So with that, I'll hand it
off to Aaron from PG&amp;E.

02:41:34.110 --> 02:41:37.380
<v ->Thanks Kevin, so this is
Aaron Johnson from PG&amp;E.</v>

02:41:38.900 --> 02:41:41.830
Thank you for having
me, I'm a vice president

02:41:41.830 --> 02:41:44.650
in our electric operations organization,

02:41:44.650 --> 02:41:49.650
and I have a responsibility
for the PSPS program in 2021.

02:41:50.453 --> 02:41:52.160
I've been involved in this program

02:41:52.160 --> 02:41:56.190
for the last three years when
we first stood it up in 2018

02:41:56.190 --> 02:41:59.420
and have worked every
PSPS event we have.

02:41:59.420 --> 02:42:03.900
So very familiar with
details of this program

02:42:03.900 --> 02:42:07.430
and look forward to presenting
some of our improvements

02:42:07.430 --> 02:42:09.570
this last year and where we look

02:42:09.570 --> 02:42:11.403
like we're going, going forward.

02:42:12.560 --> 02:42:14.363
So next slide, please.

02:42:17.480 --> 02:42:21.180
PSPS is a tool of last
resort for us to reduce the risk

02:42:21.180 --> 02:42:24.950
of major wire fires
during severe weather.

02:42:24.950 --> 02:42:28.750
We recognize that
losing power disrupts lives,

02:42:28.750 --> 02:42:31.140
especially for our customers
who rely on electricity

02:42:31.140 --> 02:42:33.820
for critical lifesaving equipment.

02:42:33.820 --> 02:42:37.550
So this is why we've been
continuing to focus on learning,

02:42:37.550 --> 02:42:40.480
listening, hearing
feedback on the program,

02:42:40.480 --> 02:42:44.820
learning how we can improve
and really more narrowly target

02:42:44.820 --> 02:42:47.720
that risk and ultimately
reducing the impacts

02:42:47.720 --> 02:42:49.620
on customers of these events.

02:42:49.620 --> 02:42:54.023
So, in my presentation
today, I thought I would cover,

02:42:54.023 --> 02:42:57.600
I plan to cover four areas,
just a general overview

02:42:57.600 --> 02:43:01.540
of our program outcomes in 2020,

02:43:01.540 --> 02:43:04.330
how our plan is evolving in 2021,

02:43:04.330 --> 02:43:06.420
the feedback from
customers and communities

02:43:06.420 --> 02:43:09.490
that are shaping our go-forward plans,

02:43:09.490 --> 02:43:14.490
and some of the key areas of
focus for 2021 in this program.

02:43:18.070 --> 02:43:20.100
I will cover a fair bit
of material that goes

02:43:20.100 --> 02:43:21.900
into some additional detail beyond

02:43:21.900 --> 02:43:23.900
what is in the wildfire mitigation plan.

02:43:24.960 --> 02:43:29.270
As you know, there are
continues to be a fair bit

02:43:29.270 --> 02:43:31.450
of activity in the
company and not all of that

02:43:31.450 --> 02:43:35.050
is all of the detail of that is outlined

02:43:35.050 --> 02:43:36.870
in the wildfire mitigation plan.

02:43:36.870 --> 02:43:39.980
So, and know that this
is obviously the subject

02:43:39.980 --> 02:43:41.690
of other regulatory proceedings,

02:43:41.690 --> 02:43:46.160
where there is additional
guidance in detail being provided.

02:43:46.160 --> 02:43:48.780
So next slide, please.

02:43:48.780 --> 02:43:53.780
So starting with 2020,
we had an event series

02:43:55.530 --> 02:44:00.530
that was an event season
that was significantly reduced

02:44:02.890 --> 02:44:04.060
from last year.

02:44:04.060 --> 02:44:08.220
We know based on a lot of the feedback

02:44:08.220 --> 02:44:10.930
that we've received this winter,

02:44:10.930 --> 02:44:13.330
as we've gone out and asked for feedback

02:44:13.330 --> 02:44:17.410
that the program performance
was significantly enhanced

02:44:17.410 --> 02:44:18.423
from last year.

02:44:19.400 --> 02:44:22.520
That said, we understand
that we still have,

02:44:22.520 --> 02:44:23.690
we're still receiving a fair amount

02:44:23.690 --> 02:44:25.200
of constructive feedback.

02:44:25.200 --> 02:44:28.060
And we know that we
have a fair bit of ways

02:44:28.060 --> 02:44:33.060
to go on this program in
terms of improvements.

02:44:34.900 --> 02:44:39.900
So, we had six events in
2020, and one already in 2021.

02:44:40.310 --> 02:44:42.580
You could say, I guess,
that that is really part

02:44:42.580 --> 02:44:45.693
of the 2020 wildfire
season from our perspective.

02:44:46.920 --> 02:44:49.230
Compared to the events in 2019,

02:44:49.230 --> 02:44:52.902
these events impacted
far fewer customers,

02:44:52.902 --> 02:44:56.650
and our average restoration
times were significantly lower.

02:44:56.650 --> 02:44:59.510
We really think the key,
some of the key drivers

02:44:59.510 --> 02:45:03.400
of this were our ability
to really narrow that risk

02:45:03.400 --> 02:45:07.240
to the areas of the
greatest fire danger.

02:45:07.240 --> 02:45:10.390
And is this that limitation
in the size and scope

02:45:10.390 --> 02:45:13.690
of the event that really
helped us shorten the duration

02:45:13.690 --> 02:45:16.987
of those events as well as we
were able to deploy resources

02:45:19.310 --> 02:45:22.250
to really restore power more quickly.

02:45:22.250 --> 02:45:24.190
As you can see on this slide,

02:45:24.190 --> 02:45:28.910
even with that narrowed
tailoring of the events,

02:45:32.370 --> 02:45:35.130
we did end up with a significant number

02:45:35.130 --> 02:45:37.610
of hazards still that
were found as we did

02:45:37.610 --> 02:45:39.490
our patrols post event, you know,

02:45:39.490 --> 02:45:41.150
any of which of course could have led

02:45:41.150 --> 02:45:45.570
to a very large potentially
catastrophic wildfire,

02:45:45.570 --> 02:45:47.570
given the weather
conditions on the ground

02:45:47.570 --> 02:45:48.570
during these events.

02:45:49.970 --> 02:45:51.583
Next slide, please.

02:45:53.510 --> 02:45:55.670
Pause for one second, I just need to,

02:45:55.670 --> 02:45:56.910
have a little trouble
seeing on my screen,

02:45:56.910 --> 02:46:01.133
so I'm gonna call this up on
secondary screen for myself.

02:46:14.166 --> 02:46:15.633
Bear with me one second.

02:46:24.860 --> 02:46:26.380
Thank you.
<v ->No problem.</v>

02:46:26.380 --> 02:46:29.963
<v Aaron>Okay, so this
slide provides a little bit</v>

02:46:34.390 --> 02:46:38.590
of an insight into where
we made progress in 2020,

02:46:40.080 --> 02:46:42.770
and reducing the scale, the size,

02:46:42.770 --> 02:46:44.450
if you will have a PSPS event.

02:46:44.450 --> 02:46:47.650
So when we run these
events back through the models

02:46:47.650 --> 02:46:50.420
that we were using and the
infrastructure we had in place

02:46:50.420 --> 02:46:55.420
in 2019, we see that these
events were reduced in size

02:46:55.680 --> 02:46:58.563
by approximately 55%.

02:46:59.830 --> 02:47:02.220
Our goal had been to
reduce the size of events

02:47:02.220 --> 02:47:04.350
by approximately 1/3, and we were able

02:47:04.350 --> 02:47:06.853
to significantly surpass that goal.

02:47:07.710 --> 02:47:09.380
Some of the key drivers, as you can see

02:47:09.380 --> 02:47:11.450
were enhanced meteorological guidance

02:47:11.450 --> 02:47:15.860
and our ability to scope and
segment the transmission system

02:47:15.860 --> 02:47:19.200
and really narrow the
risk that's identified there.

02:47:19.200 --> 02:47:22.450
And the third biggest
contributor was being able

02:47:22.450 --> 02:47:27.450
to provide islanding and
the most impactful item there

02:47:27.580 --> 02:47:29.330
was being able to island

02:47:29.330 --> 02:47:31.780
the Humboldt Bay Power Plant station

02:47:32.690 --> 02:47:34.270
that it was able to provide, you know,

02:47:34.270 --> 02:47:38.040
almost 60,000 customers,
over 60,000 customers

02:47:38.040 --> 02:47:39.670
in Humboldt County with power,

02:47:39.670 --> 02:47:42.580
almost that entire County
that had been put out of power.

02:47:42.580 --> 02:47:45.110
So some engineering
solutions were allowed us

02:47:45.110 --> 02:47:46.837
to operate that power plant,
there's an island up there,

02:47:46.837 --> 02:47:48.873
and that was the big driver of that.

02:47:53.290 --> 02:47:57.490
Obviously, we had a
series of infrastructure

02:47:57.490 --> 02:48:00.570
related investments
that we made going in

02:48:00.570 --> 02:48:02.850
to the season that we're
expected to drive a lot

02:48:02.850 --> 02:48:04.130
of that 1/3 reduction.

02:48:04.130 --> 02:48:05.470
And those were some of the items like

02:48:05.470 --> 02:48:08.860
the substation microgrids,
the segmentation devices

02:48:08.860 --> 02:48:11.860
that helped divide up the
grid into smaller pieces,

02:48:11.860 --> 02:48:14.830
switching, mid-feeder microgrids,

02:48:14.830 --> 02:48:17.980
a series of initiatives
around infrastructure.

02:48:17.980 --> 02:48:20.280
Those improvements that
we expected from those

02:48:20.280 --> 02:48:22.670
were really eclipsed by those changes

02:48:22.670 --> 02:48:25.050
in meteorology and transmission.

02:48:25.050 --> 02:48:29.070
And it really was that narrowing of risk

02:48:29.070 --> 02:48:34.070
that made some of those
devices that rendered them

02:48:35.500 --> 02:48:40.500
less impactful in the end,
than some of the meteorological

02:48:41.020 --> 02:48:43.293
and transmission scoping for us.

02:48:44.890 --> 02:48:46.190
It's not called out on this slide,

02:48:46.190 --> 02:48:48.010
but I will say we were
also able to reduce

02:48:48.010 --> 02:48:51.870
our average restoration time by 40%

02:48:51.870 --> 02:48:54.363
from 17 hours to 10 hours.

02:48:56.120 --> 02:48:58.720
Each of these areas that's
identified on the sheet,

02:48:58.720 --> 02:49:02.430
there are initiatives
around these going forward

02:49:02.430 --> 02:49:07.430
to continue to seek improvements in 2021

02:49:08.100 --> 02:49:11.400
in each of these areas
to continue sort of a cycle

02:49:11.400 --> 02:49:13.370
of continuous improvement, if you will,

02:49:13.370 --> 02:49:18.370
to add additional capability
in each of these areas

02:49:18.480 --> 02:49:23.480
to further sort of limit the
impact of PSPS in 2021.

02:49:26.060 --> 02:49:28.110
If we could go to
the next slide, please.

02:49:29.770 --> 02:49:33.560
So our PSPS program has really evolved

02:49:33.560 --> 02:49:35.123
over the last three years.

02:49:36.330 --> 02:49:40.360
This slide depicts sort of
some of the key highlights

02:49:40.360 --> 02:49:43.303
from each season and
what we've learned from that.

02:49:44.310 --> 02:49:47.340
As we saw in 2018, we
think the scope was too limited

02:49:47.340 --> 02:49:51.160
for the program as
we expanded it in 2019

02:49:51.160 --> 02:49:52.860
to include transmission lines

02:49:52.860 --> 02:49:55.940
and all of the high
fire threat district areas.

02:49:55.940 --> 02:49:58.840
We failed to scale up our
notifications, the website,

02:49:58.840 --> 02:50:02.070
the customer support
and our customers paid

02:50:02.070 --> 02:50:03.200
the price for that.

02:50:03.200 --> 02:50:05.013
Those events were far too impactful.

02:50:06.350 --> 02:50:09.260
So in 2020, we've improved on, you know,

02:50:09.260 --> 02:50:12.270
there were over 45 internal
initiatives as a company,

02:50:12.270 --> 02:50:14.070
and we've been able
to improve, you know,

02:50:14.070 --> 02:50:16.303
most all elements of the program.

02:50:17.690 --> 02:50:21.170
The size and severity of
these events going forward

02:50:21.170 --> 02:50:23.870
will really be driven,
continue to be driven

02:50:23.870 --> 02:50:25.830
by the severity of the weather.

02:50:25.830 --> 02:50:29.150
And as we've seen, certainly in 2020,

02:50:29.150 --> 02:50:31.810
that wildfire risk continues
to grow in California,

02:50:31.810 --> 02:50:33.860
the lengthening of the fire season,

02:50:33.860 --> 02:50:37.330
those fire conditions will
really ultimately dictate

02:50:37.330 --> 02:50:41.900
how we're able to limit
this program going forward.

02:50:41.900 --> 02:50:46.900
When we look out of 2020,
we think there still continues

02:50:47.140 --> 02:50:49.220
to be an opportunity to
make sure that this program

02:50:49.220 --> 02:50:52.550
is capturing all of that
catastrophic wildfire risks.

02:50:52.550 --> 02:50:56.970
So as we look for some of
those improvements in 2021,

02:50:56.970 --> 02:50:59.240
I'd really call your
attention to that first bullet

02:50:59.240 --> 02:51:03.410
where we're trying to improve
distribution scoping analysis

02:51:03.410 --> 02:51:07.020
to further incorporate
tree over strike potential.

02:51:07.020 --> 02:51:09.340
One of the reasons we were
able to be successful this year

02:51:09.340 --> 02:51:11.020
in limiting the transmission scope

02:51:11.020 --> 02:51:14.750
is we got much more granular
in assessing transmission risk.

02:51:14.750 --> 02:51:19.750
We had things like
tree density rather than

02:51:20.110 --> 02:51:23.200
we had individual
health of assets looking

02:51:23.200 --> 02:51:26.630
at individual structures
on our transmission system.

02:51:26.630 --> 02:51:31.260
And we were able to, you
know, look at things like the slope

02:51:31.260 --> 02:51:35.600
of those trees and
where they are in relation

02:51:35.600 --> 02:51:37.720
to our transmission assets.

02:51:37.720 --> 02:51:39.990
And so that gave us
a lot more granularity

02:51:39.990 --> 02:51:43.420
and we were really able to
narrow and target that risk

02:51:43.420 --> 02:51:46.580
to the transmission lines
that were most in danger

02:51:46.580 --> 02:51:49.000
of potentially being
a source of ignition

02:51:49.000 --> 02:51:51.360
for a catastrophic wildfire risk.

02:51:51.360 --> 02:51:53.990
The challenge that we
are undertaking right now

02:51:53.990 --> 02:51:58.140
is to look at in 2021, how
would we add similar levels

02:51:58.140 --> 02:52:00.130
of granularity to the
distribution system.

02:52:00.130 --> 02:52:05.130
Right now we certainly have, you know,

02:52:05.950 --> 02:52:10.450
tree, vegetation as it
contributes to outages factored in.

02:52:10.450 --> 02:52:13.920
We have, you know,
the density and the fuel,

02:52:13.920 --> 02:52:18.473
the moisture content
of vegetation in the area.

02:52:19.800 --> 02:52:22.380
But we haven't gotten
it down to a structure

02:52:22.380 --> 02:52:23.780
by structure basis.

02:52:23.780 --> 02:52:26.380
So there's approximately
50,000 structures

02:52:26.380 --> 02:52:28.170
for us in the transmission level.

02:52:28.170 --> 02:52:31.510
There's about 700,000
on the distribution side

02:52:31.510 --> 02:52:33.300
in the high fire threat area.

02:52:33.300 --> 02:52:38.120
And so the intent is to
get a lot more granular

02:52:38.120 --> 02:52:40.973
on the distribution
system going forward.

02:52:43.210 --> 02:52:46.090
And so that's been a
huge focus and look for us.

02:52:46.090 --> 02:52:50.280
We have not identified
a target for a reduction

02:52:50.280 --> 02:52:54.190
in either the scope or
the size of the events

02:52:54.190 --> 02:52:56.170
or for the duration, I should say,

02:52:56.170 --> 02:52:59.610
or the size of the events
this year like we did last year.

02:52:59.610 --> 02:53:01.720
That is largely driven by this analysis

02:53:01.720 --> 02:53:03.540
that we are undergoing.

02:53:03.540 --> 02:53:08.540
I must acknowledge that
our federal probation officer,

02:53:09.820 --> 02:53:14.100
Judge Alsup has issued
a number of queries to us.

02:53:14.100 --> 02:53:16.670
And we are in a discussion there

02:53:16.670 --> 02:53:20.020
about adding potential
scope to this program.

02:53:20.020 --> 02:53:22.590
And I know a number of
agencies are weighing in

02:53:22.590 --> 02:53:24.320
on that topic as well,

02:53:24.320 --> 02:53:26.790
and other folks are weighing in there.

02:53:26.790 --> 02:53:28.970
And so that is a very dynamic situation,

02:53:28.970 --> 02:53:31.963
and the outcome of that will really,

02:53:32.920 --> 02:53:35.250
and some of the modeling
that we're working on right now

02:53:35.250 --> 02:53:37.523
will help us understand
how to incorporate

02:53:37.523 --> 02:53:41.190
that tree over strike
potential into PSPS

02:53:41.190 --> 02:53:44.950
and what the
implications are for the size

02:53:44.950 --> 02:53:48.590
and the duration of events
going forward based on that.

02:53:48.590 --> 02:53:51.400
So that's why you don't
see a specific target for us.

02:53:51.400 --> 02:53:53.930
That said, all of the
various initiatives

02:53:53.930 --> 02:53:58.930
that were launched last year
to really push for both smaller

02:53:59.030 --> 02:54:01.790
and shorter PSPS events continue.

02:54:01.790 --> 02:54:03.680
And those are a lot of the
same initiatives you saw

02:54:03.680 --> 02:54:05.550
on the previous slide,
where we will continue

02:54:05.550 --> 02:54:07.363
to add sectionalizing devices.

02:54:08.480 --> 02:54:11.050
We will continue our microgrid work.

02:54:11.050 --> 02:54:13.860
We will continue additional
island opportunities

02:54:13.860 --> 02:54:15.560
and switching opportunities,

02:54:15.560 --> 02:54:18.610
as well as improvements to
both our transmission scoping

02:54:18.610 --> 02:54:22.663
and our meteorological
guidance this year.

02:54:24.320 --> 02:54:28.930
Our feedback that
we've received has been,

02:54:28.930 --> 02:54:31.180
we've been on a process
of gathering up feedback

02:54:31.180 --> 02:54:34.180
as we got to the end of PSPS season.

02:54:34.180 --> 02:54:37.870
I would highlight sort of three areas,

02:54:37.870 --> 02:54:41.640
there's feedback that we've
gotten from our customers,

02:54:41.640 --> 02:54:45.800
from our agency
partners, and then a variety

02:54:45.800 --> 02:54:48.570
of other sources, not the
least of which is our own staff

02:54:48.570 --> 02:54:51.630
that work these events,
and provide us feedback

02:54:51.630 --> 02:54:53.680
about what they need to be successful.

02:54:53.680 --> 02:54:56.130
Three areas that I really highlight.

02:54:56.130 --> 02:54:59.580
In the customer area,
we continue to hear

02:54:59.580 --> 02:55:01.390
the ask from our customer base,

02:55:01.390 --> 02:55:03.670
especially our most
vulnerable that they need

02:55:03.670 --> 02:55:05.670
additional help navigating these events

02:55:05.670 --> 02:55:09.653
and support among our
most medically vulnerable.

02:55:11.080 --> 02:55:13.860
Among our agencies while they gave us

02:55:13.860 --> 02:55:16.190
a much constructive
and positive feedback

02:55:16.190 --> 02:55:18.750
about our improved information sharing

02:55:18.750 --> 02:55:20.520
and tools for doing that,

02:55:20.520 --> 02:55:23.200
and the quality of
those tools themselves,

02:55:23.200 --> 02:55:26.230
there is still opportunity to improve

02:55:26.230 --> 02:55:30.560
information sharing timeliness
and accuracy, consistency,

02:55:30.560 --> 02:55:33.810
and additional refinement
available on those tools

02:55:33.810 --> 02:55:35.573
that will be a big area of focus.

02:55:37.223 --> 02:55:40.530
And we continue to
hear just a general desire

02:55:40.530 --> 02:55:44.210
for that consistency of
information across all platforms,

02:55:44.210 --> 02:55:46.970
as we're sharing informations
in different channels,

02:55:46.970 --> 02:55:51.260
can it stay a little more
aligned during events?

02:55:51.260 --> 02:55:53.380
So I'll finish now on the last slide,

02:55:53.380 --> 02:55:56.500
which is some areas of focus for us.

02:55:56.500 --> 02:55:59.670
There's a number of initiatives
highlighted on this page.

02:55:59.670 --> 02:56:04.620
I call out some that I think
are most critical for us.

02:56:04.620 --> 02:56:08.360
One focus area is just
providing that better information

02:56:08.360 --> 02:56:10.033
and resources to our customers,

02:56:11.300 --> 02:56:13.130
especially for those with medical needs.

02:56:13.130 --> 02:56:15.360
We think we have further opportunity.

02:56:15.360 --> 02:56:17.970
The battery program
that we launched last year

02:56:17.970 --> 02:56:19.780
should be fully deployed this year,

02:56:19.780 --> 02:56:23.290
will be fully deployed
this year, so that will help.

02:56:23.290 --> 02:56:28.290
We continue to partner
with cities, counties, tribes,

02:56:28.730 --> 02:56:31.300
and regulatory agencies
to drive joint solutions.

02:56:31.300 --> 02:56:36.140
So the level of local outreach
that we pushed very hard

02:56:36.140 --> 02:56:38.950
for last year, and that I
was personally involved

02:56:38.950 --> 02:56:43.570
in driving, we wanna continue
that level of engagement

02:56:43.570 --> 02:56:47.160
so that we really have this
continuous feedback loop

02:56:47.160 --> 02:56:50.010
with our local partners that
are managing these events

02:56:50.010 --> 02:56:51.143
for their communities.

02:56:52.920 --> 02:56:55.770
We really need to continue to enhance

02:56:55.770 --> 02:56:58.080
our state-of-the-art technology

02:56:58.080 --> 02:57:01.820
and our predictive wildfire risk models

02:57:01.820 --> 02:57:05.540
to inform the PSPS program
measures and make sure

02:57:05.540 --> 02:57:09.030
that we are focused on
those areas of highest risk.

02:57:09.030 --> 02:57:11.893
And we can eliminate
as much as possible,

02:57:13.000 --> 02:57:16.620
any collateral impacts
that come from not having

02:57:16.620 --> 02:57:19.490
the right level of granularity
or focus in those models

02:57:19.490 --> 02:57:22.403
to really target those
most narrow areas of risk.

02:57:23.880 --> 02:57:25.330
We have to continue to make improvements

02:57:25.330 --> 02:57:29.930
to the electric grid, so
that as those models refine

02:57:29.930 --> 02:57:31.660
that we're able to turn those models

02:57:31.660 --> 02:57:35.340
into a mirroring of that.

02:57:35.340 --> 02:57:36.960
So that we're really isolating

02:57:36.960 --> 02:57:39.573
the wildfire risk in those areas.

02:57:40.430 --> 02:57:42.350
And sectionalizing
devices in particular,

02:57:42.350 --> 02:57:45.530
really help us to match
those increasing granularity

02:57:45.530 --> 02:57:47.180
of that weather model.

02:57:47.180 --> 02:57:49.950
And then finally, we have
to continue to improve

02:57:49.950 --> 02:57:53.020
the emergency management
training for our staff,

02:57:53.020 --> 02:57:55.700
refining our operational protocols,

02:57:55.700 --> 02:57:58.690
and in just ensuring consistency across

02:57:58.690 --> 02:58:02.230
and repeatability across
that entire emergency

02:58:03.430 --> 02:58:06.143
management operation
for us during an event.

02:58:08.672 --> 02:58:11.940
So with that, I'll conclude,
thank you for your time today.

02:58:11.940 --> 02:58:14.090
And I look forward to
answering questions

02:58:14.090 --> 02:58:15.290
at the appropriate time.

02:58:17.570 --> 02:58:19.560
<v Kevin>Thank you, Mr. Johnson.</v>

02:58:19.560 --> 02:58:23.700
Now we could turn to,
if Erik Takayesu is on,

02:58:23.700 --> 02:58:26.350
hopefully I'm not betraying
everyone's name too much.

02:58:27.650 --> 02:58:30.450
<v ->Thank you Kevin, and
good afternoon everyone.</v>

02:58:30.450 --> 02:58:33.730
My name is Erik Takayesu,
and I'm the vice president

02:58:33.730 --> 02:58:35.010
in our operations department

02:58:35.010 --> 02:58:38.123
with responsibility for PSPS readiness.

02:58:39.120 --> 02:58:42.320
I've been an incident
commander for the last few years

02:58:42.320 --> 02:58:45.890
in multiple events, including
some of our largest ones.

02:58:45.890 --> 02:58:47.850
So been involved in all the work,

02:58:47.850 --> 02:58:50.190
not just getting ready for 2020,

02:58:50.190 --> 02:58:52.780
but getting ready for 2021.

02:58:52.780 --> 02:58:55.841
I appreciate the opportunity
to participate in today's panel

02:58:55.841 --> 02:58:57.520
and look forward to
discussing our strategy

02:58:57.520 --> 02:58:59.990
for reducing the scope
and frequency of PSPS.

02:58:59.990 --> 02:59:02.363
So if we can go to
the next slide, please.

02:59:04.882 --> 02:59:06.600
And so just to introduce this topic,

02:59:06.600 --> 02:59:10.000
reducing the scope of PSPS
is a fundamental component

02:59:10.000 --> 02:59:13.690
of the action plan that we
recently filed on February 16th.

02:59:13.690 --> 02:59:16.000
So I'll be discussing
the approaches that SCE

02:59:16.000 --> 02:59:18.220
is taking in this presentation,

02:59:18.220 --> 02:59:21.810
including a brief review
of our 2020 performance

02:59:21.810 --> 02:59:24.420
and commitments made
in and our recent WMP filing

02:59:24.420 --> 02:59:26.063
that proceeded our action plan.

02:59:27.191 --> 02:59:28.141
Next slide, please.

02:59:31.320 --> 02:59:33.530
So, we will be talking
about the improvements

02:59:33.530 --> 02:59:36.270
that we've fallen in WMP
but also leveraging the work

02:59:36.270 --> 02:59:38.750
from the action plan
that were recently filed

02:59:38.750 --> 02:59:43.200
that is referenced in the
WMP for a more complete view.

02:59:43.200 --> 02:59:45.790
The concerns highlighted
in President Batjer's letter

02:59:45.790 --> 02:59:48.103
feedback from our
partners and our customers

02:59:48.103 --> 02:59:51.110
were all part of the plan
to not just reduce PSPS,

02:59:51.110 --> 02:59:54.010
but to mitigate its
impacts to our customers,

02:59:54.010 --> 02:59:55.720
as well as improving our engagement

02:59:55.720 --> 02:59:58.110
and communication during events.

02:59:58.110 --> 03:00:03.110
The focus of today's
discussion is on reducing PSPS,

03:00:03.210 --> 03:00:06.980
which means designing,
building and operating our system

03:00:06.980 --> 03:00:10.360
to reduce the need by leveraging
both our past experience,

03:00:10.360 --> 03:00:13.160
as well as making improvements
that will ultimately result

03:00:13.160 --> 03:00:16.140
in a more resilient
system for our customers.

03:00:16.140 --> 03:00:17.273
Next slide, please.

03:00:19.920 --> 03:00:22.470
So last year's fire season
was one of the worst

03:00:22.470 --> 03:00:24.680
with record drive fuel
levels experienced

03:00:24.680 --> 03:00:28.420
throughout SCE's service
territory during the year.

03:00:28.420 --> 03:00:31.130
From heat spells and
lack of precipitation

03:00:31.130 --> 03:00:33.890
and a series of more
significant Santa Ana wind events

03:00:33.890 --> 03:00:35.920
towards the end of the year.

03:00:35.920 --> 03:00:40.920
We saw about 70% more red
flag days in 2020 versus 2019.

03:00:41.450 --> 03:00:44.290
And 2/3 of our activations occur

03:00:44.290 --> 03:00:46.380
from November through December,

03:00:46.380 --> 03:00:48.490
noting particular hardships experienced

03:00:48.490 --> 03:00:51.290
by our customers over
the holiday season.

03:00:51.290 --> 03:00:53.530
And for that same November
to December period,

03:00:53.530 --> 03:00:57.050
we saw four times more
circuits being monitored for PSPS

03:00:57.950 --> 03:01:01.270
due to a number of those
being repeat occurrences.

03:01:01.270 --> 03:01:03.840
So while more circuits and
customers who are de-energized

03:01:03.840 --> 03:01:05.390
as a result of those weather events,

03:01:05.390 --> 03:01:07.250
we did see some positive improvements

03:01:07.250 --> 03:01:09.580
as indicated on this slide.

03:01:09.580 --> 03:01:12.500
Most notably when we
compare the distribution circuits

03:01:12.500 --> 03:01:16.610
de-energized in 2019, we
saw fewer of those same circuits

03:01:16.610 --> 03:01:18.660
and customers de-energize in 2020.

03:01:19.840 --> 03:01:24.393
And we removed around 25,000
customers in scope for PSPS.

03:01:25.340 --> 03:01:27.850
The majority of these
improvements came from expanding

03:01:27.850 --> 03:01:30.610
or segmentation plans
on our distribution system.

03:01:30.610 --> 03:01:33.290
And that overall we saw more circuits

03:01:33.290 --> 03:01:35.695
and customers come in a scope.

03:01:35.695 --> 03:01:38.160
230,000 customers impacted,

03:01:38.160 --> 03:01:41.060
which also include
repeat de-energizations.

03:01:41.060 --> 03:01:42.840
And this highlights the concern around

03:01:42.840 --> 03:01:45.570
the frequent impacted
circuits and communities,

03:01:45.570 --> 03:01:48.070
and represents even
more than need to advance

03:01:48.070 --> 03:01:51.010
our mitigation measures
more aggressively

03:01:51.010 --> 03:01:53.130
as we look to get ahead in advance

03:01:53.130 --> 03:01:54.763
of this year's peak fire season.

03:01:55.630 --> 03:01:58.190
It's also worth noting
that the vast majority

03:01:58.190 --> 03:02:01.160
of our de-energizations
occur on the distribution system

03:02:01.160 --> 03:02:04.270
versus our bulk and
sub-transmission levels

03:02:04.270 --> 03:02:07.100
that are at 66,000 volts and above.

03:02:07.100 --> 03:02:09.930
Hence our strategy to
reduce and the mitigations

03:02:09.930 --> 03:02:11.400
that are part of our action plan

03:02:11.400 --> 03:02:13.600
that I'll be covering in more detail

03:02:13.600 --> 03:02:15.860
are specific to the
local distribution system

03:02:15.860 --> 03:02:18.600
that served our customers directly,

03:02:18.600 --> 03:02:20.780
which represented about 1100 circuits

03:02:20.780 --> 03:02:22.283
in our high fire risk area.

03:02:23.350 --> 03:02:24.473
Next slide, please.

03:02:26.961 --> 03:02:29.350
So coming off of our
experience in the last two years,

03:02:29.350 --> 03:02:32.120
our initial emphasis to reduce PSPS

03:02:32.120 --> 03:02:35.380
was through better segmentation
of our system primarily.

03:02:35.380 --> 03:02:38.290
And then 2020 SCE
developed a segmentation plan

03:02:38.290 --> 03:02:41.110
for each of the 1100
circuits that traverse

03:02:41.110 --> 03:02:42.900
our high fire risk areas.

03:02:42.900 --> 03:02:44.800
Identifying the specific devices

03:02:44.800 --> 03:02:47.110
that would be remotely
operated in the event

03:02:47.110 --> 03:02:49.743
that a de-energization
becomes necessary.

03:02:50.590 --> 03:02:52.060
This allowed us to more quickly

03:02:52.060 --> 03:02:54.230
and efficiently de-energize our system

03:02:54.230 --> 03:02:56.690
using real-time information.

03:02:56.690 --> 03:02:59.040
And as we develop
more operating experience

03:02:59.040 --> 03:03:02.190
with segmentation, we
learned more about our circuits.

03:03:02.190 --> 03:03:05.390
The characteristics of
the geography they cover

03:03:05.390 --> 03:03:08.160
and how that is overlayed
on our segmentation plans

03:03:08.160 --> 03:03:10.400
with particular focus on those areas

03:03:10.400 --> 03:03:12.940
that have been de-energized repeatedly.

03:03:12.940 --> 03:03:15.870
So as you compare
distribution circuits from one area

03:03:15.870 --> 03:03:19.250
to another, each one
covers a unique topography

03:03:19.250 --> 03:03:21.830
and each have varying configurations.

03:03:21.830 --> 03:03:25.000
And so by taking a more
micro view of individual circuits

03:03:25.000 --> 03:03:27.890
and segments, we can
compare the physical

03:03:27.890 --> 03:03:30.260
and operational
characteristics that determine

03:03:30.260 --> 03:03:33.750
the most appropriate
solution for the area.

03:03:33.750 --> 03:03:37.010
And as a result, there's not a
single technology or a method

03:03:37.010 --> 03:03:39.970
that will reduce PSPS costs effectively,

03:03:39.970 --> 03:03:42.130
or rather a combination
of possible measures

03:03:42.130 --> 03:03:43.940
that can be applied.

03:03:43.940 --> 03:03:45.160
So on the top of this slide,

03:03:45.160 --> 03:03:49.220
I've listed three principle
forms of mitigation for 2021

03:03:49.220 --> 03:03:53.170
that we expect to have the
largest impact in reducing PSPS.

03:03:53.170 --> 03:03:55.420
These include circuit exceptions,

03:03:55.420 --> 03:03:57.960
followed by targeted circuit automation

03:03:57.960 --> 03:04:01.160
and the more extensive
grid hardening measures.

03:04:01.160 --> 03:04:04.500
So circuit exceptions
refer to localized situations

03:04:04.500 --> 03:04:07.140
that are circuits,
where the wildfire risk

03:04:07.140 --> 03:04:09.750
is significantly less
than what is represented

03:04:09.750 --> 03:04:12.660
by tier or consequence risk models.

03:04:12.660 --> 03:04:15.660
Examples of this include
recent burn scar areas,

03:04:15.660 --> 03:04:17.480
where there is no longer burnable fuel

03:04:17.480 --> 03:04:19.430
that could ignite a wildfire.

03:04:19.430 --> 03:04:22.030
Or where types of
developments in the area

03:04:22.030 --> 03:04:25.340
have changed that they
fuel loading assumptions.

03:04:25.340 --> 03:04:27.170
So one of the enhancements we've made

03:04:27.170 --> 03:04:29.800
to supplement our
incident management teams

03:04:29.800 --> 03:04:34.260
is having permanent
operations folks that would call

03:04:34.260 --> 03:04:36.640
the advanced circuit evaluation team,

03:04:36.640 --> 03:04:39.950
working during events as
well as blue sky conditions

03:04:39.950 --> 03:04:42.040
to gain an increasing
knowledge of opportunities

03:04:42.040 --> 03:04:44.957
for reducing PSPS by
identifying these areas

03:04:44.957 --> 03:04:48.600
and working to reconfigure
our circuits to accommodate.

03:04:48.600 --> 03:04:50.760
So currently there are about 22 circuits

03:04:50.760 --> 03:04:53.880
we've identified these
opportunities and we're working

03:04:53.880 --> 03:04:56.223
to build an additional queue for 2021.

03:04:57.350 --> 03:05:00.670
Now, in most cases, these reviews

03:05:00.670 --> 03:05:04.510
involve relatively small
sections of an overhead circuit.

03:05:04.510 --> 03:05:07.290
The physical characteristics
of the areas around the section

03:05:07.290 --> 03:05:10.400
and various options for
reconfiguration or even changes

03:05:10.400 --> 03:05:12.250
to field operations.

03:05:12.250 --> 03:05:13.870
And were deemed appropriate generally

03:05:13.870 --> 03:05:17.100
does not require capital
investments to deploy.

03:05:17.100 --> 03:05:19.900
In addition to the benefit
of reducing de-energization,

03:05:19.900 --> 03:05:21.350
this may further lessen the need

03:05:21.350 --> 03:05:24.100
for more costs year
solutions to mitigate.

03:05:24.100 --> 03:05:26.500
And implementing these
changes require a thorough

03:05:26.500 --> 03:05:29.360
and ongoing review
of our fire science team,

03:05:29.360 --> 03:05:31.180
our engineers, our operators

03:05:31.180 --> 03:05:33.230
and our enterprise
risk management folks.

03:05:34.460 --> 03:05:36.160
The second mitigation is targeted

03:05:36.160 --> 03:05:38.410
distribution circuit automation.

03:05:38.410 --> 03:05:41.000
And as we prepare for
2020, we were largely able

03:05:41.000 --> 03:05:44.100
to leverage our existing
automation devices,

03:05:44.100 --> 03:05:46.860
remotely operated reclosers
and switches located

03:05:46.860 --> 03:05:49.060
throughout our high fire risk area.

03:05:49.060 --> 03:05:52.640
However, not all remote
devices used for de-energization

03:05:52.640 --> 03:05:55.200
are naturally optimally placed

03:05:55.200 --> 03:05:58.230
and our operating experiences
identified additional devices

03:05:58.230 --> 03:06:00.440
that could be automated,
or even relocated

03:06:00.440 --> 03:06:03.433
to minimize the number of
customers that are impacted.

03:06:04.360 --> 03:06:06.560
It's also important to have
adequate weather station

03:06:06.560 --> 03:06:09.110
coverage align with
our ability to de-energize

03:06:09.110 --> 03:06:11.370
in the right locations to ensure

03:06:11.370 --> 03:06:14.410
that we are best using
real-time information.

03:06:14.410 --> 03:06:17.180
So through more targeted
automation where we're reviewing

03:06:17.180 --> 03:06:19.670
where additional weather
stations are needed

03:06:19.670 --> 03:06:23.170
to better increase the
granularity of our segmentation

03:06:23.170 --> 03:06:25.070
and better optimize how we de-energize

03:06:25.930 --> 03:06:27.590
and reduce the scope of PSPS

03:06:27.590 --> 03:06:30.680
by further isolating
additional customers

03:06:30.680 --> 03:06:32.900
from where the problems exist.

03:06:32.900 --> 03:06:35.740
Unlike circuit exceptions,
this may also allow us

03:06:35.740 --> 03:06:37.600
to reduce the scope of grid hardening

03:06:37.600 --> 03:06:40.380
if we're able to isolate
parts of the system

03:06:40.380 --> 03:06:43.490
from the areas that are
exposed to hazardous conditions

03:06:43.490 --> 03:06:45.750
that may require PSPS.

03:06:45.750 --> 03:06:48.420
And having more options
to reconfigure the system

03:06:48.420 --> 03:06:51.810
with automation enhances
our overall reliability,

03:06:51.810 --> 03:06:53.650
even under normal outage conditions

03:06:53.650 --> 03:06:56.123
that are not related
to wildfire mitigation.

03:06:57.020 --> 03:06:58.043
Next slide, please.

03:07:00.660 --> 03:07:03.040
So the early grid hardening is replacing

03:07:03.040 --> 03:07:06.400
our bare overhead conductor
with cover conductor primarily.

03:07:06.400 --> 03:07:08.160
And I know this has been talked about

03:07:08.160 --> 03:07:09.980
throughout the session.

03:07:09.980 --> 03:07:11.950
One of the drivers
behind our wind thresholds

03:07:11.950 --> 03:07:13.850
is the need to mitigate
against the contact

03:07:13.850 --> 03:07:17.260
of foreign objects, which
isn't just trees and vegetation,

03:07:17.260 --> 03:07:18.890
but also includes man-made debris,

03:07:18.890 --> 03:07:20.840
such as metallic balloons,

03:07:20.840 --> 03:07:23.730
or the things that can
cause a risk of ignition.

03:07:23.730 --> 03:07:25.350
So by installing cover conductor,

03:07:25.350 --> 03:07:27.460
this will allow us to
raise wind thresholds

03:07:27.460 --> 03:07:29.037
given the significant removal

03:07:29.037 --> 03:07:32.150
of one of the leading
causes of ignitions.

03:07:32.150 --> 03:07:33.680
And by raising wind thresholds,

03:07:33.680 --> 03:07:36.960
the frequency of PSPS will be reduced.

03:07:36.960 --> 03:07:39.750
So we're still relatively
early in the deployment

03:07:39.750 --> 03:07:41.110
of covered conductor.

03:07:41.110 --> 03:07:43.210
And we have used a
lot of our risk models

03:07:43.210 --> 03:07:45.470
to prioritize the locations,
given the number

03:07:45.470 --> 03:07:49.170
of circuits we have in
our high fire risk areas.

03:07:49.170 --> 03:07:51.340
But given our recent PSPS experience,

03:07:51.340 --> 03:07:53.870
we recognize that
those circuits impacted

03:07:53.870 --> 03:07:56.050
haven't fully coincided
with their models.

03:07:56.050 --> 03:07:58.590
So we are utilizing in our action plan,

03:07:58.590 --> 03:08:02.160
additional criteria for
accelerating cover conductor.

03:08:02.160 --> 03:08:05.030
The goal is there to
reduce wildfire risk,

03:08:05.030 --> 03:08:07.740
but also to make sure that
we have the biggest impact

03:08:07.740 --> 03:08:09.370
in the shortest amount of time

03:08:09.370 --> 03:08:10.970
in our heaviest hit communities.

03:08:11.870 --> 03:08:14.160
So while there are
other mitigation measures

03:08:14.160 --> 03:08:17.880
such as undergrounding and
microgrids that we also consider

03:08:17.880 --> 03:08:20.000
and will continue to evaluate,

03:08:20.000 --> 03:08:22.400
we expect that those would
only enhance our plans

03:08:22.400 --> 03:08:25.200
to implement the three
options presented today

03:08:25.200 --> 03:08:27.150
and to reduce the need
for the de-energization

03:08:27.150 --> 03:08:29.140
with similar benefits.

03:08:29.140 --> 03:08:30.930
So for the circuits we are reviewing,

03:08:30.930 --> 03:08:34.100
we evaluate each of these
three options between exceptions,

03:08:34.100 --> 03:08:35.720
automation and hardening.

03:08:35.720 --> 03:08:38.710
So wherever what might be
the best and most feasible way

03:08:38.710 --> 03:08:41.420
to reduce PSPS and to provide

03:08:41.420 --> 03:08:43.560
significant benefits this year.

03:08:43.560 --> 03:08:46.010
Now this is also an iterative process

03:08:46.010 --> 03:08:47.670
that we can perform each year,

03:08:47.670 --> 03:08:49.620
providing a pathway for continuing

03:08:49.620 --> 03:08:54.050
to reduce PSPS more broadly beyond 2021.

03:08:54.050 --> 03:08:56.700
And by also recognizing
that in addition to reducing

03:08:56.700 --> 03:09:00.380
the need for PSPS and working
on our most impacted circuits,

03:09:00.380 --> 03:09:03.980
even the process of activating
and notifying our customers

03:09:03.980 --> 03:09:07.890
of a forecasted event, whether
results in de-energization

03:09:07.890 --> 03:09:10.410
or not is something we
need to better address

03:09:10.410 --> 03:09:12.480
given the disruption in everyday life.

03:09:12.480 --> 03:09:14.180
So if we can go to the next slide.

03:09:16.370 --> 03:09:19.290
So, working to improve
our situational awareness,

03:09:19.290 --> 03:09:21.100
and this means improving the accuracy

03:09:21.100 --> 03:09:25.280
of our weather forecasts as
well as what happens real time.

03:09:25.280 --> 03:09:27.820
So today we forecast
PSPS events on a circuit

03:09:27.820 --> 03:09:29.400
by circuit basis.

03:09:29.400 --> 03:09:32.070
We have a two kilometer
resolution in our forecast,

03:09:32.070 --> 03:09:34.753
which allows us to
connect to specific circuits.

03:09:35.610 --> 03:09:38.350
We also strive to have at
least two weather stations

03:09:38.350 --> 03:09:40.870
per circuit, to use the
best real time weather data

03:09:40.870 --> 03:09:43.373
as a basis for the
decisions to de-energize.

03:09:44.330 --> 03:09:47.740
However, because we
forecast for activation

03:09:49.000 --> 03:09:51.670
and make decisions for
de-energization using data

03:09:51.670 --> 03:09:53.290
from our weather stations,

03:09:53.290 --> 03:09:55.550
this often leads to
notify more customers

03:09:55.550 --> 03:09:58.900
of a potential de-energization
than experience.

03:09:58.900 --> 03:10:02.240
So while we believe,
it's better to notify

03:10:02.240 --> 03:10:04.300
and not de-energized than de-energize

03:10:04.300 --> 03:10:07.570
when it's not substantiated
by actual conditions,

03:10:07.570 --> 03:10:10.900
we recognize and
acknowledge the issues that arise

03:10:10.900 --> 03:10:12.820
as customers need to
prepare for something

03:10:12.820 --> 03:10:15.270
that may not actually happen.

03:10:15.270 --> 03:10:17.410
So as part of our action
plan, we're also working

03:10:17.410 --> 03:10:19.470
on additional data and enhance modeling

03:10:19.470 --> 03:10:23.640
to improve the granularity,
so one kilometer resolution.

03:10:23.640 --> 03:10:25.210
We believe that this should result

03:10:25.210 --> 03:10:28.207
in a more accurate
forecast on our circuits.

03:10:28.207 --> 03:10:30.870
And in addition, we're developing
a machine learning model

03:10:30.870 --> 03:10:35.000
for each weather station
based off of historical data.

03:10:35.000 --> 03:10:36.760
Now, we can only do this for stations

03:10:36.760 --> 03:10:39.560
that have at least six
months of information.

03:10:39.560 --> 03:10:41.060
So we're gonna build models

03:10:41.060 --> 03:10:42.890
for 50 weather station locations,

03:10:42.890 --> 03:10:45.600
starting with the
highly impacted circuits

03:10:45.600 --> 03:10:47.700
and where forecast in our experience

03:10:47.700 --> 03:10:49.760
had been the least accurate.

03:10:49.760 --> 03:10:52.030
And then we'll begin later
this summer into next year,

03:10:52.030 --> 03:10:54.850
developing models for
all of our weather stations.

03:10:54.850 --> 03:10:57.010
Representing some longer-term efforts

03:10:57.010 --> 03:10:59.800
to train and retrain
our models over time.

03:10:59.800 --> 03:11:01.760
And as each station
accumulates more data

03:11:01.760 --> 03:11:04.250
to produce some more accurate results.

03:11:04.250 --> 03:11:07.080
So we expect that these
efforts will continually close

03:11:07.080 --> 03:11:10.390
the gap between customers
who need to be notified

03:11:10.390 --> 03:11:12.890
of a potential event, and those

03:11:12.890 --> 03:11:14.990
that actually experienced
de-energization.

03:11:16.130 --> 03:11:19.930
We also intend to leverage advancements

03:11:19.930 --> 03:11:22.710
and real-time fire spread
modeling as another factor

03:11:22.710 --> 03:11:25.263
in the decision-making
process for de-energization.

03:11:26.170 --> 03:11:28.170
While there is more
refinement and verification

03:11:28.170 --> 03:11:30.300
that's needed, we do expect

03:11:30.300 --> 03:11:33.010
that using fire spread consequences

03:11:33.010 --> 03:11:37.673
of factor de-energization
decisions by November this year.

03:11:38.640 --> 03:11:40.670
So lastly, we also intend to install

03:11:40.670 --> 03:11:45.260
about 375 weather stations
to supplement our automation

03:11:45.260 --> 03:11:47.090
to provide better situational awareness

03:11:47.090 --> 03:11:49.380
for de-energization decisions.

03:11:49.380 --> 03:11:51.300
In addition, we're
also working to improve

03:11:51.300 --> 03:11:53.400
the weather information
by our first responders

03:11:53.400 --> 03:11:55.690
using portable devices.

03:11:55.690 --> 03:11:58.880
It's worth noting that when
you take reads from the ground

03:11:58.880 --> 03:12:02.050
versus the air at the
height of our conductors,

03:12:02.050 --> 03:12:03.920
we've often seen about a 10 mile

03:12:03.920 --> 03:12:06.010
an hour difference on average.

03:12:06.010 --> 03:12:08.760
So hence I thought it would
be interesting to mention

03:12:08.760 --> 03:12:10.870
that we started to get
some early success

03:12:10.870 --> 03:12:14.470
in the next generation of low
cost mobile weather stations,

03:12:14.470 --> 03:12:17.870
modded on vehicles to
supplement the analysis,

03:12:17.870 --> 03:12:19.430
measuring and transmitting data

03:12:19.430 --> 03:12:22.590
to our emergency operations
center and to provide data

03:12:22.590 --> 03:12:24.190
to our incident management teams,

03:12:24.190 --> 03:12:26.690
where we have gaps in
weather station coverage,

03:12:26.690 --> 03:12:29.370
or need additional
validation and verification

03:12:29.370 --> 03:12:33.083
for what's actually happening
on the ground, next slide.

03:12:36.090 --> 03:12:39.670
So based on the strategies
of online in this presentation,

03:12:39.670 --> 03:12:43.190
we cite in the WMP these
reductions in scope, frequency,

03:12:43.190 --> 03:12:44.990
and duration as shown in this chart.

03:12:45.870 --> 03:12:47.470
However, as part of our action plan,

03:12:47.470 --> 03:12:49.730
we're also further
accelerating additional work

03:12:49.730 --> 03:12:52.600
on frequently most impacted circuits.

03:12:52.600 --> 03:12:54.650
So we expect to have
incremental benefits

03:12:54.650 --> 03:12:56.570
more than what is shown here,

03:12:56.570 --> 03:12:59.530
which are still on the
process of determining.

03:12:59.530 --> 03:13:02.100
So in addition to reductions identified

03:13:02.100 --> 03:13:04.840
from our acception process,
increasing thresholds,

03:13:04.840 --> 03:13:08.210
due to cover conductor
and any additional benefits

03:13:08.210 --> 03:13:10.490
from providing backup generation,

03:13:10.490 --> 03:13:12.890
the action plan outlines
accelerating work

03:13:12.890 --> 03:13:15.820
on frequently impacted circuits
that have experienced four

03:13:15.820 --> 03:13:18.790
or more de-energizations since 2019.

03:13:18.790 --> 03:13:22.860
So this amounts to
about 72 of the 220 circuits

03:13:22.860 --> 03:13:26.260
that have experienced at
least one de-energization.

03:13:26.260 --> 03:13:28.360
And more importantly,
having a hardened system

03:13:28.360 --> 03:13:32.410
that will reduce PSPS is
expected to be a more reliable

03:13:32.410 --> 03:13:34.480
and resilient system overall,

03:13:34.480 --> 03:13:36.950
including weather
events for more traditional

03:13:36.950 --> 03:13:39.590
storm conditions throughout the year.

03:13:39.590 --> 03:13:42.740
This should also help
our customers in the fact

03:13:42.740 --> 03:13:44.700
that more extreme weather, in the face

03:13:44.700 --> 03:13:46.930
of more extreme weather threats,

03:13:46.930 --> 03:13:49.275
and to ensure that we're
continuing to provide

03:13:49.275 --> 03:13:53.273
the reliable service that
our customers expect.

03:13:54.800 --> 03:13:56.840
So lastly, if you go to the next slide.

03:13:56.840 --> 03:13:59.440
I wanna close by providing some links

03:13:59.440 --> 03:14:03.280
to PSPS information
and resources on sce.com.

03:14:03.280 --> 03:14:04.340
And then I certainly look forward

03:14:04.340 --> 03:14:06.060
to answering any questions.

03:14:06.060 --> 03:14:08.660
Thank you for your time
and Kevin, back over to you.

03:14:11.330 --> 03:14:12.580
<v ->Thank you, Mr Takayesu.</v>

03:14:13.550 --> 03:14:16.080
Next, we'll go to SDG&amp;E,

03:14:16.080 --> 03:14:19.663
Brian D'Agostino and
Jonathan Woldemariam.

03:14:20.830 --> 03:14:22.960
<v ->Yeah, great, thank
you very much, Kevin.</v>

03:14:22.960 --> 03:14:24.650
And good afternoon everybody.

03:14:24.650 --> 03:14:28.210
I appreciate the opportunity to be here,

03:14:28.210 --> 03:14:30.820
to really talk about public
safety power shutoff,

03:14:30.820 --> 03:14:33.610
and reducing the scale
scope and frequency.

03:14:33.610 --> 03:14:35.740
As Kevin mentioned,
I'm joined here today

03:14:35.740 --> 03:14:37.540
with Jonathan Woldemariam our director

03:14:37.540 --> 03:14:39.320
of wildfire mitigation,

03:14:39.320 --> 03:14:42.150
and I'm meteorologist Brian D'Agostino,

03:14:42.150 --> 03:14:45.400
I'm the director of fire
science and climate adaptation.

03:14:45.400 --> 03:14:50.210
And I joined the SDG&amp;E team back in 2009

03:14:50.210 --> 03:14:53.290
as the first meteorologist
to really start bringing

03:14:53.290 --> 03:14:55.720
the situational
awareness and the science

03:14:55.720 --> 03:14:58.370
into our original shutoff program.

03:14:58.370 --> 03:15:01.543
So I'm here to really
talk a bit about, you know,

03:15:01.543 --> 03:15:04.425
what we experienced in 2020,

03:15:04.425 --> 03:15:08.280
because it was a very eventful year

03:15:08.280 --> 03:15:10.570
across Southern California.

03:15:10.570 --> 03:15:12.740
And then we'll talk about
ways that we did mitigate

03:15:12.740 --> 03:15:14.460
and reduce the impact this year.

03:15:14.460 --> 03:15:17.170
And then we will get into
ways we're gonna continue

03:15:17.170 --> 03:15:20.560
to do that moving forward.

03:15:20.560 --> 03:15:22.040
As we headed to the first slide,

03:15:22.040 --> 03:15:24.123
we are starting with some weather data.

03:15:25.110 --> 03:15:29.967
When, for the first steps that
we took back in 2009 and 2010

03:15:30.960 --> 03:15:33.820
was we started putting weather stations

03:15:33.820 --> 03:15:37.620
on all of our high-risk
circuits, it's practice

03:15:37.620 --> 03:15:39.240
which is now spread across the state,

03:15:39.240 --> 03:15:41.423
even across the country in many cases.

03:15:42.410 --> 03:15:47.230
But what we have seen
over the last decade

03:15:48.310 --> 03:15:50.770
is we're an increase in occurrences

03:15:50.770 --> 03:15:53.090
of these high wind events.

03:15:53.090 --> 03:15:55.850
So, I'll point out just
below the text there,

03:15:55.850 --> 03:15:59.453
Hellhole Canyon, it is a
wind prone in Valley Center.

03:16:00.440 --> 03:16:03.460
The graph there is actually
showing peak wind speed

03:16:03.460 --> 03:16:06.230
everyday back to 2013.

03:16:06.230 --> 03:16:09.720
So the last eight fire
seasons and that red line

03:16:09.720 --> 03:16:13.730
is our trend line in
terms of the wind speeds

03:16:13.730 --> 03:16:17.250
that we've been seeing
in these areas prone

03:16:17.250 --> 03:16:18.410
to Santa Ana winds.

03:16:18.410 --> 03:16:23.410
So it is in fact that the data
is showing more events,

03:16:25.140 --> 03:16:28.660
stronger events
impacting the back country.

03:16:28.660 --> 03:16:31.800
And this has been especially since 2017,

03:16:31.800 --> 03:16:35.390
where we have seen
a pretty sharp increase.

03:16:35.390 --> 03:16:38.840
And it's not just across
this one community,

03:16:38.840 --> 03:16:41.020
as we look at the graphs on the right,

03:16:41.020 --> 03:16:43.100
whether we're looking
at our foothill communities

03:16:43.100 --> 03:16:46.980
in Alpine or we go all the way
up to the Cuyamaca mountains,

03:16:46.980 --> 03:16:50.540
wide scale across the SDG&amp;E network,

03:16:50.540 --> 03:16:54.100
we are seeing this
increase in wind, right?

03:16:54.100 --> 03:16:57.510
Which does impact the implementation

03:16:57.510 --> 03:16:59.833
of public safety power shutoff.

03:17:00.840 --> 03:17:05.340
And the next slide, what
we're gonna get into is,

03:17:05.340 --> 03:17:10.070
especially in 2020, and
we heard this from Erik

03:17:10.070 --> 03:17:14.058
was that we had a
very late season impact,

03:17:14.058 --> 03:17:15.950
and this is unusual.

03:17:15.950 --> 03:17:18.783
We've had a program
in place going back now,

03:17:19.880 --> 03:17:24.540
as I mentioned to 2009
and out of the last 12 years,

03:17:24.540 --> 03:17:27.230
this is only the second instance

03:17:27.230 --> 03:17:30.270
where we've surpassed Thanksgiving

03:17:30.270 --> 03:17:32.300
and kind of moved
through that Thanksgiving

03:17:32.300 --> 03:17:36.170
to Christmas point, and
we haven't seen the rainfall.

03:17:36.170 --> 03:17:39.620
That really starts bringing
down that fire potential.

03:17:39.620 --> 03:17:41.870
So now this is two out
of the last four years,

03:17:41.870 --> 03:17:44.740
and it's also a clear
trend, which is consistent

03:17:44.740 --> 03:17:47.760
with the climate science
that we are seeing

03:17:47.760 --> 03:17:52.020
that less reliable late season rainfall

03:17:52.020 --> 03:17:53.040
across the region.

03:17:53.040 --> 03:17:55.840
So, but I did wanna
highlight this period

03:17:55.840 --> 03:17:57.350
that you're looking at here

03:17:57.350 --> 03:18:00.250
between Thanksgiving
and Christmas, right?

03:18:00.250 --> 03:18:05.250
So you'll notice the graph
or the bar chart up at the top.

03:18:05.670 --> 03:18:10.100
It starts on Thursday,
11/26, that is Thanksgiving

03:18:10.100 --> 03:18:12.723
and it ends on December 24th.

03:18:14.130 --> 03:18:16.470
The red lines across the top,

03:18:16.470 --> 03:18:19.570
are when we had red flag warnings issued

03:18:19.570 --> 03:18:23.720
by the national weather
service during that time.

03:18:23.720 --> 03:18:27.120
And the bar underneath
with the yellow and the red,

03:18:27.120 --> 03:18:31.170
that's our internal fire
potential index that we share

03:18:31.170 --> 03:18:34.070
with community stakeholders,
the national weather service.

03:18:35.190 --> 03:18:37.550
So I wanted to point all
this out and go through

03:18:37.550 --> 03:18:39.850
a few events because
the events that started

03:18:39.850 --> 03:18:43.223
on Thanksgiving, point that
I wanted to make there is,

03:18:44.160 --> 03:18:49.160
you know, we did not have
any PSPS customers affected

03:18:49.760 --> 03:18:51.160
in that event, right?

03:18:51.160 --> 03:18:54.070
So that was positive for
part of the reason you'll notice

03:18:54.070 --> 03:18:56.990
our fire potential index
remained elevated,

03:18:56.990 --> 03:18:58.940
and we take all of these factors in.

03:18:58.940 --> 03:19:01.290
So this was an area
that the fire potential

03:19:01.290 --> 03:19:03.440
wasn't quite as high.

03:19:03.440 --> 03:19:06.250
We were monitoring
conditions very closely.

03:19:06.250 --> 03:19:10.540
And in that case, we were able to avoid

03:19:10.540 --> 03:19:14.510
a public safety power shutoff impacts.

03:19:14.510 --> 03:19:16.570
The next event was
very different for us.

03:19:16.570 --> 03:19:19.290
It was described as the
national weather service

03:19:19.290 --> 03:19:23.580
as extremely critical as
we moved into that event.

03:19:23.580 --> 03:19:25.820
And to this day in the 12 years,

03:19:25.820 --> 03:19:28.210
it is the windiest event that we've seen

03:19:28.210 --> 03:19:31.080
with the top 20 average weather stations

03:19:31.080 --> 03:19:35.663
recording 71 miles per hour,
and a peak wind gust of 94.

03:19:37.660 --> 03:19:41.516
So that event came in
and that was the largest

03:19:41.516 --> 03:19:45.110
and most impactful public
safety power shutoff event

03:19:45.110 --> 03:19:46.333
that we have had.

03:19:47.200 --> 03:19:50.190
But that being said, we'll
hear from Jonathan here more,

03:19:50.190 --> 03:19:51.940
there were great implementation

03:19:51.940 --> 03:19:55.140
of our different generator programs,

03:19:55.140 --> 03:20:00.140
our microgrids really helped
keep core community resources

03:20:00.900 --> 03:20:02.230
energized in that event.

03:20:02.230 --> 03:20:07.230
So despite the larger impact,
there were some benefits

03:20:08.330 --> 03:20:10.570
that we've seen this year,

03:20:10.570 --> 03:20:14.440
even our community resource
centers extremely popular

03:20:15.380 --> 03:20:17.270
during that event.

03:20:17.270 --> 03:20:21.350
And as we move then into the next event,

03:20:21.350 --> 03:20:24.620
which was just several days later,

03:20:24.620 --> 03:20:28.020
that event was not quite as windy.

03:20:28.020 --> 03:20:31.160
So part of that event,
we'll talk more about

03:20:31.160 --> 03:20:33.360
how we've implemented some of our new

03:20:33.360 --> 03:20:37.930
high speed weather data
technology during that second event,

03:20:37.930 --> 03:20:39.627
to try to decrease the impact.

03:20:39.627 --> 03:20:43.200
And what that is now is we
can set our weather network

03:20:43.200 --> 03:20:48.200
to give us weather station
updates every 30 seconds.

03:20:48.370 --> 03:20:52.560
And if we start seeing areas
that get windy and it triggers

03:20:52.560 --> 03:20:55.880
an alert for us to start
watching it closely,

03:20:55.880 --> 03:20:59.240
then we start looking
at it in 30-second reads.

03:20:59.240 --> 03:21:01.357
And a lot of times it
will start to trend down

03:21:01.357 --> 03:21:04.280
and we found that additional information

03:21:04.280 --> 03:21:06.960
and that additional
situational awareness

03:21:06.960 --> 03:21:10.440
really helped us save
some customers impacts

03:21:11.560 --> 03:21:12.713
during that event.

03:21:13.560 --> 03:21:17.620
And then the very impactful event,

03:21:17.620 --> 03:21:21.120
just because of the timing
coming in right at Christmas

03:21:21.120 --> 03:21:23.100
on the 23rd of December,

03:21:23.100 --> 03:21:26.850
yet another red flag
impacted our region.

03:21:26.850 --> 03:21:30.330
But you'll notice again,
looking at the bar chart up

03:21:30.330 --> 03:21:34.060
at the top, we didn't
have that extreme FPI.

03:21:34.060 --> 03:21:36.650
We were in an elevated fire potential,

03:21:36.650 --> 03:21:41.650
but lacking those extreme
FPI, it really did help us start

03:21:42.140 --> 03:21:44.270
to minimize it, be much more targeted

03:21:44.270 --> 03:21:46.020
and leverage those weather stations

03:21:46.020 --> 03:21:49.700
and leverage the sectionalizing
devices to really start

03:21:49.700 --> 03:21:52.350
to bring the impact down during

03:21:52.350 --> 03:21:57.060
that extremely critical
time around the holidays.

03:21:57.060 --> 03:22:00.138
But overall, as I've mentioned already,

03:22:00.138 --> 03:22:03.360
a very eventful year for us with a total

03:22:03.360 --> 03:22:08.360
of 11 red flag warnings and
public safety power shutoff

03:22:09.440 --> 03:22:11.460
events for the region.

03:22:11.460 --> 03:22:13.920
But out of those 11 red flag warnings,

03:22:13.920 --> 03:22:18.200
I'd like to go to that next
slide because out of the 11,

03:22:18.200 --> 03:22:21.310
there were five of those red flags

03:22:21.310 --> 03:22:23.690
that escalated to actually implementing

03:22:23.690 --> 03:22:26.167
a public safety power shutoff with that.

03:22:27.083 --> 03:22:30.380
And a couple of those
early season events,

03:22:30.380 --> 03:22:34.240
September eighth and ninth
and October 26th and 27th,

03:22:34.240 --> 03:22:38.000
we were really able to
implement our weather station

03:22:38.000 --> 03:22:41.620
and our sectionalizing devices
on September eighth and ninth

03:22:41.620 --> 03:22:44.390
we kept it down to 49 customers.

03:22:44.390 --> 03:22:46.720
Really being able to
just leverage everything

03:22:46.720 --> 03:22:49.880
we've learned over the
last decade to isolate

03:22:49.880 --> 03:22:52.113
and keep those numbers small.

03:22:53.480 --> 03:22:56.243
And then we did talk about
the damaging wind event,

03:22:57.180 --> 03:23:02.180
widespread wind event that we
had December second to fourth.

03:23:02.850 --> 03:23:05.940
That again, that was our largest damage

03:23:05.940 --> 03:23:08.470
that we found across the system

03:23:08.470 --> 03:23:10.290
with over a dozen different instances

03:23:10.290 --> 03:23:13.960
where we had impacts to the system.

03:23:13.960 --> 03:23:16.380
And then we've already
talked about December seventh

03:23:16.380 --> 03:23:19.880
and eighth and 23rd and 24th.

03:23:19.880 --> 03:23:21.760
But the other thing that
I wanted to point out is,

03:23:21.760 --> 03:23:25.810
and I think we've done a
much better job this year

03:23:25.810 --> 03:23:30.720
on really keeping that outage
duration as low as possible.

03:23:30.720 --> 03:23:34.300
And there's a few different
ways that we're able to do this.

03:23:34.300 --> 03:23:37.300
One of them is our
additional weather stations

03:23:37.300 --> 03:23:40.300
and the more that we segment the system,

03:23:40.300 --> 03:23:43.620
it doesn't only help us
minimize the impact of PSPS,

03:23:43.620 --> 03:23:46.040
but in some of these larger events,

03:23:46.040 --> 03:23:48.740
as soon as the winds begin to come down,

03:23:48.740 --> 03:23:52.850
we can find out right away
that the winds have decreased

03:23:52.850 --> 03:23:57.500
and we start patrolling
earlier and it helps speed up

03:23:57.500 --> 03:23:59.410
the restoration as well.

03:23:59.410 --> 03:24:01.180
So as you see those first two events,

03:24:01.180 --> 03:24:04.430
we kept the average
duration to less than 10 hours

03:24:05.280 --> 03:24:06.200
during those events.

03:24:06.200 --> 03:24:09.290
So there's been really
significant improvement

03:24:09.290 --> 03:24:12.220
in that area this year,
something that we're planning

03:24:12.220 --> 03:24:16.483
to continue to build on moving forward.

03:24:17.340 --> 03:24:21.820
With this ongoing impact
of PSPS and the trends,

03:24:21.820 --> 03:24:26.820
again of longer fire seasons
with windier conditions,

03:24:26.880 --> 03:24:30.150
the next slide starts
to get into, you know,

03:24:30.150 --> 03:24:33.170
how do we work with
the customers, right?

03:24:33.170 --> 03:24:36.320
And how do we work
to mitigate the impact

03:24:36.320 --> 03:24:38.070
that public safety power shutoff

03:24:38.070 --> 03:24:39.980
is having on our communities.

03:24:39.980 --> 03:24:42.730
We heard yesterday from Mason and Sarah,

03:24:42.730 --> 03:24:45.620
that we're really integrating PSPS risk

03:24:45.620 --> 03:24:47.430
into the wings model moving forward

03:24:47.430 --> 03:24:51.330
and we'll continue to assess it that way

03:24:51.330 --> 03:24:52.730
and prioritize it that way.

03:24:52.730 --> 03:24:55.410
But at the same time,
we're looking at who some

03:24:55.410 --> 03:24:57.397
of these most impacted customers

03:24:57.397 --> 03:25:00.660
and what can we do
right now to help them.

03:25:00.660 --> 03:25:05.600
So, this year we did have 1,334 portable

03:25:07.340 --> 03:25:10.010
battery powered generators that went

03:25:10.010 --> 03:25:12.380
to medical baseline customers this year.

03:25:12.380 --> 03:25:16.390
So anybody who's
registered in medical baseline,

03:25:16.390 --> 03:25:20.550
who had experienced
the PSPS outage in 2019,

03:25:20.550 --> 03:25:23.200
qualified for this, and
we're expanding this

03:25:23.200 --> 03:25:26.823
as we move into 2021, because
it's been very well received.

03:25:28.380 --> 03:25:32.330
In terms of the generator
purchase rebates,

03:25:32.330 --> 03:25:36.510
this is a program that is
targeting our care customers,

03:25:36.510 --> 03:25:39.020
those where we can provide
some financial assistance

03:25:39.020 --> 03:25:43.810
and rebates to those who wanna
go and purchase a generator.

03:25:43.810 --> 03:25:47.813
So again, that was also a very
successful program this year.

03:25:48.730 --> 03:25:50.540
The picture you see on the right there,

03:25:50.540 --> 03:25:54.530
that was the first install
of some happy customers

03:25:54.530 --> 03:25:57.110
who got their whole-home generator.

03:25:57.110 --> 03:25:59.347
And we've gone in
using our weather data,

03:25:59.347 --> 03:26:03.150
and we really targeted those
areas that are most prone

03:26:03.150 --> 03:26:06.220
to these extreme weather conditions.

03:26:07.380 --> 03:26:11.040
And those are the places
that we're prioritizing first

03:26:11.040 --> 03:26:12.470
from the whole-home generators.

03:26:12.470 --> 03:26:13.310
And then we're still,

03:26:13.310 --> 03:26:15.100
through our emergency operations center,

03:26:15.100 --> 03:26:19.720
finding ways to implement
any community needs.

03:26:19.720 --> 03:26:22.610
And one example was the
Alpine mental health facility

03:26:23.460 --> 03:26:26.850
during our large event in December.

03:26:26.850 --> 03:26:29.510
Earlier today, you did
hear Jonathan mention

03:26:29.510 --> 03:26:33.950
the microgrids and a big piece of this

03:26:33.950 --> 03:26:36.280
is it's not just the
hundreds of customers

03:26:37.280 --> 03:26:39.980
that are being served here,
but it's the type of customers.

03:26:39.980 --> 03:26:44.650
It's very specifically
targeting those resources

03:26:44.650 --> 03:26:49.100
that can serve a community
while they're experiencing a PSPS

03:26:49.100 --> 03:26:50.790
to mitigate the impacts.

03:26:50.790 --> 03:26:54.800
So this is an ongoing project,
which we'll hear more about

03:26:54.800 --> 03:26:57.623
and I know you've heard
about it in detail this morning.

03:26:58.850 --> 03:27:00.863
Sorry, I won't expand too much on that.

03:27:01.890 --> 03:27:06.890
The next slide gets into
the weather technology.

03:27:06.900 --> 03:27:10.900
So these 30 new weather stations,

03:27:10.900 --> 03:27:13.350
we really started to
target Valley Center,

03:27:13.350 --> 03:27:16.520
'cause as I showed you in
that first graph Valley Center

03:27:16.520 --> 03:27:19.890
is seeing an upward
trend in winds faster

03:27:19.890 --> 03:27:23.150
than what appears to be
the rest of our service territory.

03:27:23.150 --> 03:27:26.500
And we're studying that,
we're working with universities,

03:27:26.500 --> 03:27:30.000
we're looking very closely
at ways that we can continue

03:27:30.000 --> 03:27:33.190
to serve that community
through new weather stations,

03:27:33.190 --> 03:27:35.750
new sectionalizing
devices, and find ways

03:27:35.750 --> 03:27:37.960
that we can immediately
continue to decrease

03:27:37.960 --> 03:27:41.410
the impact that PSPS can
have on that community.

03:27:41.410 --> 03:27:43.350
And we do a lot of it through working

03:27:43.350 --> 03:27:47.240
with their fire agencies,
with the fire chief,

03:27:47.240 --> 03:27:50.830
with their fire safe councils
and find out what can we do

03:27:50.830 --> 03:27:55.500
to minimize the increasing
impact in that region.

03:27:55.500 --> 03:27:59.440
The 30-second weather data right now,

03:27:59.440 --> 03:28:03.350
and you'll see, it's
really giving us the insight

03:28:03.350 --> 03:28:08.350
and the confidence to keep
circuits energized in some cases,

03:28:11.600 --> 03:28:15.630
because we may see a
quick spike up to 60 miles

03:28:15.630 --> 03:28:18.010
an hour potentially,
but then when we put

03:28:18.010 --> 03:28:20.610
on the 30-second reads, we
could see that it's dropped off

03:28:20.610 --> 03:28:24.420
very quickly and it gives
us really good confidence

03:28:24.420 --> 03:28:27.900
that we are tracking well with the data

03:28:27.900 --> 03:28:29.363
in a particular area.

03:28:30.650 --> 03:28:33.780
And then we've implemented
all of this new intel

03:28:33.780 --> 03:28:36.860
into public safety
power shutoff databases,

03:28:36.860 --> 03:28:40.100
which are going directly to
our utility incident commander.

03:28:40.100 --> 03:28:43.190
So, our ability to process
the data and make

03:28:44.080 --> 03:28:47.430
the best, most informed
decisions in real time taking

03:28:47.430 --> 03:28:50.470
into account all those factors that feed

03:28:50.470 --> 03:28:52.427
into public safety power shutoff.

03:28:52.427 --> 03:28:56.670
And making sure that we do
have all the best available data

03:28:56.670 --> 03:29:01.150
is something that was a
big improvement in 2020,

03:29:01.150 --> 03:29:05.200
and we're still expanding
upon that in 2021.

03:29:05.200 --> 03:29:08.210
The last point that I'll touch
on before handing it over

03:29:08.210 --> 03:29:11.840
to Jonathan is that
the transferring of load.

03:29:11.840 --> 03:29:15.030
Now, we're continuing
to study the impact

03:29:15.030 --> 03:29:17.920
of every circuit in
our service territory.

03:29:17.920 --> 03:29:21.130
And in many cases, critical resources

03:29:21.130 --> 03:29:24.620
in the community may be
fed by multiple directions.

03:29:24.620 --> 03:29:27.480
So we will do analysis
coming into an event

03:29:27.480 --> 03:29:31.300
and in some cases, switch
over and transfer the load

03:29:31.300 --> 03:29:33.650
to come in from a lower risk area.

03:29:33.650 --> 03:29:36.060
And even in some cases, we'll say, well,

03:29:36.060 --> 03:29:39.050
it looks like both areas
could be impacted by PSPS,

03:29:39.050 --> 03:29:41.210
but we could get this
one restored more quickly

03:29:41.210 --> 03:29:44.620
because it doesn't require
a helicopter to patrol,

03:29:44.620 --> 03:29:45.730
and just as an example.

03:29:45.730 --> 03:29:49.000
So we can start making
switching plans that will, you know,

03:29:49.000 --> 03:29:53.112
in some cases even
decrease the length of a PSPS.

03:29:53.112 --> 03:29:55.900
And we're finding that this
is having a positive impact

03:29:57.110 --> 03:29:57.943
on the community.

03:29:57.943 --> 03:30:02.360
So again, I appreciate
the opportunity to talk about

03:30:02.360 --> 03:30:06.230
how 2020, a very
eventful year played out

03:30:06.230 --> 03:30:09.120
and how we were able
to decrease the impact

03:30:09.120 --> 03:30:10.950
of public safety power shutoff.

03:30:10.950 --> 03:30:12.017
Look forward to the questioning

03:30:12.017 --> 03:30:13.750
and the discussion
afterwards, and with that,

03:30:13.750 --> 03:30:15.463
I'll hand it off to Jonathan.

03:30:18.240 --> 03:30:19.380
<v Jonathan>Thank you, Brian.</v>

03:30:19.380 --> 03:30:20.600
If we go to the next slide,

03:30:20.600 --> 03:30:25.600
I'd like to start off by
including our approach

03:30:25.850 --> 03:30:30.850
into the 2020 plan this
past year, we really assigned

03:30:32.680 --> 03:30:36.810
two task force teams that would look at

03:30:36.810 --> 03:30:39.450
the specific solutions
that we could come up with

03:30:39.450 --> 03:30:42.660
in our internal teams for PSPS impacts.

03:30:42.660 --> 03:30:46.760
And we leveraged the
engineering type team,

03:30:46.760 --> 03:30:48.540
that was one of the
teams that was looking

03:30:48.540 --> 03:30:49.930
at engineering solutions.

03:30:49.930 --> 03:30:52.760
The second team was
looking at customer service type

03:30:52.760 --> 03:30:55.280
solutions that we could
provide our customers

03:30:55.280 --> 03:30:56.840
during PSPS events.

03:30:56.840 --> 03:31:00.380
And I'll focus on the
engineering solutions

03:31:00.380 --> 03:31:02.110
for this particular slide.

03:31:02.110 --> 03:31:04.480
But I also wanted
to highlight just briefly

03:31:04.480 --> 03:31:07.140
some of the customer
service oriented solutions

03:31:07.140 --> 03:31:11.370
that were created in 2020,
that benefited our customers

03:31:11.370 --> 03:31:13.890
during PSPS events.

03:31:13.890 --> 03:31:16.660
Brian mentioned the
community resource centers

03:31:16.660 --> 03:31:18.670
with some of the additional
activities that were done,

03:31:18.670 --> 03:31:20.340
but also the additional
community resource centers

03:31:20.340 --> 03:31:22.680
that were added in 2020.

03:31:22.680 --> 03:31:25.810
Installing some changeable
and movable road signs

03:31:25.810 --> 03:31:28.300
that display PSPS related messages

03:31:28.300 --> 03:31:30.920
and highly traversed HFTD intersections

03:31:30.920 --> 03:31:33.630
helped customers stay
informed, especially customers

03:31:33.630 --> 03:31:35.860
that were hard to reach and
maybe didn't have access

03:31:35.860 --> 03:31:38.070
to online tools.

03:31:38.070 --> 03:31:40.860
The other thing that we were
able to do was take advantage

03:31:40.860 --> 03:31:45.420
of enhanced AM radio
spots during PSPS events to

03:31:45.420 --> 03:31:50.150
and pre and prior PSPS events
as well to inform customers.

03:31:50.150 --> 03:31:53.760
And then how-to videos
that we initiated and shared

03:31:53.760 --> 03:31:57.040
with customers so that they
could get crucial information

03:31:57.040 --> 03:31:59.550
on navigating PSPS events.

03:31:59.550 --> 03:32:03.400
And also a PSPS app
that we provided customers

03:32:03.400 --> 03:32:05.770
that they could install
on their mobile phones

03:32:05.770 --> 03:32:07.670
so that they could
receive alerts, right?

03:32:07.670 --> 03:32:09.790
Even if they didn't
have an SDG&amp;E account

03:32:09.790 --> 03:32:11.467
when a PSPS event was eminent,

03:32:11.467 --> 03:32:13.620
and any additional information as well.

03:32:13.620 --> 03:32:17.010
So, all of this to say that
our approach was two fold,

03:32:17.010 --> 03:32:19.000
customer service related solutions

03:32:19.000 --> 03:32:21.400
as well as engineering solutions,

03:32:21.400 --> 03:32:24.450
more technical in nature
that I'm gonna share next here

03:32:24.450 --> 03:32:25.530
on the slide.

03:32:25.530 --> 03:32:29.075
Brian partly shared the
generator programs that we have,

03:32:29.075 --> 03:32:31.470
the microgrids were
highlighted specifically

03:32:31.470 --> 03:32:32.840
in Shelter Valley.

03:32:32.840 --> 03:32:36.437
This is one example,
sorry, go back to the slide.

03:32:38.240 --> 03:32:40.320
Yeah, so microgrid shared,

03:32:40.320 --> 03:32:45.320
but on the weather stations
besides the 30-second solution,

03:32:46.120 --> 03:32:48.510
as Brian highlighted, the
additional weather stations

03:32:48.510 --> 03:32:53.100
helped inform the surgical
process that we can take

03:32:53.100 --> 03:32:54.880
for how we engage dot circuits.

03:32:54.880 --> 03:32:57.750
So instead of
de-energizing larger session,

03:32:57.750 --> 03:32:59.490
we were able to minimize the impact

03:32:59.490 --> 03:33:01.690
by going to smaller sections.

03:33:01.690 --> 03:33:04.500
Additional sectionalizing
devices allowed us to break up

03:33:04.500 --> 03:33:06.650
the circuit even more so
that the customer impacts

03:33:06.650 --> 03:33:11.050
were reduced, and then
transferring loads of circuits,

03:33:11.050 --> 03:33:14.023
you know, parts of circuits
over to another circuit

03:33:14.023 --> 03:33:18.100
that would not be impacted
by PSPS events also helped.

03:33:18.100 --> 03:33:22.600
So in this next slide,
we will discuss some

03:33:22.600 --> 03:33:27.600
of the comprehensive solutions, right?

03:33:27.960 --> 03:33:32.010
So, take the single
incidents that I've talked about

03:33:32.010 --> 03:33:36.460
linking all the solutions,
the engineering solutions,

03:33:36.460 --> 03:33:39.040
and that is highlighted
on the right there.

03:33:39.040 --> 03:33:42.302
The undergrounding,
whole-home generator, microgrids,

03:33:42.302 --> 03:33:44.828
load tranfer, sectionalizing,
weather station.

03:33:44.828 --> 03:33:47.950
And for the December
second to the fourth event

03:33:47.950 --> 03:33:52.950
where we have over 73,000
customers that were impacted,

03:33:53.540 --> 03:33:58.150
we were able to reduce the
impacts by 7300 customers.

03:33:58.150 --> 03:34:01.510
So that the totals
for each, for example,

03:34:01.510 --> 03:34:05.420
by undergrounding, strategic
undergrounding areas on PSPS,

03:34:06.350 --> 03:34:11.350
we were able to save 5,773
customers from being impacted.

03:34:13.040 --> 03:34:16.800
And so on, right, with
the microgrids, we're able

03:34:16.800 --> 03:34:19.440
to save 348 customers
from being impacted.

03:34:19.440 --> 03:34:24.110
On the right, it's a picture
of how we were able

03:34:24.110 --> 03:34:29.110
to save over 1700 customers
from customer, I'm sorry,

03:34:29.293 --> 03:34:31.995
PSPS impacts, and then December seventh

03:34:31.995 --> 03:34:32.970
through the ninth event.

03:34:32.970 --> 03:34:36.850
Now each PSPS event is
different, like the scope and scale

03:34:36.850 --> 03:34:39.073
and frequency is
different for each event.

03:34:39.913 --> 03:34:42.450
And so the solution
on the right is different

03:34:42.450 --> 03:34:43.750
from solution on the left.

03:34:43.750 --> 03:34:46.630
When we mix both
solutions, it's still the same.

03:34:46.630 --> 03:34:48.510
But how much reduction we get

03:34:48.510 --> 03:34:50.840
from the solution is different.

03:34:50.840 --> 03:34:53.620
So that as we don't our next slide,

03:34:53.620 --> 03:34:58.620
we will look at a summary
of pre events in December

03:34:59.880 --> 03:35:04.573
of the chart is showing the customers

03:35:04.573 --> 03:35:06.020
that were impacted, right?

03:35:06.020 --> 03:35:08.303
The blue bar chart shows
how many customers

03:35:08.303 --> 03:35:10.320
were impacted for each event.

03:35:10.320 --> 03:35:13.860
The middle bar shows how
many customers were able

03:35:13.860 --> 03:35:17.020
to be saved from our
situational awareness reduction.

03:35:17.020 --> 03:35:19.070
So our situational awareness tools.

03:35:19.070 --> 03:35:20.943
Brian shared with you the 30-second tool

03:35:20.943 --> 03:35:24.720
that allows us to understand how high

03:35:24.720 --> 03:35:26.220
the wind speeds go, right?

03:35:26.220 --> 03:35:29.580
On a 30-second
interval, but also how long

03:35:29.580 --> 03:35:32.600
those wind gusts lasted, right?

03:35:32.600 --> 03:35:35.210
So if they're going to
be lasting a lot longer

03:35:35.210 --> 03:35:38.950
and we anticipate and
see that the wind gusts

03:35:38.950 --> 03:35:41.720
are remaining and
sustained, then we're able

03:35:41.720 --> 03:35:44.430
to de-energize a segment of circuit.

03:35:44.430 --> 03:35:49.430
Whereas if the 30-second
hit of high winds is brief,

03:35:51.120 --> 03:35:55.630
then we're able to likely
and avoid PSPS impacts.

03:35:55.630 --> 03:35:59.044
And so with that, you see in
the December second report,

03:35:59.044 --> 03:36:04.044
5,899 customers were
saved on PSPS events.

03:36:04.212 --> 03:36:07.044
The bar chart on the right
for the December second

03:36:07.044 --> 03:36:10.950
through the fourth, 7,300
customers that we're saved.

03:36:10.950 --> 03:36:13.023
I already shared with you it
was the engineering solutions

03:36:13.023 --> 03:36:16.190
that were able to save
them from the impact.

03:36:16.190 --> 03:36:20.380
So overall 15% reduction
for that December second

03:36:20.380 --> 03:36:22.230
to forth event.

03:36:22.230 --> 03:36:25.607
On the middle area,
the slide for the impacts

03:36:25.607 --> 03:36:28.060
for December seventh
through the ninth are shared.

03:36:28.060 --> 03:36:31.000
Over 15,000 customers
experience the PSPS event,

03:36:31.000 --> 03:36:36.000
but over 22,000 customers
were able to avoid impacts

03:36:36.180 --> 03:36:39.620
to them by using the
30-second technology.

03:36:39.620 --> 03:36:42.480
Now on the December 23rd and 24th event,

03:36:42.480 --> 03:36:46.660
it wasn't the 30-second
wind speed capability

03:36:46.660 --> 03:36:48.323
that allowed us to save the impacts

03:36:48.323 --> 03:36:50.900
for the 19,000 customers,

03:36:50.900 --> 03:36:53.510
but it was the fire potential index

03:36:53.510 --> 03:36:56.350
that Brian talked about,
meaning the fact that

03:36:56.350 --> 03:36:58.540
there was a red flag
warning was one condition,

03:36:58.540 --> 03:37:02.890
but we also had additional
tools to understand the situation

03:37:02.890 --> 03:37:05.740
that in our service territory
and the impacted areas

03:37:05.740 --> 03:37:09.390
to understand that the fire
potential index was as elevated

03:37:09.390 --> 03:37:13.090
or extreme, and therefore
avoid impacts to our customers.

03:37:13.090 --> 03:37:15.490
So that numbers would
have been that much higher

03:37:15.490 --> 03:37:17.397
without the fire potential index tool,

03:37:17.397 --> 03:37:19.410
the 30-second weather tool,

03:37:19.410 --> 03:37:22.880
as well as the engineering
solution that we discussed.

03:37:22.880 --> 03:37:27.210
So in summary, when
we look at the approach

03:37:27.210 --> 03:37:31.020
that we took from 2020,
we focused very specifically

03:37:31.020 --> 03:37:33.937
on solutions for our areas of impact

03:37:33.937 --> 03:37:36.590
and the customers that were
impacted in previous years

03:37:36.590 --> 03:37:38.000
to provide solutions.

03:37:38.000 --> 03:37:41.430
We combined engineering
and customer care solutions,

03:37:41.430 --> 03:37:44.780
as well as we used our granular
data that we're able to get

03:37:44.780 --> 03:37:47.490
from our situational awareness tools

03:37:47.490 --> 03:37:50.950
to leverage the capability and use it

03:37:50.950 --> 03:37:53.310
towards conducive PSPS impacts.

03:37:53.310 --> 03:37:55.650
So appreciate your attention today.

03:37:55.650 --> 03:37:59.200
And this last slide is a picture of,

03:37:59.200 --> 03:38:03.210
this next slide is a
picture of the 2021 plan

03:38:03.210 --> 03:38:06.313
and leveraging some of the
same engineering solutions

03:38:06.313 --> 03:38:08.983
as well as customer care
solutions that we're gonna have

03:38:08.983 --> 03:38:13.599
towards reducing even
more impacts from about 3000

03:38:13.599 --> 03:38:17.100
to 7,500 customers in terms when we run

03:38:17.100 --> 03:38:22.100
based on the fact that we've
had similar events as 2020.

03:38:23.410 --> 03:38:24.310
So each event is different.

03:38:24.310 --> 03:38:29.050
So there may be more or less
customers saved from impacts,

03:38:29.050 --> 03:38:32.120
but this is the overall
estimate for 2021.

03:38:32.120 --> 03:38:33.010
Thank you for your attention

03:38:33.010 --> 03:38:34.910
and look forward to the questions.

03:38:36.500 --> 03:38:39.190
<v ->Thank you, and
that's where I'll take</v>

03:38:39.190 --> 03:38:41.060
moderator's prerogative
here, we're a little bit early,

03:38:41.060 --> 03:38:43.660
and then I'll let
everyone go a little early.

03:38:43.660 --> 03:38:48.380
But with the FPI, can you just describe

03:38:48.380 --> 03:38:50.760
for everyone since we
talked about the weather

03:38:50.760 --> 03:38:53.083
what influences the FPI?

03:38:54.010 --> 03:38:58.760
<v ->Yeah, absolutely, so the
FPI has a few different factors.</v>

03:38:58.760 --> 03:39:00.820
One is of course the weather, right?

03:39:00.820 --> 03:39:03.330
So we take wind speeds,

03:39:03.330 --> 03:39:05.840
and then we take two point depression,

03:39:05.840 --> 03:39:06.673
which is the difference.

03:39:06.673 --> 03:39:10.130
It's pretty much a measure
of humidity in the atmosphere.

03:39:10.130 --> 03:39:12.190
Then we take live fuel moisture,

03:39:12.190 --> 03:39:13.980
which we generate with AI models.

03:39:13.980 --> 03:39:15.560
We take dead fuel moisture,

03:39:15.560 --> 03:39:18.020
which we developed through
partnerships with UCLA

03:39:18.020 --> 03:39:20.210
in the United States Forest Service.

03:39:20.210 --> 03:39:24.240
And then we also have
the greenness of the grass,

03:39:24.240 --> 03:39:26.820
which we incorporate from satellites.

03:39:26.820 --> 03:39:30.410
And we continue, we
combine all of those,

03:39:30.410 --> 03:39:32.970
relate it back to
historical fire occurrence

03:39:32.970 --> 03:39:35.520
and we can calculate the probability

03:39:35.520 --> 03:39:39.160
of large fires developing
on any given day,

03:39:39.160 --> 03:39:41.810
given the fire weather conditions.

03:39:41.810 --> 03:39:45.880
This is something we started
running operationally in 2012.

03:39:45.880 --> 03:39:49.020
We started sharing it with
stakeholders across San Diego,

03:39:49.020 --> 03:39:54.020
and it's now being built
by utilities across the State

03:39:55.340 --> 03:39:58.080
and even up into the
Pacific Northwest as well.

03:39:58.080 --> 03:40:01.880
And a big part of what
we will find is we continue

03:40:01.880 --> 03:40:02.760
to enhance it, right?

03:40:02.760 --> 03:40:05.950
Like any science-based tool,
there's always a next step.

03:40:05.950 --> 03:40:07.150
So this year we're working with

03:40:07.150 --> 03:40:08.980
the San Diego Super Computing Center

03:40:08.980 --> 03:40:10.800
and one of their capstone teams.

03:40:10.800 --> 03:40:14.040
And we're looking
closely at additional inputs,

03:40:14.040 --> 03:40:17.830
such as fuel temperature,
solar radiation,

03:40:17.830 --> 03:40:20.170
and then duration of those to understand

03:40:20.170 --> 03:40:23.480
how those can impact fire potential

03:40:23.480 --> 03:40:27.820
to just continue to enhance,
continue to improve our ability

03:40:27.820 --> 03:40:30.410
to assess the potential
for catastrophic wildfire

03:40:30.410 --> 03:40:33.430
on the landscape.

03:40:33.430 --> 03:40:34.720
<v ->Thank you, I think
that helps complete</v>

03:40:34.720 --> 03:40:36.603
the picture you were painting there.

03:40:38.190 --> 03:40:39.620
And with that, we'll take a break

03:40:39.620 --> 03:40:42.410
and have everyone come back
and give you two minutes back

03:40:42.410 --> 03:40:44.923
that we took earlier
today, come back at 2:30.

03:41:18.089 --> 03:41:20.743
Yeah, I wanna welcome
everyone back showing 2:30

03:41:21.920 --> 03:41:26.920
on my computer, and I
wanna thank all the panelists

03:41:27.010 --> 03:41:28.570
for the presentations provided,

03:41:28.570 --> 03:41:30.560
which provided some further insights

03:41:30.560 --> 03:41:34.770
into some of the questions
that we had prepared

03:41:34.770 --> 03:41:38.343
from WSD, our safety division.

03:41:39.780 --> 03:41:44.780
Which have now been
fully or partially addressed

03:41:44.820 --> 03:41:48.570
to some degree or a large degree.

03:41:48.570 --> 03:41:50.950
And now we'd like to build upon those

03:41:50.950 --> 03:41:52.560
as well as provide
additional opportunity

03:41:52.560 --> 03:41:53.900
for questions and discussion.

03:41:53.900 --> 03:41:58.900
So as we have been
doing with the workshops,

03:41:59.580 --> 03:42:02.850
I will start with a question
and then I will turn

03:42:02.850 --> 03:42:07.373
to the stakeholders that
we have identified previously

03:42:09.390 --> 03:42:14.390
on the line from TURN, from
Mussey Grade Road Alliance,

03:42:17.170 --> 03:42:21.180
Public Advocates, Will Abrams
and Green Power Institute

03:42:22.238 --> 03:42:23.470
to each take a turn.

03:42:23.470 --> 03:42:28.420
And then also we have
Nathan Poon on the line

03:42:28.420 --> 03:42:32.593
who's moderating the chat
with questions from the audience.

03:42:34.057 --> 03:42:39.057
And as before we'll ask
the, any of the stakeholders

03:42:39.360 --> 03:42:43.540
to raise their hand and
take a turn at a question

03:42:43.540 --> 03:42:44.563
and we'll go around.

03:42:46.030 --> 03:42:51.000
So with that, I had a
question that I think

03:42:51.000 --> 03:42:54.990
has to a large degree been answered,

03:42:54.990 --> 03:42:57.000
but I wanted to give
one more opportunity

03:42:57.000 --> 03:43:00.720
for each of the utility representatives

03:43:00.720 --> 03:43:04.280
to talk about a little bit
about the WMP initiatives

03:43:04.280 --> 03:43:09.040
that you have described
that account for direct impacts

03:43:09.040 --> 03:43:12.070
on reducing PSPS
scope, frequency, duration.

03:43:12.070 --> 03:43:15.740
And if I realized that
you have described,

03:43:15.740 --> 03:43:18.770
there are a mix of opportunities there,

03:43:18.770 --> 03:43:23.060
but if you could underscore
which initiatives really

03:43:23.060 --> 03:43:26.750
you see either now, if
not now, but in the future,

03:43:26.750 --> 03:43:30.313
having a large impact or underscoring

03:43:32.440 --> 03:43:36.610
what that initiative is
and how you're measuring

03:43:36.610 --> 03:43:39.070
and potentially how
large that impact would be,

03:43:39.070 --> 03:43:41.533
maybe starting with PG&amp;E.

03:43:50.600 --> 03:43:53.570
<v ->Thanks Kevin, so this is
Aaron Johnson with PG&amp;E.</v>

03:43:53.570 --> 03:43:57.870
So as we outlined, I think it's harder

03:43:57.870 --> 03:44:02.870
to provide a sense of what
that will be going forward.

03:44:05.190 --> 03:44:07.390
The two single biggest contributors,

03:44:07.390 --> 03:44:09.430
which contribute to 3/4 of the reduction

03:44:09.430 --> 03:44:14.430
for us this year were
the improved granularity

03:44:16.880 --> 03:44:20.300
of our weather modeling that accounted

03:44:20.300 --> 03:44:24.530
for about a little over
50% and about 25% came

03:44:24.530 --> 03:44:28.740
from tighter scoping
of transmission events,

03:44:28.740 --> 03:44:32.370
which was largely about
increased granularity

03:44:32.370 --> 03:44:35.040
of understanding of the
robustness of that system

03:44:35.040 --> 03:44:37.550
and where there was potential risks.

03:44:37.550 --> 03:44:40.570
So again, that drove 3/4
of the reduction that we saw

03:44:40.570 --> 03:44:42.320
in the size of events.

03:44:42.320 --> 03:44:45.240
There are similar
initiatives, and then again,

03:44:45.240 --> 03:44:49.250
the overall outcome was 55%
smaller than it would have been

03:44:49.250 --> 03:44:52.620
under the 2019 state of infrastructure

03:44:52.620 --> 03:44:54.660
and modeling capability.

03:44:54.660 --> 03:44:58.270
So, I think a couple of
thoughts that I just offer on that,

03:44:58.270 --> 03:45:02.150
future improvements are highly unlikely

03:45:02.150 --> 03:45:05.510
to be quite that dramatic, right?

03:45:05.510 --> 03:45:10.510
So I think it's fairly
tempered in our expectations

03:45:12.100 --> 03:45:17.100
going forward, given the
improvements that we saw this year.

03:45:18.820 --> 03:45:21.300
But those are the two areas where again,

03:45:21.300 --> 03:45:24.150
we would continue to
see the largest impact.

03:45:24.150 --> 03:45:27.870
For us, I think one of the
challenges, one of the things,

03:45:27.870 --> 03:45:30.090
an example I would share, and again,

03:45:30.090 --> 03:45:32.610
that's very hard to
predict what that will be

03:45:32.610 --> 03:45:37.370
until the continued refinement
work is completed this year,

03:45:37.370 --> 03:45:39.700
where there will be refinement
in both of those areas.

03:45:39.700 --> 03:45:43.170
So we will continue to refine
the meteorological models

03:45:44.280 --> 03:45:48.120
in transmission while that
scoping has largely matured.

03:45:48.120 --> 03:45:51.620
What we now have the
capability with clearer set of criteria

03:45:51.620 --> 03:45:55.560
is to go after targeted work
on that transmission system

03:45:55.560 --> 03:45:59.200
to really reduce, take
particular segments

03:45:59.200 --> 03:46:01.750
of transmission lines out of scope,

03:46:01.750 --> 03:46:05.540
based on those clearly
established detailed criteria

03:46:05.540 --> 03:46:07.700
and to really target work, if you will,

03:46:07.700 --> 03:46:11.480
at the low hanging fruit
where perhaps the removal

03:46:11.480 --> 03:46:15.360
of a dozen trees can
take a line out of scope,

03:46:15.360 --> 03:46:17.980
as opposed to some other
lines where maybe 1,000 trees

03:46:17.980 --> 03:46:21.240
would need to be removed,
and that might not be realistic.

03:46:21.240 --> 03:46:24.320
So very targeted work
there, and we've identified

03:46:24.320 --> 03:46:26.440
at least six lines that
we think could come out

03:46:26.440 --> 03:46:29.660
of future scope with
those established criteria.

03:46:29.660 --> 03:46:33.330
So again, very hard to
say what it will look like.

03:46:33.330 --> 03:46:38.243
One more example I'll
give is sectionalizing devices

03:46:38.243 --> 03:46:42.290
that we installed last
year really provided a ring

03:46:42.290 --> 03:46:44.960
around tier one and tier two,

03:46:44.960 --> 03:46:47.290
to really isolate that tier one area

03:46:47.290 --> 03:46:48.760
where we don't expect fire risk,

03:46:48.760 --> 03:46:51.520
where we couldn't
always electrically isolate it.

03:46:51.520 --> 03:46:54.980
What we saw with the
increased granularity of PSPS

03:46:54.980 --> 03:46:59.540
is that not exactly
but many of the events

03:46:59.540 --> 03:47:04.010
really were just, were
quite nicely aligned

03:47:04.010 --> 03:47:06.100
with the tier three areas.

03:47:06.100 --> 03:47:09.190
And so our sectionalizing
effort this area this year

03:47:09.190 --> 03:47:11.430
is to install more
sectionalizing devices

03:47:11.430 --> 03:47:14.330
around the tier two
and tier three boundaries

03:47:14.330 --> 03:47:15.330
in the electrical system.

03:47:15.330 --> 03:47:18.260
So again, those ones at the
tier one tier two boundaries

03:47:18.260 --> 03:47:21.633
will be helpful in the event
of a very large weather event,

03:47:22.610 --> 03:47:26.170
but as we get more and
more narrow and targeted

03:47:26.170 --> 03:47:30.230
an initiative like that will
be, we need to, you know,

03:47:30.230 --> 03:47:33.680
respond with our
sectionalizing around the areas

03:47:33.680 --> 03:47:38.180
where we're starting to isolate
some of these PSPS events.

03:47:38.180 --> 03:47:39.440
So that's a little bit of color,

03:47:39.440 --> 03:47:43.967
obviously the increased
inclusion of distribution tree

03:47:45.530 --> 03:47:49.570
over strike potential
will makes it impossible

03:47:49.570 --> 03:47:52.850
at this moment to predict
exactly what to offer a projection

03:47:52.850 --> 03:47:56.200
on what that will be, but
is that a process works

03:47:56.200 --> 03:47:59.410
its way through, we
intend to be as transparent

03:47:59.410 --> 03:48:02.560
as we can about what
those outcomes look like

03:48:02.560 --> 03:48:05.470
and what a prediction would look like

03:48:05.470 --> 03:48:08.800
once that's all settled
in terms of the impact

03:48:08.800 --> 03:48:11.083
on potential scopes of
events going forward.

03:48:13.450 --> 03:48:16.617
<v ->Thanks, appreciate that
insight into what you're seeing</v>

03:48:16.617 --> 03:48:18.473
and what you're thinking.

03:48:19.680 --> 03:48:20.937
Maybe turn to SCE.

03:48:23.140 --> 03:48:27.420
<v ->Yeah thanks, so far as
far as WMP, there's a table,</v>

03:48:27.420 --> 03:48:32.130
I had that in my presentation,
citing the reductions

03:48:32.130 --> 03:48:34.873
that we expect in scope,
frequency and duration.

03:48:35.820 --> 03:48:38.340
The primary drivers behind that,

03:48:38.340 --> 03:48:42.210
I covered some of those
that's the exception process,

03:48:42.210 --> 03:48:44.050
grid hardening and we're also looking

03:48:44.050 --> 03:48:46.910
at evaluating potential locations

03:48:46.910 --> 03:48:49.240
where we have underground
systems that potentially

03:48:49.240 --> 03:48:51.780
could be supplied by backup generators.

03:48:51.780 --> 03:48:54.390
A lot of feasibility
analysis that's needed there

03:48:54.390 --> 03:48:57.703
because there's some siting
challenges and other things

03:48:57.703 --> 03:49:00.040
that we need to get over
in order to make those

03:49:00.040 --> 03:49:02.090
both cost effective,
as well as feasible.

03:49:03.110 --> 03:49:05.560
And I would say the second
piece of that is in addition

03:49:05.560 --> 03:49:08.863
to reducing the, sort of
the physical de-energization

03:49:08.863 --> 03:49:10.910
and the impacts, it's really about

03:49:10.910 --> 03:49:13.500
how do we assist our customers.

03:49:13.500 --> 03:49:17.853
We also talk a little bit about
how to improve or expand

03:49:19.250 --> 03:49:21.040
our critical care battery backup systems

03:49:21.040 --> 03:49:23.730
to all medical baseline customers,

03:49:23.730 --> 03:49:25.610
to extend our rebate programs,

03:49:25.610 --> 03:49:28.360
to help our customers deal with PSPS.

03:49:28.360 --> 03:49:32.450
So I think between the
initiatives around the grid,

03:49:32.450 --> 03:49:34.310
as well as our customer programs

03:49:34.310 --> 03:49:37.760
is really our focus
strategy to assist in PSPS

03:49:37.760 --> 03:49:39.460
and reducing the impact this year.

03:49:41.960 --> 03:49:45.790
<v ->Thank you, SDG&amp;E.</v>

03:49:49.340 --> 03:49:51.320
<v ->Yeah, so this is
Jonathan Woldemariam.</v>

03:49:51.320 --> 03:49:53.730
It is similar in our approach too

03:49:53.730 --> 03:49:58.730
where we put up a table
showing our 2021 reductions

03:50:00.720 --> 03:50:03.503
just like shared in a
slide in WMP filing,

03:50:04.730 --> 03:50:08.320
looking at what mitigations
can you plan on putting in place

03:50:08.320 --> 03:50:11.170
for PSPS impact reductions.

03:50:11.170 --> 03:50:14.297
And those are a combination
of the engineering solutions

03:50:14.297 --> 03:50:17.193
and the customer
solutions that we shared.

03:50:18.440 --> 03:50:23.020
As we continue to develop
and implement those solutions,

03:50:23.020 --> 03:50:28.020
we expect to see reaction,
frequency as well as the impacts

03:50:28.650 --> 03:50:31.240
to the customers and add installations.

03:50:31.240 --> 03:50:33.140
However, that's also
balanced with, you know,

03:50:33.140 --> 03:50:36.050
how that is different and, you know,

03:50:36.050 --> 03:50:39.800
each PSPS event may
have different characteristics.

03:50:39.800 --> 03:50:44.250
So, what we do is we usually compare it

03:50:44.250 --> 03:50:46.930
to a previous PSPS event
when we say we're able

03:50:46.930 --> 03:50:49.050
to reduce impacts.

03:50:49.050 --> 03:50:54.050
For example, in 2020, we
compared our reduction projections

03:50:54.150 --> 03:50:59.150
to 2019 and suddenly we'll
be able to use by 25 to 30%

03:51:00.780 --> 03:51:02.667
as compared to the 2019 event.

03:51:02.667 --> 03:51:06.130
And so we're doing similar with 2021,

03:51:06.130 --> 03:51:07.860
comparing it to 2020,

03:51:07.860 --> 03:51:11.693
by saying that one gives
3000 to 7,500 customers.

03:51:12.610 --> 03:51:15.303
Going forward,
long-term we do share the,

03:51:16.490 --> 03:51:20.070
our plan to earlier with grid hardening

03:51:20.070 --> 03:51:22.840
with more undergrounding
and capabilities

03:51:22.840 --> 03:51:26.813
with covered conductors to
be able to have more reduction.

03:51:31.473 --> 03:51:33.357
<v ->Appreciate it, thank you.</v>

03:51:34.570 --> 03:51:37.850
With that, I'll turn to the stakeholders

03:51:37.850 --> 03:51:42.370
and I'll go in reverse
order from previously

03:51:42.370 --> 03:51:44.433
and start with Mr. Abrams.

03:51:48.460 --> 03:51:50.130
<v ->Thank you very much.</v>

03:51:50.130 --> 03:51:54.620
My questions are around
the communication associated

03:51:54.620 --> 03:51:57.550
with the public safety power shutoffs

03:51:57.550 --> 03:52:02.060
and sort of definitional
terms that are used

03:52:02.060 --> 03:52:03.930
across the different utilities.

03:52:03.930 --> 03:52:08.440
So, in the wildfire
mitigation plans from 2018,

03:52:10.400 --> 03:52:13.720
there was really a lot of discussion

03:52:13.720 --> 03:52:18.720
and definitions around
reclosers, that evolved over time

03:52:21.360 --> 03:52:26.360
to a broader definition
of sectionalization devices

03:52:26.860 --> 03:52:30.070
and the communications around

03:52:30.070 --> 03:52:34.410
those sectionalization devices
as they land in the hands

03:52:34.410 --> 03:52:38.700
of public agencies,
often doesn't provide them

03:52:38.700 --> 03:52:42.470
with the tools they need
to understand the gates

03:52:42.470 --> 03:52:46.940
and the constraints
associated with controlling

03:52:46.940 --> 03:52:49.780
the power shutoffs
and where it is effected.

03:52:49.780 --> 03:52:52.320
And so I was hoping that
you could all sort of talk

03:52:52.320 --> 03:52:57.320
to A, how we can be more
transparent associated

03:52:57.490 --> 03:53:00.900
with that information so that
the public understands that

03:53:02.470 --> 03:53:06.190
and B, whether you feel
like it's your responsibility

03:53:06.190 --> 03:53:09.470
to sort of take the lead on
defining that mapping that.

03:53:09.470 --> 03:53:14.470
So if you asked a emergency
manager, municipality,

03:53:15.580 --> 03:53:19.010
they would be able to
identify here, here and here,

03:53:19.010 --> 03:53:21.570
are these types of
sectionalization devices?

03:53:21.570 --> 03:53:26.090
And therefore can help
you to limit the harm caused

03:53:26.090 --> 03:53:28.530
by the public safety power shutoffs

03:53:28.530 --> 03:53:33.530
and obviously maximize
the protection that it provides.

03:53:34.300 --> 03:53:37.670
And similarly around
those communications,

03:53:37.670 --> 03:53:42.610
I wanna understand
whether each utility identifies

03:53:42.610 --> 03:53:46.680
that it's their responsibility
to communicate

03:53:46.680 --> 03:53:48.670
around public safety power shutoffs,

03:53:48.670 --> 03:53:50.800
in terms of where resiliency centers

03:53:50.800 --> 03:53:52.830
are gonna be ahead of time.

03:53:52.830 --> 03:53:56.660
So I know before going
into wildfire season,

03:53:56.660 --> 03:53:59.830
where those are gonna
be, whether you feel like

03:53:59.830 --> 03:54:04.610
it's your responsibility to
communicate effectively

03:54:04.610 --> 03:54:07.120
around the use of
generators and other things

03:54:07.120 --> 03:54:11.600
to keep us safe, or is it
just your responsibility

03:54:11.600 --> 03:54:15.080
to provide materials
and then sort of left up

03:54:15.080 --> 03:54:18.060
to the individual,
whether they actually take

03:54:18.060 --> 03:54:21.970
that information in going forward.

03:54:21.970 --> 03:54:25.403
So that's my general
question there, thank you.

03:54:37.924 --> 03:54:40.007
<v ->We can start with PG&amp;E.</v>

03:54:45.700 --> 03:54:48.780
<v ->Yeah, thank you for
the questions Mr. Abrams.</v>

03:54:48.780 --> 03:54:53.730
So there's a lot of
questions inherent in that.

03:54:53.730 --> 03:54:56.350
So, let me speak to a couple of them.

03:54:56.350 --> 03:54:59.240
And maybe some of my sister utilities

03:54:59.240 --> 03:55:00.990
will snag other parts of it

03:55:00.990 --> 03:55:02.913
or can speak to their elements.

03:55:05.340 --> 03:55:09.543
One thing to go back in
time is the recloser program.

03:55:10.990 --> 03:55:15.130
So a fire risk mitigation
that is fairly mature for us

03:55:15.130 --> 03:55:17.730
at this point is we added
communication devices,

03:55:17.730 --> 03:55:20.120
which we did not
necessarily have in some

03:55:20.120 --> 03:55:23.473
of our remote locations to SCADA system,

03:55:24.310 --> 03:55:26.250
to all of our reclosing devices.

03:55:26.250 --> 03:55:30.270
And so those have all been
outfitted now with reclosers

03:55:30.270 --> 03:55:33.120
and based on different weather models,

03:55:33.120 --> 03:55:36.100
a weather operational
process that comes out

03:55:36.100 --> 03:55:38.420
at 600 every morning, those devices

03:55:38.420 --> 03:55:40.540
are turned on or off for the day.

03:55:40.540 --> 03:55:44.720
We used to have to turn
those devices off for the season.

03:55:44.720 --> 03:55:45.990
We did that for a couple of years

03:55:45.990 --> 03:55:47.270
while we were going
through the automation.

03:55:47.270 --> 03:55:49.800
So that's largely been complete.

03:55:49.800 --> 03:55:53.290
It is been beneficial to
the narrowing of PSPS

03:55:53.290 --> 03:55:56.023
to have that automation
on those reclosing devices,

03:55:57.320 --> 03:55:59.730
because that has given us again,

03:55:59.730 --> 03:56:03.180
greater granularity to
isolate PSPS events.

03:56:03.180 --> 03:56:06.980
So that program ended
up spilling over if you will,

03:56:06.980 --> 03:56:09.580
into helping us narrow PSPS.

03:56:09.580 --> 03:56:14.580
There are certainly other
devices that help sectionalize

03:56:15.070 --> 03:56:18.150
the grid that are not
reclosers, switches,

03:56:18.150 --> 03:56:22.060
even some fuses can serve
in that any sort of break point

03:56:22.060 --> 03:56:23.190
in the electrical grid.

03:56:23.190 --> 03:56:28.190
So, there are reclosers are a subset

03:56:28.400 --> 03:56:30.240
of sectionalizing devices, if you will.

03:56:30.240 --> 03:56:34.680
And some of the sectionalizing
we install is more reclosers,

03:56:34.680 --> 03:56:38.330
some is switches,
some are types of fuses,

03:56:38.330 --> 03:56:41.500
and it really just depends
on the topography of the grid

03:56:41.500 --> 03:56:44.490
as to which is the right
solution in any given location

03:56:45.540 --> 03:56:47.740
as determined by our
distribution engineers.

03:56:49.985 --> 03:56:53.110
So that hopefully that
helps with some of that.

03:56:53.110 --> 03:56:56.260
In terms of communicating
those locations,

03:56:56.260 --> 03:57:00.230
we have tried to
provide a series of maps

03:57:00.230 --> 03:57:03.640
to affected communities
that are more about

03:57:03.640 --> 03:57:08.180
what is most likely
affected in terms of,

03:57:08.180 --> 03:57:11.460
as we add this sectionalizing
how does that narrow down

03:57:11.460 --> 03:57:14.363
and through a series of
workshops that we held with.

03:57:16.180 --> 03:57:18.210
We used local emergency
management at largely

03:57:18.210 --> 03:57:20.710
the County level, we invite
tribal government into that.

03:57:20.710 --> 03:57:22.270
We had series of meetings with them,

03:57:22.270 --> 03:57:26.450
where we would go into our
GIS system and try and show

03:57:26.450 --> 03:57:27.910
where some of those improvements are

03:57:27.910 --> 03:57:30.980
so they could help understand
which neighborhoods

03:57:30.980 --> 03:57:32.490
were coming out of scope.

03:57:32.490 --> 03:57:35.250
We have a series of
maps we call the most likely

03:57:35.250 --> 03:57:38.400
to be effected areas that
we post both on our website

03:57:38.400 --> 03:57:40.590
and for emergency management partners

03:57:40.590 --> 03:57:43.113
in our PSPS agency portal.

03:57:44.150 --> 03:57:47.630
And they show you a sort
of, not necessarily the location

03:57:47.630 --> 03:57:50.940
of all those devices, but
the outcome on PSPS

03:57:50.940 --> 03:57:55.763
in terms of geographic limitation
from those improvements.

03:57:56.850 --> 03:58:00.300
So that's what we do in
terms of communications

03:58:00.300 --> 03:58:05.300
with stakeholders, we
have a series of, I guess,

03:58:07.280 --> 03:58:09.850
from a backup generation
standpoint, you know,

03:58:09.850 --> 03:58:13.080
we keep a fleet of generators
to support customers.

03:58:13.080 --> 03:58:16.760
Our messaging very much
is that customers need

03:58:16.760 --> 03:58:19.990
to develop their own
emergency management plans.

03:58:19.990 --> 03:58:22.360
This last year, we were
very supportive of hospitals

03:58:22.360 --> 03:58:24.020
and boat tabulation centers.

03:58:24.020 --> 03:58:27.480
And so we did go and provide
generation there to ensure

03:58:27.480 --> 03:58:29.790
that the election was not disrupted

03:58:29.790 --> 03:58:31.470
and that hospitals were not disrupted

03:58:31.470 --> 03:58:33.500
within the high fire threat area.

03:58:33.500 --> 03:58:35.820
And then again, we keep
a fleet of backup generators

03:58:35.820 --> 03:58:39.230
that we will support various entities

03:58:39.230 --> 03:58:41.500
when those emergency
needs come up in the events.

03:58:41.500 --> 03:58:44.210
We encourage customers to
not make that their base plan.

03:58:44.210 --> 03:58:47.120
They should have their
own base plan for resiliency,

03:58:47.120 --> 03:58:48.217
but we're there to support them,

03:58:48.217 --> 03:58:51.980
and what we often find is the odd agency

03:58:51.980 --> 03:58:54.320
that hasn't planned well,
and we support them,

03:58:54.320 --> 03:58:58.260
or in many instances
where backup generation fails

03:58:58.260 --> 03:59:00.420
for entities and we're able to step in

03:59:00.420 --> 03:59:02.130
and support them in that.

03:59:02.130 --> 03:59:04.110
And so that is a program that we have

03:59:04.110 --> 03:59:05.910
and that we continue to support.

03:59:05.910 --> 03:59:08.470
And then there are terms of
like community resource centers

03:59:08.470 --> 03:59:11.350
and things like that, a
big learning for 2019,

03:59:11.350 --> 03:59:15.440
we built a plan on our
own not closely connected.

03:59:15.440 --> 03:59:20.200
That was one of those
definitely in hindsight moments,

03:59:20.200 --> 03:59:21.490
it was not the right way forward.

03:59:21.490 --> 03:59:24.050
So now going forward,
we build those plans

03:59:24.050 --> 03:59:28.280
for where those locations
are with local government

03:59:28.280 --> 03:59:30.760
to determine where's the
best place to situate those.

03:59:30.760 --> 03:59:34.380
And then in actual events,
we activate based on

03:59:34.380 --> 03:59:36.610
their feedback collaboratively,

03:59:36.610 --> 03:59:38.050
which one of those we're gonna activate.

03:59:38.050 --> 03:59:40.720
And sometimes we'll
even add new locations

03:59:40.720 --> 03:59:43.100
based on feedback, you know,
a fairgrounds is not available

03:59:43.100 --> 03:59:44.700
because there's an event that weekend.

03:59:44.700 --> 03:59:48.050
So we will find a new
event, but we now do that.

03:59:48.050 --> 03:59:50.800
We try our best to do that in lockstep

03:59:50.800 --> 03:59:52.610
with local emergency management,

03:59:52.610 --> 03:59:56.820
so that we're synced up there,
and there's strong agreement

03:59:56.820 --> 03:59:59.150
across the utility and local leaders

03:59:59.150 --> 04:00:01.300
about how and where those should be.

04:00:01.300 --> 04:00:04.745
So, hopefully that covered a
number of your questions there.

04:00:04.745 --> 04:00:06.595
And I'll turn that back to you Kevin.

04:00:07.930 --> 04:00:09.500
<v ->Just a clarifying
question on that.</v>

04:00:09.500 --> 04:00:11.200
I guess, part of what
I'm trying to understand,

04:00:11.200 --> 04:00:13.720
no, that's a lot of the activities,

04:00:13.720 --> 04:00:15.380
but part of what I'm
trying to understand

04:00:15.380 --> 04:00:18.790
is who's accountable so
that we have a strategic plan

04:00:18.790 --> 04:00:19.810
that we can rely on.

04:00:19.810 --> 04:00:24.810
So, as an example, if we
were to ask who's responsible

04:00:26.160 --> 04:00:30.780
for if a mayor doesn't know where

04:00:31.770 --> 04:00:34.310
there are these
sectionalization devices,

04:00:34.310 --> 04:00:38.420
is that your responsibility
or is that their responsibility

04:00:38.420 --> 04:00:39.910
to go and get that information?

04:00:39.910 --> 04:00:44.910
Similarly, if customers don't
know how to use a generator

04:00:45.420 --> 04:00:50.420
or don't know where their
closest resiliency center is,

04:00:50.420 --> 04:00:54.743
or don't know about how to
manage during a power shutoff,

04:00:57.165 --> 04:01:00.860
is that your responsibility
that the residents don't know

04:01:00.860 --> 04:01:04.040
or is that somebody
else's responsibility?

04:01:04.040 --> 04:01:06.670
'Cause I just, I think
having accountability

04:01:06.670 --> 04:01:09.590
in the plan of what you
own and what you don't own,

04:01:09.590 --> 04:01:12.480
and I know that
sometimes it's split 50/50,

04:01:12.480 --> 04:01:14.810
but at least we understand who owns it.

04:01:14.810 --> 04:01:16.930
If you could just talk to, you know,

04:01:16.930 --> 04:01:21.930
sort of what PG&amp;E owns in
terms of the communications

04:01:23.070 --> 04:01:26.420
around the PSPS events, please.

04:01:26.420 --> 04:01:30.320
<v ->Yeah, so I think we have
a very strong responsibility</v>

04:01:30.320 --> 04:01:35.320
to communicate those
locations for those.

04:01:35.480 --> 04:01:38.590
So we do not consider
it, we like to partner

04:01:38.590 --> 04:01:41.490
with emergency management
to help get that information out

04:01:42.896 --> 04:01:44.330
and to determine those locations,

04:01:44.330 --> 04:01:47.170
but we feel we have the responsibility

04:01:47.170 --> 04:01:48.900
to publish that information, you know,

04:01:48.900 --> 04:01:52.630
on our websites and
to raise that information,

04:01:52.630 --> 04:01:54.330
raise that awareness.

04:01:54.330 --> 04:01:57.610
We certainly will not be
successful without the partnership

04:01:57.610 --> 04:02:00.390
of local government and
communicating that same information

04:02:00.390 --> 04:02:01.240
through their channels.

04:02:01.240 --> 04:02:05.710
So well, we are accountable
for delivering those services

04:02:05.710 --> 04:02:06.973
as part of our plan.

04:02:08.270 --> 04:02:10.750
It cannot be done
successfully alone by the utility.

04:02:10.750 --> 04:02:14.473
So I think there are some
joint accountability there for,

04:02:16.470 --> 04:02:18.720
in terms of communicating
that, we would,

04:02:18.720 --> 04:02:22.620
a lot of those resources and
information we are accountable

04:02:22.620 --> 04:02:25.740
to put forward for the
public's consumption.

04:02:25.740 --> 04:02:27.440
But again, success will depend

04:02:27.440 --> 04:02:29.233
on that strong local partnership.

04:02:32.110 --> 04:02:32.943
<v ->Thank you.</v>

04:02:36.790 --> 04:02:40.210
<v ->So this is Erik from
Edison, I guess I can go next.</v>

04:02:40.210 --> 04:02:43.220
So first of all I do wanna acknowledge

04:02:43.220 --> 04:02:45.020
and is a really great question

04:02:45.020 --> 04:02:48.430
around sectionalization
devices, because there's a lot

04:02:48.430 --> 04:02:50.870
of different things that we use.

04:02:50.870 --> 04:02:53.530
We have reclosers, as you mentioned,

04:02:53.530 --> 04:02:57.490
we have remote control switches
that are operated remotely.

04:02:57.490 --> 04:03:00.640
We have overhead, we have underground,

04:03:00.640 --> 04:03:04.410
we have devices that
can be operated under low.

04:03:04.410 --> 04:03:06.820
We have devices that
have to be de-energized

04:03:06.820 --> 04:03:08.670
in order for us to
actually operate them.

04:03:08.670 --> 04:03:11.670
So there is some level
of confusion, I think,

04:03:11.670 --> 04:03:15.460
or maybe some misuse
of terms when it comes

04:03:15.460 --> 04:03:18.810
to being sort of accurate
about the capability

04:03:18.810 --> 04:03:21.483
and where we can actually
sectionalize and how.

04:03:22.920 --> 04:03:25.610
I'll just give one example,
we had a situation

04:03:25.610 --> 04:03:28.025
where we have the
ability to sectionalize,

04:03:28.025 --> 04:03:30.940
but it requires a crew to go out there

04:03:30.940 --> 04:03:34.090
and physically operate a
device that is pad mounted.

04:03:34.090 --> 04:03:37.900
And when we had a
larger public safety concern,

04:03:37.900 --> 04:03:39.690
those crews had to pull off.

04:03:39.690 --> 04:03:42.660
But that's different than if
we send a signal to a device

04:03:42.660 --> 04:03:45.260
and we could just
simply operate it remotely.

04:03:45.260 --> 04:03:49.960
So I do think it is our
responsibility to provide clarity

04:03:49.960 --> 04:03:52.460
in how our system some operates.

04:03:52.460 --> 04:03:56.180
We are looking at increasing
the level of transparency

04:03:56.180 --> 04:03:58.850
and our decision making
both with, you know,

04:03:58.850 --> 04:04:00.050
state local governments,

04:04:00.050 --> 04:04:02.950
as well as our emergency managers.

04:04:02.950 --> 04:04:05.720
So the, you know, one of the
things we're also embarking on

04:04:05.720 --> 04:04:08.850
is particularly for highly
impact communities,

04:04:08.850 --> 04:04:10.963
is to share circuit by circuit

04:04:10.963 --> 04:04:13.643
what are some of the
mitigations that we have planned

04:04:13.643 --> 04:04:15.460
and what are some of the limitations.

04:04:15.460 --> 04:04:17.370
So some of them will include, you know,

04:04:17.370 --> 04:04:21.660
just how we operate the system
and what we can do remotely,

04:04:21.660 --> 04:04:24.260
and what actually requires
some manual intervention.

04:04:26.100 --> 04:04:27.910
Building upon what Aaron said, I mean,

04:04:27.910 --> 04:04:31.050
I think as far as
information that we provide,

04:04:31.050 --> 04:04:36.050
we do own, having the need
to communicate an event

04:04:37.020 --> 04:04:39.990
as best information we
can particularly around

04:04:39.990 --> 04:04:42.440
not just the status, but
where our CRCs are located,

04:04:42.440 --> 04:04:46.680
where our CCBs are located,
our community crew vehicles,

04:04:46.680 --> 04:04:48.620
resource center locations.

04:04:48.620 --> 04:04:51.193
And we do so at 24 hours in advance.

04:04:52.380 --> 04:04:55.900
But we also have to as there
are gonna be challenges too

04:04:55.900 --> 04:04:58.790
with, we try to locate those
where the weather events

04:04:58.790 --> 04:05:02.190
are happening, so there are
always gonna be some level of,

04:05:02.190 --> 04:05:04.110
you know, subject to
change kinda things,

04:05:04.110 --> 04:05:07.623
but it's upon us to do
the best that we can.

04:05:08.650 --> 04:05:10.500
The one thing I think you also mentioned

04:05:10.500 --> 04:05:12.260
is about generation.

04:05:12.260 --> 04:05:14.850
So I think where we have places

04:05:14.850 --> 04:05:18.090
where we would be supplying
generation for, you know,

04:05:18.090 --> 04:05:21.150
the underground road block
situation that I mentioned,

04:05:21.150 --> 04:05:22.750
or we might have some locations

04:05:22.750 --> 04:05:25.170
where we could preplan ahead of time.

04:05:25.170 --> 04:05:28.140
Those are probably the examples
of where we can show some

04:05:28.140 --> 04:05:30.010
of that information.

04:05:30.010 --> 04:05:33.470
I think when it comes
to what we would do

04:05:33.470 --> 04:05:36.030
in an event though, I think working

04:05:36.030 --> 04:05:39.690
with our County emergency
managers on the process associated

04:05:39.690 --> 04:05:42.360
with what we can and can't do,

04:05:42.360 --> 04:05:45.250
I think is gonna be extremely important.

04:05:45.250 --> 04:05:47.020
And lastly, I'll close with

04:05:47.020 --> 04:05:49.523
our critical infrastructure customers.

04:05:51.000 --> 04:05:53.270
We need to figure out a
way to work really close

04:05:53.270 --> 04:05:56.550
to where we have
significant issues at risk.

04:05:56.550 --> 04:06:00.300
One of the things that we
did leading into the last event

04:06:00.300 --> 04:06:04.910
in January, recognizing
we have both hospitals

04:06:04.910 --> 04:06:08.940
and COVID facilities that
are out there that are critical.

04:06:08.940 --> 04:06:11.760
We reached out to
every single one of them.

04:06:11.760 --> 04:06:13.680
We asked what their resiliency needs,

04:06:13.680 --> 04:06:17.000
where if they had additional
ones that weren't being met.

04:06:17.000 --> 04:06:20.240
And if there's a way that we could do

04:06:20.240 --> 04:06:23.410
some additional
sectionalization or isolation,

04:06:23.410 --> 04:06:26.500
we would take all those
things into consideration

04:06:26.500 --> 04:06:29.610
to try to mitigate as
many issues as we can.

04:06:29.610 --> 04:06:31.220
So that's just an
example of where we have

04:06:31.220 --> 04:06:33.190
a really significant issue,

04:06:33.190 --> 04:06:36.840
how we could figure out
different ways to communicate.

04:06:36.840 --> 04:06:40.200
So, hopefully that answers
most of your questions.

04:06:40.200 --> 04:06:42.860
<v ->Yeah, that's good, thanks.</v>

04:06:42.860 --> 04:06:45.360
Yeah, I agree with you that
there's this sort of conflation

04:06:45.360 --> 04:06:48.570
of terms and sort of
how that's evolved sort of

04:06:48.570 --> 04:06:51.450
from public consumption
is that, you know,

04:06:51.450 --> 04:06:52.880
we used to call them reclosers

04:06:52.880 --> 04:06:54.810
and now they're sectionalization devices

04:06:54.810 --> 04:06:56.660
as if all those are the same thing.

04:06:56.660 --> 04:07:00.560
And, you know, we've gotten
from 50 in our County to 80.

04:07:00.560 --> 04:07:04.010
And so as if, you know,
we know what that does.

04:07:04.010 --> 04:07:07.300
So I do think it would be
extremely helpful as you said,

04:07:07.300 --> 04:07:10.650
to sort of understand
what each of those are,

04:07:10.650 --> 04:07:14.330
the limitations of that, what
it can and cannot do so that,

04:07:14.330 --> 04:07:17.080
you know, emergency
managers can contribute

04:07:17.080 --> 04:07:20.070
to that conversation
and help with that sort

04:07:20.070 --> 04:07:23.790
of cost benefit analysis of
where those gates are are put.

04:07:23.790 --> 04:07:25.720
So thank you, I appreciate that.

04:07:25.720 --> 04:07:26.553
<v ->Thank you.</v>

04:07:29.460 --> 04:07:31.890
<v ->Just from SDG&amp;E's point of view</v>

04:07:34.147 --> 04:07:35.570
for the sectionalizing devices

04:07:35.570 --> 04:07:39.240
or communication or general information

04:07:39.240 --> 04:07:41.930
that our community safety
partners and the public needs,

04:07:41.930 --> 04:07:45.083
we do have a very good, robust process

04:07:45.083 --> 04:07:47.688
in that point of view to collaborate

04:07:47.688 --> 04:07:52.170
with the emergency
services or safety partners

04:07:52.170 --> 04:07:54.220
to understand what is needed for,

04:07:54.220 --> 04:07:57.190
and then after each event
going back and looking

04:07:57.190 --> 04:08:00.970
at what can we improve and
we heard back from Virginia

04:08:00.970 --> 04:08:02.000
and Allison as well.

04:08:02.000 --> 04:08:06.220
So with that though, the
most helpful information

04:08:06.220 --> 04:08:09.060
when it comes to
sectionalization or grid closing,

04:08:09.060 --> 04:08:12.710
we think is to share a map and show what

04:08:12.710 --> 04:08:15.260
are the impacted areas,
potential impact areas,

04:08:15.260 --> 04:08:19.540
or even during events
sharing the updated information

04:08:19.540 --> 04:08:22.610
as to what communities are
gonna be impacted rather than,

04:08:22.610 --> 04:08:25.690
you know, pointing out
the sectionalization device.

04:08:25.690 --> 04:08:28.760
So that provides a little
bit more information,

04:08:28.760 --> 04:08:33.290
may require a lot more on
almost to care how we characterize

04:08:33.290 --> 04:08:37.655
this communities has
been helpful in our case.

04:08:37.655 --> 04:08:41.070
As well as back to the
resiliency centers question.

04:08:41.070 --> 04:08:42.904
Yes, we do have a responsibility

04:08:42.904 --> 04:08:45.770
for the community resource
centers and identifying

04:08:45.770 --> 04:08:49.910
and sharing with the community
as to where these will be.

04:08:49.910 --> 04:08:53.410
And we do that, not
just be part of that,

04:08:53.410 --> 04:08:56.800
but also, you know,
in our annual planning.

04:08:56.800 --> 04:09:01.110
So as we collaborate with
the different safety partners

04:09:01.110 --> 04:09:03.900
in wildfire safety and information share

04:09:03.900 --> 04:09:05.690
with the community every year,

04:09:05.690 --> 04:09:07.890
we try and educate them
with the outreach program

04:09:07.890 --> 04:09:10.150
so that people understand ahead of time,

04:09:10.150 --> 04:09:11.310
ahead of these events

04:09:11.310 --> 04:09:12.233
where these community
resource centers are.

04:09:13.575 --> 04:09:17.330
And what is the assistance
that they can have,

04:09:17.330 --> 04:09:18.970
whether it be generators,

04:09:18.970 --> 04:09:23.420
whether it be other assistance
when it comes to PSPS events

04:09:23.420 --> 04:09:26.646
and even some of the tools
that are highlighted on WMP,

04:09:26.646 --> 04:09:28.700
the information that
we have on our website

04:09:28.700 --> 04:09:30.873
or through our PSPS app.

04:09:33.010 --> 04:09:35.470
<v ->Do you think those
maps would be included</v>

04:09:35.470 --> 04:09:39.380
in the WMPs or attached
so that we understood

04:09:39.380 --> 04:09:41.140
here's where all those devices are

04:09:41.140 --> 04:09:42.900
and here's where those
resource centers are,

04:09:42.900 --> 04:09:44.180
and things of that nature?

04:09:44.180 --> 04:09:46.833
Would those maps be
included in those submittals?

04:09:49.160 --> 04:09:54.160
<v ->We have a GIS submittal that
we have to have in our WMP,</v>

04:09:56.260 --> 04:09:59.570
so that, you know, we'll
laid out all the plans, right?

04:09:59.570 --> 04:10:01.880
Based on what we submitted, right?

04:10:01.880 --> 04:10:04.730
Including the hardening,
community care centers,

04:10:04.730 --> 04:10:08.043
and other things, we have
all those features in GIS files.

04:10:11.215 --> 04:10:12.215
<v ->Thank you.</v>

04:10:16.300 --> 04:10:20.380
<v ->Thank you for that
Q&amp;A on that topic.</v>

04:10:20.380 --> 04:10:23.180
I'd like to turn to Green
Power Institute at this point.

04:10:25.110 --> 04:10:28.020
<v GPI Lady>Hi, thanks, so
my question is for PG&amp;E,</v>

04:10:29.040 --> 04:10:31.060
but also for the other utilities.

04:10:31.060 --> 04:10:35.700
So PG&amp;E provided a
plot of PSPS mitigation

04:10:35.700 --> 04:10:39.050
as a function of mitigation activity.

04:10:39.050 --> 04:10:41.050
And I was wondering if
there's an understanding

04:10:41.050 --> 04:10:45.030
of why the distribution
grid hardening efforts

04:10:45.030 --> 04:10:46.770
really seem to have minimal ability

04:10:46.770 --> 04:10:49.590
to reduce customer PSPS impacts.

04:10:49.590 --> 04:10:53.760
So if that's related
to essentially intrinsic

04:10:53.760 --> 04:10:57.120
to the selected grid
hardening mitigations,

04:10:57.120 --> 04:10:59.760
or where they were implemented,

04:10:59.760 --> 04:11:01.170
or does it have to do with the amount

04:11:01.170 --> 04:11:02.670
of those mitigation implemented?

04:11:02.670 --> 04:11:06.970
So is there not enough
say covered conductors

04:11:06.970 --> 04:11:10.183
to currently make an
impact on PSPS mitigation?

04:11:15.200 --> 04:11:17.130
<v ->So this is Aaron,
I'll jump in on that.</v>

04:11:17.130 --> 04:11:19.910
I think the answer is
yes to all of the things

04:11:19.910 --> 04:11:21.760
that you highlighted.

04:11:21.760 --> 04:11:25.010
So let me sort of tick through hardening

04:11:25.010 --> 04:11:27.500
as how it relates to PSPS.

04:11:27.500 --> 04:11:32.500
So first of all, hardening
until 2021 for PG&amp;E

04:11:33.440 --> 04:11:35.070
has been primarily driven

04:11:35.070 --> 04:11:38.683
by larger fire risk prioritization.

04:11:40.300 --> 04:11:43.980
General, you know,
climatological wildfire risk

04:11:45.140 --> 04:11:50.140
is different than the acute
catastrophic, you know,

04:11:51.010 --> 04:11:53.420
a large wildfire
potential that we're trying

04:11:53.420 --> 04:11:55.860
to head off with PSPS.

04:11:55.860 --> 04:11:59.870
And there is some overlap in where

04:11:59.870 --> 04:12:02.380
those risk models point
you, but they are not,

04:12:02.380 --> 04:12:03.900
they are measuring different risks,

04:12:03.900 --> 04:12:06.340
and they are not fully aligned.

04:12:06.340 --> 04:12:10.680
And the general climatological
risk was the source

04:12:10.680 --> 04:12:15.680
of prioritization for
previous hardening efforts.

04:12:15.970 --> 04:12:18.150
So, what you see as an outcome of that

04:12:18.150 --> 04:12:20.880
is that a circuit segment
that was hardened

04:12:20.880 --> 04:12:23.710
over the last couple of years might not

04:12:23.710 --> 04:12:25.820
be electrically isolatable, right?

04:12:25.820 --> 04:12:28.270
It might be a stretch of circuit,

04:12:28.270 --> 04:12:31.700
sort of in the middle
of a segment of a circuit

04:12:31.700 --> 04:12:34.000
in the middle of a larger circuit.

04:12:34.000 --> 04:12:38.560
And it can't be traced back
to a source of electricity

04:12:38.560 --> 04:12:40.763
to keep it energized during an event.

04:12:44.150 --> 04:12:46.490
So that's been one challenge for us.

04:12:46.490 --> 04:12:50.370
We are beginning as we
prioritize hardening work this year

04:12:50.370 --> 04:12:54.410
to incorporate PSPS,
that acute wildfire risk,

04:12:54.410 --> 04:12:57.360
along with the climatological risk.

04:12:57.360 --> 04:13:00.250
We are doing that and
balancing that portfolio

04:13:01.630 --> 04:13:05.450
in a subject matter
informed way this year.

04:13:05.450 --> 04:13:07.530
We are looking to a mature to see

04:13:07.530 --> 04:13:10.610
if there is a single
alignment around risk model

04:13:10.610 --> 04:13:12.860
that will help us going forward.

04:13:12.860 --> 04:13:15.100
The reality is that there
are other mitigations

04:13:15.100 --> 04:13:18.040
that may come into play
around PSPS, you know,

04:13:18.040 --> 04:13:19.617
can we do a microgrid?

04:13:20.900 --> 04:13:22.550
Are there other forms of support

04:13:22.550 --> 04:13:23.890
that we might be able to offer?

04:13:23.890 --> 04:13:28.790
So, you know, we are
looking to mature our capability

04:13:28.790 --> 04:13:31.623
to understand on a
circuit by circuit basis,

04:13:32.666 --> 04:13:36.040
what the different mitigations
are that are possible.

04:13:36.040 --> 04:13:40.633
So that sort of explains
why the hardened circuits

04:13:40.633 --> 04:13:44.330
that we've done so far
don't necessarily show up

04:13:44.330 --> 04:13:46.350
as a reduction in PSPS.

04:13:46.350 --> 04:13:49.220
We do have some projects
this year that, you know,

04:13:49.220 --> 04:13:52.630
construction schedules
willing may be able

04:13:52.630 --> 04:13:56.300
to help reduce PSPS impact this year.

04:13:56.300 --> 04:13:58.430
And those are largely
a handful of projects

04:13:58.430 --> 04:13:59.610
that were started last year,

04:13:59.610 --> 04:14:01.470
'cause they generally
involve some undergrounding

04:14:01.470 --> 04:14:04.060
and those are not single year projects

04:14:04.060 --> 04:14:08.930
in order to get all the permits
and work aligned locally.

04:14:08.930 --> 04:14:12.050
So, the other thing that's critical

04:14:12.050 --> 04:14:15.450
to the removal of hardening
is coming up with a standard

04:14:15.450 --> 04:14:20.420
that helps us understand how
we would raise the threshold

04:14:20.420 --> 04:14:21.560
for a hardened circuit.

04:14:21.560 --> 04:14:23.530
And let me differentiate
when I talk about

04:14:23.530 --> 04:14:27.150
a hardened circuit from,
when you harden a circuit,

04:14:27.150 --> 04:14:29.290
you know, there's sort of
three ways you can harden it

04:14:29.290 --> 04:14:30.680
that we look at.

04:14:30.680 --> 04:14:32.253
First, can we remove it?

04:14:33.660 --> 04:14:35.330
Second, can we underground it?

04:14:35.330 --> 04:14:38.810
Third, if either of those
two are not possible,

04:14:38.810 --> 04:14:41.480
then we would look at
overhead hardening, right?

04:14:41.480 --> 04:14:44.700
Which is covered
conductor, stronger poles,

04:14:44.700 --> 04:14:47.293
different spacing on
the cross arms, et cetera.

04:14:49.210 --> 04:14:52.070
And what we have not
yet established at PG&amp;E,

04:14:52.070 --> 04:14:54.650
but we will have established
for this fire season

04:14:54.650 --> 04:14:57.490
is what that higher threshold would be.

04:14:57.490 --> 04:15:01.050
And we have been trying
to understand the risk model

04:15:01.050 --> 04:15:04.400
of that better and have
some data on the performance

04:15:04.400 --> 04:15:07.250
of hardened circuits through fire season

04:15:07.250 --> 04:15:10.780
and through PSPS events in order to make

04:15:11.900 --> 04:15:15.630
a field validated decision
around how to do that, right?

04:15:15.630 --> 04:15:17.630
We can build all the models in the world

04:15:18.750 --> 04:15:22.150
and make assumptions
there, but we wanted to see

04:15:22.150 --> 04:15:24.610
how those assets actually performed.

04:15:24.610 --> 04:15:27.160
And we now have some
of that data to understand

04:15:27.160 --> 04:15:29.740
how some of those assets performed.

04:15:29.740 --> 04:15:32.530
And so the intent is to have

04:15:32.530 --> 04:15:34.800
that threshold established this year.

04:15:34.800 --> 04:15:37.770
Now there will be a very
limited number of the areas

04:15:37.770 --> 04:15:40.070
where that threshold, that, you know,

04:15:40.070 --> 04:15:42.670
higher threshold for a hardened asset,

04:15:42.670 --> 04:15:45.140
it doesn't take it entirely
out of PSPS scope,

04:15:45.140 --> 04:15:47.583
but it would significantly
raise that threshold.

04:15:49.588 --> 04:15:53.030
And so we will have that for this year

04:15:53.030 --> 04:15:55.190
and then that will go into play.

04:15:55.190 --> 04:15:58.070
But again, there will only
be really a handful of circuits

04:15:58.070 --> 04:16:00.370
that are electrically isolatable

04:16:00.370 --> 04:16:03.080
that we could actually
put that into play

04:16:03.080 --> 04:16:04.890
throughout this fire season.

04:16:04.890 --> 04:16:08.330
So, you will begin to
see that much more.

04:16:08.330 --> 04:16:11.290
I think over time in the coming years,

04:16:11.290 --> 04:16:14.660
in our wildfire mitigation plan,

04:16:14.660 --> 04:16:18.700
as we continue to harden those assets,

04:16:18.700 --> 04:16:22.600
and to be able to trace
some of those back to sources

04:16:22.600 --> 04:16:26.220
so that they can be removed
from a future PSPS consideration

04:16:26.220 --> 04:16:27.923
or that standard can be raised.

04:16:29.690 --> 04:16:32.240
Happy to follow up if
there's additional questions.

04:16:40.532 --> 04:16:41.750
<v ->And this is Erik from Edison,</v>

04:16:41.750 --> 04:16:44.160
maybe I can add a little
bit to what Aaron is saying.

04:16:44.160 --> 04:16:47.180
I think he hit on a number
of important aspects here

04:16:47.180 --> 04:16:50.503
associated with scope as
well as process and standards.

04:16:52.620 --> 04:16:54.690
I think one of the things
and really one of the reasons

04:16:54.690 --> 04:16:58.210
why we have moved into
the direction of hardening

04:16:58.210 --> 04:17:03.210
and cover conductor, partly
is due to our operating history.

04:17:03.340 --> 04:17:06.160
And what's occurred over
the last couple of years,

04:17:06.160 --> 04:17:09.467
as well as defining
the scope of hardening.

04:17:09.467 --> 04:17:13.530
And so one of the things
that I think it's important

04:17:13.530 --> 04:17:15.650
for us here at Edison to understand

04:17:15.650 --> 04:17:20.340
is how does the scope
of cover conductor overlay

04:17:20.340 --> 04:17:22.987
on top of the way that
we have de-energized

04:17:22.987 --> 04:17:25.700
our system over the
last couple of years?

04:17:25.700 --> 04:17:26.930
So we just had the discussion

04:17:26.930 --> 04:17:29.540
about different sectionalizing devices.

04:17:29.540 --> 04:17:33.100
There's a couple of lessons
learned here that we can apply.

04:17:33.100 --> 04:17:37.100
One is the amount of cover conductor

04:17:37.100 --> 04:17:41.040
that is needed to be
installed in what Aaron referred

04:17:41.040 --> 04:17:42.600
to as isolatable segments.

04:17:42.600 --> 04:17:45.670
So as we get more
and more into a segment

04:17:45.670 --> 04:17:48.610
by segment process,
as opposed to circuit

04:17:48.610 --> 04:17:51.680
by circuit process, it
sort of brings to light

04:17:51.680 --> 04:17:55.360
the areas that are more
impacted than others.

04:17:55.360 --> 04:17:57.970
But in order to able
to raise a threshold,

04:17:57.970 --> 04:18:02.290
you have to have sufficient
coverage across the geography

04:18:02.290 --> 04:18:04.870
of the risk areas that
you're trying to mitigate.

04:18:04.870 --> 04:18:08.100
So, I think we learned a lot
and that's part of acceleration

04:18:08.100 --> 04:18:11.940
of scope that we're
applying for this year

04:18:11.940 --> 04:18:13.980
in our highly impacted communities.

04:18:13.980 --> 04:18:17.180
'Cause I do think we've
reached a level of awareness

04:18:17.180 --> 04:18:19.730
and in operating knowledge to one,

04:18:19.730 --> 04:18:22.650
be able to cover that
risk, but also to look

04:18:22.650 --> 04:18:26.120
at other alternatives
to sort of maximize

04:18:26.120 --> 04:18:29.980
the flexibility of our system
and minimize the amount

04:18:29.980 --> 04:18:32.600
of cover conductor that we really need

04:18:32.600 --> 04:18:34.800
in order to raise the thresholds.

04:18:34.800 --> 04:18:36.390
So I think the last part of it too,

04:18:36.390 --> 04:18:39.880
is there's still some, I think,
work needing to be done

04:18:39.880 --> 04:18:44.190
on really understanding just
how far we can go at threshold.

04:18:44.190 --> 04:18:46.730
So we've taken some interim steps here

04:18:46.730 --> 04:18:49.690
using the high wind warning
versus the wind advisory level.

04:18:49.690 --> 04:18:53.100
So we're very confident that
that is a good eminent measure

04:18:53.100 --> 04:18:54.453
for now to implement.

04:18:55.550 --> 04:18:58.747
And then from that we can
measure both the reduction

04:18:58.747 --> 04:19:02.120
and PSPS events that we expect to see

04:19:02.120 --> 04:19:04.830
and also provide some clarity in terms

04:19:04.830 --> 04:19:06.710
of future operating experience,

04:19:06.710 --> 04:19:09.360
with additional things that
we're gonna have to do.

04:19:09.360 --> 04:19:14.040
So I do think, you know,
both in the short term,

04:19:14.040 --> 04:19:16.210
as well as the long-term
that grid hardening

04:19:16.210 --> 04:19:17.970
and particularly covered conductor,

04:19:17.970 --> 04:19:19.790
in addition to the other options here

04:19:19.790 --> 04:19:21.587
is gonna be really important for us.

04:19:21.587 --> 04:19:23.720
The more granular
we get in understanding

04:19:23.720 --> 04:19:25.107
the distribution system.

04:19:26.770 --> 04:19:28.630
<v GPI Lady>Great, thanks,
that was really helpful.</v>

04:19:28.630 --> 04:19:31.220
Just a follow up question then.

04:19:31.220 --> 04:19:36.220
So, I guess, what is the
progress towards determining

04:19:36.380 --> 04:19:39.560
what is sufficient coverage
for covered conductor

04:19:39.560 --> 04:19:41.600
to actually start making impacts?

04:19:41.600 --> 04:19:44.360
<v ->Yeah, so part
of it is defining,</v>

04:19:44.360 --> 04:19:46.070
looking at consequence models

04:19:46.070 --> 04:19:48.473
where we have the highest risk.

04:19:49.430 --> 04:19:51.570
The second thing, and
this goes to the point

04:19:51.570 --> 04:19:56.500
of sectionalization is if we
have our sectionalizing device,

04:19:56.500 --> 04:19:59.570
that's located in a place
where we're, you know,

04:19:59.570 --> 04:20:01.870
not only de-energizing the customers

04:20:01.870 --> 04:20:03.560
that are in high fire risk areas,

04:20:03.560 --> 04:20:05.600
but de-energizing ones before they get

04:20:05.600 --> 04:20:06.950
to the high fire risk areas.

04:20:06.950 --> 04:20:10.230
So that provides us an
opportunity to limit the scope

04:20:10.230 --> 04:20:14.350
and relocate or installing
a new sectionalizing device

04:20:14.350 --> 04:20:16.803
just to the area that we're
most concerned about.

04:20:17.700 --> 04:20:20.590
The other thing I mentioned is that

04:20:20.590 --> 04:20:22.700
if we have inadequate coverage,

04:20:22.700 --> 04:20:26.030
I guess the thing we don't
wanna avoid is covering,

04:20:26.030 --> 04:20:28.280
and I'll just make it up, you know,

04:20:28.280 --> 04:20:31.560
20 spans of covered conductor,

04:20:31.560 --> 04:20:36.440
and you have another 12
that are also equally risky

04:20:36.440 --> 04:20:38.150
because our models say one thing,

04:20:38.150 --> 04:20:39.620
but actual field conditions

04:20:39.620 --> 04:20:41.980
might actually say something else.

04:20:41.980 --> 04:20:45.020
So fully covered means
ensuring that we have

04:20:45.020 --> 04:20:47.780
an understanding of the
environmental conditions,

04:20:47.780 --> 04:20:50.603
the physical layout of
our distribution circuits,

04:20:51.504 --> 04:20:54.370
how the isolation and
sectionalization works

04:20:54.370 --> 04:20:56.990
and where we can fully
deploy cover conductor

04:20:56.990 --> 04:21:00.880
in order to then say that
section can now move up

04:21:00.880 --> 04:21:03.950
in terms of threshold
and become more resilient

04:21:03.950 --> 04:21:06.083
to the contact report
and object concerns.

04:21:10.776 --> 04:21:15.776
<v GPI Lady>Thank you.</v>

04:21:16.143 --> 04:21:18.550
<v ->Thank you, just want to
make sure that San Diego,</v>

04:21:18.550 --> 04:21:20.002
you didn't have any thoughts you wanted

04:21:20.002 --> 04:21:22.173
to add to that topic.

04:21:23.070 --> 04:21:26.290
<v ->Yeah, I just, I
think we will continue</v>

04:21:26.290 --> 04:21:31.290
to all refine our risk
modeling tools, right?

04:21:31.800 --> 04:21:36.520
To take the input from the
field experience and be able

04:21:36.520 --> 04:21:41.520
to have a refined model that
can help us be more predictive

04:21:41.550 --> 04:21:45.127
about the PSPS impact reduction
and hopefully as we develop

04:21:46.110 --> 04:21:48.523
those models, we'll be
able to have more capability

04:21:48.523 --> 04:21:52.250
this year, how much actually can expect.

04:21:52.250 --> 04:21:55.116
So, other than that, it's
similar to my responsibility

04:21:55.116 --> 04:21:57.810
similar to Edison and PG&amp;E.

04:21:57.810 --> 04:21:59.160
<v ->Appreciate it, thank you.</v>

04:22:00.207 --> 04:22:05.183
I'd like to next turn to
public advocates, Justin.

04:22:07.700 --> 04:22:10.600
<v Justin>Hello, Justin Hagler,
public advocate's office.</v>

04:22:11.840 --> 04:22:15.230
This question is more
directed at South Cal Edison,

04:22:15.230 --> 04:22:18.660
but I'd like to hear from
the other utilities as well.

04:22:18.660 --> 04:22:20.960
Do your PSPS wind speed thresholds

04:22:20.960 --> 04:22:23.190
on individual distribution
circuits depend

04:22:23.190 --> 04:22:26.670
on the local vegetation
type in that area?

04:22:26.670 --> 04:22:29.610
If so, how granular
are you looking at them

04:22:29.610 --> 04:22:32.633
and how frequently updated
is this vegetation information?

04:22:34.070 --> 04:22:36.980
<v ->So our wind speed
thresholds are based</v>

04:22:36.980 --> 04:22:39.210
on a number of things.

04:22:39.210 --> 04:22:44.180
We look at the historical
wind speeds for the area.

04:22:44.180 --> 04:22:48.690
We look at the national
weather service on advisory level.

04:22:48.690 --> 04:22:51.750
We look at the reacts
consequence levels.

04:22:51.750 --> 04:22:54.700
And then we also look at
vegetation in terms of whether

04:22:54.700 --> 04:22:59.430
or not there's a mismatch
between what our risk models say

04:22:59.430 --> 04:23:02.170
and what actual operating
in our field knowledge

04:23:02.170 --> 04:23:03.940
tells us otherwise.

04:23:03.940 --> 04:23:07.870
So I think we have a
ways to go when it comes

04:23:07.870 --> 04:23:09.670
to more granular sort of structured

04:23:09.670 --> 04:23:12.610
by structuring
information on vegetation.

04:23:12.610 --> 04:23:14.110
But because we started our journey,

04:23:14.110 --> 04:23:16.740
looking at it on a
circuit by circuit level,

04:23:16.740 --> 04:23:20.700
as we get into segment
by segment review,

04:23:20.700 --> 04:23:22.900
that's where I think more of
these opportunities will arise.

04:23:22.900 --> 04:23:26.720
So there is some emergent
work that is underway,

04:23:26.720 --> 04:23:29.910
saying if we could leverage
things like our war model

04:23:29.910 --> 04:23:34.120
for looking at more
dynamically based thresholds

04:23:34.120 --> 04:23:37.510
that leverage that type of
data, but where we sit today

04:23:37.510 --> 04:23:42.510
is utilizing those various
historical wind speeds

04:23:43.130 --> 04:23:46.523
as well as other indices
to form our wind thresholds.

04:23:54.380 --> 04:23:56.843
<v ->This is Aaron from
PG&amp;E, I'd just add that we,</v>

04:23:58.800 --> 04:24:01.023
the way the wind speed
data locally is incorporated

04:24:01.023 --> 04:24:03.283
is looking at the outage history.

04:24:04.482 --> 04:24:07.379
And so that's the way
that wind sort of shows up,

04:24:07.379 --> 04:24:10.379
and looking at how those
outages correlate with wind speeds.

04:24:11.650 --> 04:24:13.637
You know, the example
that we would give is that,

04:24:13.637 --> 04:24:16.610
you know, so that sets
wind thresholds differently

04:24:16.610 --> 04:24:20.367
depending on the type of
wind that is experienced locally.

04:24:20.367 --> 04:24:24.390
So the example that
we'll often give folks is,

04:24:24.390 --> 04:24:27.040
or uses, you know,
in the Sierra foothills

04:24:27.040 --> 04:24:31.220
or in the Sierras where higher
wind speeds are quite common.

04:24:31.220 --> 04:24:34.410
You know, we see fewer
outages at those lower wind speeds

04:24:34.410 --> 04:24:35.243
than we do at higher.

04:24:35.243 --> 04:24:37.670
And in some ways it's because,
you know, loose branches

04:24:37.670 --> 04:24:40.200
from trees and the like have
often already been dislodged,

04:24:40.200 --> 04:24:42.300
'cause those winds are quite common.

04:24:42.300 --> 04:24:45.340
Unlike say down South in
our service territory more

04:24:45.340 --> 04:24:47.750
say in the Fresno or Bakersfield area,

04:24:47.750 --> 04:24:51.000
we would certainly expect more
outages at lower wind speeds

04:24:51.000 --> 04:24:53.900
'cause we don't see
the same level of wind

04:24:53.900 --> 04:24:55.027
on a consistent basis.

04:24:55.027 --> 04:24:59.240
And so that ends up
incorporating itself in our models,

04:24:59.240 --> 04:25:02.943
through the outage
history in the various areas.

04:25:07.440 --> 04:25:11.810
<v ->And from the
perspective of SDG&amp;E,</v>

04:25:11.810 --> 04:25:14.323
we established something
that we call our alerts.

04:25:15.170 --> 04:25:18.360
And we developed
that through the 10 years

04:25:18.360 --> 04:25:20.180
of historical data, which we collected

04:25:20.180 --> 04:25:21.700
from our weather network.

04:25:21.700 --> 04:25:25.430
So it's the top 1% of winds.

04:25:25.430 --> 04:25:27.330
Generally, and just like Aaron said,

04:25:27.330 --> 04:25:29.963
that's very different
based off where you go.

04:25:31.170 --> 04:25:32.950
But in addition to that alert speed,

04:25:32.950 --> 04:25:36.710
we do a couple of things,
one, we updated every year.

04:25:36.710 --> 04:25:40.050
So 2020, as we know,
had lots of red flags,

04:25:40.050 --> 04:25:41.930
lots of high wind events.

04:25:41.930 --> 04:25:44.660
So, our alert speeds
are actually trending

04:25:44.660 --> 04:25:48.437
a little bit higher as we
recalculate them every year

04:25:48.437 --> 04:25:51.660
and we look at what is
normal for a given area.

04:25:51.660 --> 04:25:54.150
And then the other thing that we look at

04:25:54.150 --> 04:25:57.030
is we calculate a vegetation risk index.

04:25:57.030 --> 04:25:59.720
We look at the exact number of trees

04:26:00.750 --> 04:26:02.250
past a sectionalizing device.

04:26:02.250 --> 04:26:04.940
So on an area that could
be impacted by PSPS,

04:26:04.940 --> 04:26:09.320
we look at species, we look
at any historical vegetation

04:26:09.320 --> 04:26:11.290
related outages in that area.

04:26:11.290 --> 04:26:16.010
And then that vegetation
risk index is also incorporated

04:26:16.010 --> 04:26:19.410
into the alert speed,
where if we have a place,

04:26:19.410 --> 04:26:21.870
let's say you're in a eucalyptus forest,

04:26:21.870 --> 04:26:26.340
we may look at the 95th
percentile that top 5% of wind

04:26:26.340 --> 04:26:29.000
just because we have
the history of impact.

04:26:29.000 --> 04:26:32.513
So those are some of the
inputs that we use in San Diego.

04:26:37.290 --> 04:26:38.670
<v ->And do you have
work to follow up?</v>

04:26:38.670 --> 04:26:43.240
Do you foresee further
expansion on taking into account

04:26:44.770 --> 04:26:47.330
the vegetation classes on the segments?

04:26:47.330 --> 04:26:50.730
I think Erik answered
the question on that one

04:26:50.730 --> 04:26:52.680
is that it is continuing
and development,

04:26:52.680 --> 04:26:56.130
but for PG&amp;E and San Diego,

04:26:56.130 --> 04:26:58.143
is that kind of an ongoing project?

04:26:59.930 --> 04:27:02.070
<v ->In San Diego it is, that's one</v>

04:27:02.070 --> 04:27:04.440
that we're working specifically.

04:27:04.440 --> 04:27:07.420
Again, we have another
project going on right now

04:27:07.420 --> 04:27:11.160
with Academia where we are combining all

04:27:11.160 --> 04:27:14.323
of that vegetation data, but
then now we're also coupling it

04:27:14.323 --> 04:27:16.480
with all of our historical weather data

04:27:17.720 --> 04:27:19.390
running back 30 years.

04:27:19.390 --> 04:27:22.160
So we're trying to where
we're actually studying now

04:27:22.160 --> 04:27:25.210
as failure rates of
each individual tree.

04:27:25.210 --> 04:27:27.160
And that the goal
here is that we can get

04:27:27.160 --> 04:27:31.210
some operational model
and then an AI based model

04:27:31.210 --> 04:27:34.290
that will give us additional information

04:27:34.290 --> 04:27:35.643
coming into an event.

04:27:38.150 --> 04:27:39.790
<v ->Yeah, and I would
just add for PG&amp;E</v>

04:27:39.790 --> 04:27:42.530
that's what we're actively
looking at right now.

04:27:42.530 --> 04:27:45.130
And we're trying to
understand and look at

04:27:47.460 --> 04:27:49.670
some of the correlations
and understand, you know,

04:27:49.670 --> 04:27:54.140
we've looked at tree density, you know,

04:27:54.140 --> 04:27:56.510
tree over strike potential
is the one that we think

04:27:56.510 --> 04:27:58.890
has the most promise currently, right?

04:27:58.890 --> 04:28:01.290
So that's the amount
of tree that if it falls

04:28:01.290 --> 04:28:03.910
at just the right angle
is longer than the line.

04:28:03.910 --> 04:28:07.080
So we're trying to isolate
what is the actual variable

04:28:07.080 --> 04:28:09.600
that really presents the most risk

04:28:09.600 --> 04:28:14.063
as we look at different
ways you could think about,

04:28:15.820 --> 04:28:20.040
you know, trees coming
in contact with our assets.

04:28:20.040 --> 04:28:22.040
So that is something we're
definitely looking to do.

04:28:22.040 --> 04:28:25.100
We were down to a
segment by segment level

04:28:25.100 --> 04:28:27.550
on the transmission system, again,

04:28:27.550 --> 04:28:30.620
much more manageable
at 50,000 structures,

04:28:30.620 --> 04:28:32.740
than at 700,000 structures.

04:28:32.740 --> 04:28:36.830
But we're attempting
to put that in place

04:28:36.830 --> 04:28:38.490
for this year as well.

04:28:38.490 --> 04:28:40.630
It won't have the same specificity

04:28:40.630 --> 04:28:43.230
of the transmission system,
but it will be very much headed

04:28:43.230 --> 04:28:44.090
in that direction.

04:28:44.090 --> 04:28:48.060
And over the longer term
that is certainly we would like

04:28:48.060 --> 04:28:50.390
to have a similar level of granularity

04:28:50.390 --> 04:28:51.930
that we have with our
transmission system,

04:28:51.930 --> 04:28:53.380
with the distribution system.

04:28:56.644 --> 04:28:57.933
<v ->Thank you, appreciate it.</v>

04:28:59.540 --> 04:29:00.740
<v ->Thank you all.</v>

04:29:00.740 --> 04:29:05.180
Next, I'd like to turn to
Dr. Mitchell form Mussey Grade

04:29:05.180 --> 04:29:08.260
and then I'll go to the chat.

04:29:08.260 --> 04:29:09.810
<v Joseph>Hi, Joseph Mitchell.</v>

04:29:11.172 --> 04:29:15.130
There've been a number of
incidents over the last few years

04:29:16.340 --> 04:29:21.220
where PSPS was not
activated in the right place

04:29:21.220 --> 04:29:24.103
in the right time, and fires started.

04:29:25.640 --> 04:29:29.310
Also, a lot of anecdotal
evidence about PSPS

04:29:29.310 --> 04:29:31.530
being initiated in places

04:29:31.530 --> 04:29:36.530
without really strong
weather conditions.

04:29:38.050 --> 04:29:42.890
So the question is, and this
is mostly for SCE and PG&amp;E

04:29:43.740 --> 04:29:46.293
'cause SDG&amp;E has been fortunate.

04:29:50.070 --> 04:29:53.803
Is this an issue with
the meteorology models?

04:29:55.020 --> 04:29:56.570
How are they being validated?

04:29:56.570 --> 04:30:00.400
And if there are issues, how
are they being addressed?

04:30:00.400 --> 04:30:02.830
Or is it a weather station issue

04:30:02.830 --> 04:30:07.830
or is this just a consequence
system topology?

04:30:08.630 --> 04:30:12.213
And just to give a SDG&amp;E
a hook in here as well,

04:30:13.490 --> 04:30:16.540
have you just been lucky
in not having this happen,

04:30:16.540 --> 04:30:18.830
or you think you're doing something

04:30:18.830 --> 04:30:21.380
that's a little bit more sophisticated

04:30:21.380 --> 04:30:26.380
than the other two utilities
that have enabled you

04:30:26.400 --> 04:30:29.510
to better right size the PSPS?

04:30:40.983 --> 04:30:43.090
<v ->So this is Erik, I
guess I can go first</v>

04:30:43.090 --> 04:30:44.873
since Edison was mentioned first.

04:30:46.820 --> 04:30:51.480
So, to answer your question,
I mean, I think, you know,

04:30:51.480 --> 04:30:55.990
one of the things that we
do to ensure that we're using

04:30:55.990 --> 04:31:00.610
the best information possible
is we have moved towards using

04:31:00.610 --> 04:31:05.460
as best we can, actual
conditions versus forecasts

04:31:05.460 --> 04:31:09.670
'cause we recognized that
weather forecasts, you know,

04:31:09.670 --> 04:31:14.060
as far as the accuracy, as I
mentioned in the presentation,

04:31:14.060 --> 04:31:17.610
we are working on developing
better accurate models

04:31:17.610 --> 04:31:19.990
than what we currently have today.

04:31:19.990 --> 04:31:23.500
So we've currently forecasted
a two kilometer granularity.

04:31:23.500 --> 04:31:26.620
We're moving that over to
one kilometer granularity.

04:31:26.620 --> 04:31:29.320
But even with that, you
know, we think that, you know,

04:31:29.320 --> 04:31:32.760
trying to forecast wind
speed at such a local level,

04:31:32.760 --> 04:31:34.950
is gonna have its inherent challenges.

04:31:34.950 --> 04:31:38.120
And so that's why we're
deploying, you know,

04:31:38.120 --> 04:31:41.230
more weather stations, even
using mobile weather stations

04:31:41.230 --> 04:31:46.230
where we can to sort
of help us understand

04:31:47.720 --> 04:31:51.800
our real-time situational
awareness during the event.

04:31:51.800 --> 04:31:55.230
I will say though that,
you know, like other utilities

04:31:55.230 --> 04:31:57.490
and, you know, PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E,

04:31:57.490 --> 04:32:02.490
we have all accumulated
information and verification

04:32:02.860 --> 04:32:06.620
of damage that has occurred
after each one of these events.

04:32:06.620 --> 04:32:08.890
And so I think if anything, you know,

04:32:08.890 --> 04:32:12.820
the PSPS is designed to be a mitigation.

04:32:12.820 --> 04:32:16.240
It's a mitigation that
we use and it's intended

04:32:16.240 --> 04:32:18.653
to ensure public safety
and the thresholds

04:32:18.653 --> 04:32:21.660
and all the techniques
and things that we do

04:32:21.660 --> 04:32:25.040
are designed to one, do it consistently,

04:32:25.040 --> 04:32:27.670
do it in a way that we
believe is addressing

04:32:27.670 --> 04:32:28.950
the most significant risks

04:32:28.950 --> 04:32:31.540
and then using the
best information possible,

04:32:31.540 --> 04:32:34.253
and in our case, it's
using real-time information.

04:32:37.170 --> 04:32:39.690
<v ->Thanks Erik, this
is Aaron from PG&amp;E.</v>

04:32:39.690 --> 04:32:41.343
I'll build off of what Erik said.

04:32:43.378 --> 04:32:45.178
You know, I just want to acknowledge

04:32:46.830 --> 04:32:49.980
that there are only a
handful of utilities in the world

04:32:49.980 --> 04:32:53.100
that are attempting to
do something like PSPS.

04:32:53.100 --> 04:32:55.340
So we are continuing to learn.

04:32:55.340 --> 04:32:57.870
And I think a lot of credit goes

04:32:57.870 --> 04:32:59.300
to San Diego, Gas and Electric,

04:32:59.300 --> 04:33:02.980
which really pioneered this
process and opened their books

04:33:02.980 --> 04:33:05.530
and their process to
all of the other utilities

04:33:05.530 --> 04:33:08.810
for us to come down there,
and especially in the early days

04:33:08.810 --> 04:33:12.320
of this program, we spent a
lot of time closely connected

04:33:12.320 --> 04:33:15.150
with them, really
building our program off

04:33:15.150 --> 04:33:16.840
of the foundation that they had laid.

04:33:16.840 --> 04:33:19.730
So, I wanna give them
credit where credit is due.

04:33:19.730 --> 04:33:22.660
Our meteorology teams continue
to stay very closely aligned

04:33:22.660 --> 04:33:25.410
so that we are looking
at similar characteristics.

04:33:25.410 --> 04:33:26.557
We all have different risks,

04:33:26.557 --> 04:33:29.410
and so we need to approach
those slightly differently.

04:33:29.410 --> 04:33:31.347
But there are many
similarities in the program

04:33:31.347 --> 04:33:33.460
and we continue to kinda work together

04:33:33.460 --> 04:33:36.510
to make sure that where
there are best practices

04:33:36.510 --> 04:33:40.180
that we can, you know,
steal liberally from each other,

04:33:40.180 --> 04:33:41.770
and benefit from those.

04:33:41.770 --> 04:33:44.680
And that's very much a common mindset

04:33:44.680 --> 04:33:45.960
in the utility business.

04:33:45.960 --> 04:33:48.000
One of the benefits of not
competing with each other

04:33:48.000 --> 04:33:52.093
is there's a lot of open
sharing of information.

04:33:53.415 --> 04:33:54.850
And so that makes it easy to adopt

04:33:54.850 --> 04:33:56.293
each other's best practices.

04:33:57.370 --> 04:34:01.390
I will say that from the
standpoint of the perception

04:34:03.940 --> 04:34:06.200
of the utilities, it's a
process that we have

04:34:06.200 --> 04:34:07.410
to have a learning mentality,

04:34:07.410 --> 04:34:09.040
a continuous improvement mentality.

04:34:09.040 --> 04:34:11.470
I think I provided a
slide that showed some

04:34:11.470 --> 04:34:16.460
of the takeaways each year
and to the previous questions,

04:34:16.460 --> 04:34:20.210
I believe from Justin, with
Public Advocates, you know,

04:34:20.210 --> 04:34:23.540
we are looking very much
our learning from last year is,

04:34:23.540 --> 04:34:27.580
are we incorporating
vegetation risk appropriately

04:34:27.580 --> 04:34:28.870
at the distribution level?

04:34:28.870 --> 04:34:31.583
Can we get more surgical
and granular there?

04:34:32.950 --> 04:34:36.970
And I think we've had, unfortunately,

04:34:36.970 --> 04:34:41.220
some incident that
points us towards one area

04:34:41.220 --> 04:34:44.190
of focus along with just
general process improvement

04:34:44.190 --> 04:34:45.960
and a lot of the customer support

04:34:45.960 --> 04:34:48.080
and systems that go around it.

04:34:48.080 --> 04:34:51.107
There will always be customers
who will say, you know,

04:34:52.231 --> 04:34:53.580
it's a running conversation.

04:34:53.580 --> 04:34:57.840
And the feedback we generally
get is some version of it,

04:34:57.840 --> 04:34:59.660
it wasn't windy at my house.

04:34:59.660 --> 04:35:02.490
And when you run a
program based our forecast,

04:35:02.490 --> 04:35:06.013
that will always be incidences
where it doesn't materialize.

04:35:07.160 --> 04:35:09.440
What we're trying really hard to do

04:35:09.440 --> 04:35:12.700
with the sectionalizing devices
and the increased, you know,

04:35:12.700 --> 04:35:14.970
deployment of weather
stations in the granularity

04:35:14.970 --> 04:35:19.173
of our modeling is to
try and avoid, you know,

04:35:19.173 --> 04:35:21.470
it's one thing if the
forecast doesn't materialize,

04:35:21.470 --> 04:35:23.690
it's another thing if
there's a neighborhood

04:35:23.690 --> 04:35:26.500
that we couldn't keep in lights,

04:35:26.500 --> 04:35:27.850
even though it wasn't at risk,

04:35:27.850 --> 04:35:30.530
just because of the
configuration of the electrical grid

04:35:30.530 --> 04:35:33.660
and where the fire
risk sat over that grid.

04:35:33.660 --> 04:35:37.580
And so that's the part that
we're in particular working on,

04:35:37.580 --> 04:35:41.653
so that there's far less
collateral impact, which is why we,

04:35:42.532 --> 04:35:44.843
you know, installed 600
sectionalizing devices last year

04:35:44.843 --> 04:35:48.230
at PG&amp;E to really isolate
those tier one areas

04:35:48.230 --> 04:35:50.987
that might potentially be
impacted even though tier two

04:35:50.987 --> 04:35:52.410
and tier three are the areas

04:35:52.410 --> 04:35:56.050
where we're really more
concerned about wildfire risk.

04:35:56.050 --> 04:35:58.600
So hopefully that provides
a little bit of insight.

04:36:02.220 --> 04:36:04.380
<v ->Yeah, and then just
to build on that, I mean,</v>

04:36:04.380 --> 04:36:07.870
first and foremost, the
way that our biologists

04:36:07.870 --> 04:36:10.340
now work together at the
utilities across the State

04:36:10.340 --> 04:36:15.170
with the shared mission of
advancing fire science right now

04:36:15.170 --> 04:36:19.303
that is gaining momentum
and will continue into the future.

04:36:21.050 --> 04:36:23.670
Additionally, you know,
when we first started building

04:36:23.670 --> 04:36:28.500
our weather network in
2009 and 2010, you know,

04:36:28.500 --> 04:36:31.330
I went to the textbooks
studied Santa Ana,

04:36:31.330 --> 04:36:34.800
and they said, the windy spots
are the passes and canyons.

04:36:34.800 --> 04:36:38.680
And, you know, after
studying and putting this,

04:36:38.680 --> 04:36:40.130
we found out that in San Diego,

04:36:40.130 --> 04:36:42.190
that wasn't actually the case, right?

04:36:42.190 --> 04:36:45.160
So the science continues
to evolve over time.

04:36:45.160 --> 04:36:49.140
We continue to learn more about
how Santa Ana winds behave

04:36:49.140 --> 04:36:50.760
in our service territory.

04:36:50.760 --> 04:36:53.650
And then we've since
then been able to target

04:36:53.650 --> 04:36:57.610
the windiest areas and
then work with the universities

04:36:57.610 --> 04:36:59.060
to fine tune our models.

04:36:59.060 --> 04:37:01.290
So I think the main
point is that the science

04:37:01.290 --> 04:37:02.870
has been an evolution.

04:37:02.870 --> 04:37:04.900
It wasn't something that
happened very quickly,

04:37:04.900 --> 04:37:09.050
it was something that through
kind of continuous research

04:37:09.050 --> 04:37:10.690
and learning, we've been able

04:37:10.690 --> 04:37:13.460
to just continuously better understand

04:37:14.360 --> 04:37:19.110
how Santa Ana winds impact
our particular service territory.

04:37:19.110 --> 04:37:22.060
And we're still making
improvements based off events

04:37:22.060 --> 04:37:24.810
that we had last year with
the high number of events.

04:37:24.810 --> 04:37:26.520
We find even more opportunities

04:37:26.520 --> 04:37:29.440
where we do still see surprises,

04:37:29.440 --> 04:37:33.440
we continue to react and
we continue to integrate

04:37:33.440 --> 04:37:35.140
the lessons learned and, you know,

04:37:35.140 --> 04:37:38.220
we do integrate this into our
engineering practices as well.

04:37:38.220 --> 04:37:40.423
I don't know, Jonathan,
are you on at all?

04:37:42.980 --> 04:37:43.813
<v ->Yeah, thank you Brian.</v>

04:37:43.813 --> 04:37:46.010
I just wanted to highlight
the fact that, you know,

04:37:46.010 --> 04:37:50.900
earlier on after the 2007
wildfires in San Diego Gas

04:37:50.900 --> 04:37:53.100
and Electric service territory,

04:37:53.100 --> 04:37:56.500
we did start with our
transmission hardening.

04:37:56.500 --> 04:38:01.050
And that was, you know,
started but also leveraged

04:38:01.050 --> 04:38:03.560
and balanced by the weather information,

04:38:03.560 --> 04:38:04.743
as well as the fire science information

04:38:04.743 --> 04:38:09.610
that we were starting to
build from our 2003 experience

04:38:09.610 --> 04:38:12.450
by bringing on board, you
know, fire science experts,

04:38:12.450 --> 04:38:14.670
but also going forward as we learn more

04:38:14.670 --> 04:38:16.950
from our weather data leveraging,

04:38:16.950 --> 04:38:19.467
what would it take to harden
our transmission system?

04:38:19.467 --> 04:38:23.560
And that has helped to
reduce the impacts, right?

04:38:23.560 --> 04:38:28.100
By not taking up a larger
areas of the customer base

04:38:29.160 --> 04:38:34.160
through a PSPS events,
really being able to limit it

04:38:34.310 --> 04:38:36.650
to our distribution circuits

04:38:36.650 --> 04:38:39.560
that are smaller and
impact higher customers.

04:38:43.767 --> 04:38:46.262
<v Joseph>Thank you.</v>

04:38:46.262 --> 04:38:47.875
<v ->Thank you all.</v>

04:38:47.875 --> 04:38:50.070
And, in our last few minutes,

04:38:50.070 --> 04:38:52.163
I'd like to turn to the chat.

04:38:53.510 --> 04:38:56.290
Nathan has been monitoring,

04:38:56.290 --> 04:38:58.513
there are several questions in the chat.

04:39:00.855 --> 04:39:03.310
Do you have any other questions, Nathan?

04:39:04.190 --> 04:39:05.213
<v Nathan>Yeah, there's
a couple of questions</v>

04:39:05.213 --> 04:39:06.160
from the chat.

04:39:06.160 --> 04:39:08.500
The first one is from Jacqueline Ayer

04:39:08.500 --> 04:39:13.060
from Acton town council
for SCE and open to input

04:39:13.060 --> 04:39:15.793
from PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E as well.

04:39:16.784 --> 04:39:21.540
SCE's 2021 WMP states
that ignition consequence

04:39:21.540 --> 04:39:25.580
is factored into the decision
to trigger a PSPS event.

04:39:25.580 --> 04:39:29.380
However, ESRB-8 only
allows utilities to de-energize

04:39:29.380 --> 04:39:32.340
when there is an
imminent and significant risk

04:39:32.340 --> 04:39:35.920
other infrastructure will ignite
a fire and does not specify

04:39:35.920 --> 04:39:38.500
that utilities can initiate PSPS based

04:39:38.500 --> 04:39:41.020
on how big a fire may get.

04:39:41.020 --> 04:39:44.310
So can you please
explain how SCE believes

04:39:44.310 --> 04:39:47.180
they can lower the PSPS triggers

04:39:47.180 --> 04:39:49.560
based on ignition
consequence when doing so

04:39:49.560 --> 04:39:51.830
is not authorized by ESRB-8?

04:39:54.630 --> 04:39:56.620
<v ->Thank you for the question.</v>

04:39:56.620 --> 04:39:59.330
So yeah, so ignition
consequence is factored

04:39:59.330 --> 04:40:02.980
in our decision making and
addition to FPI and wind speed,

04:40:02.980 --> 04:40:07.130
we also factor in, as we talked
about reacts consequence.

04:40:07.130 --> 04:40:09.800
But hence we de-energized
when we believe

04:40:09.800 --> 04:40:12.150
that there is a
significant risk associated

04:40:12.150 --> 04:40:13.250
with those conditions.

04:40:14.520 --> 04:40:15.920
I'll say that one of the challenges

04:40:15.920 --> 04:40:19.240
with using a full
segmentation model is that

04:40:19.240 --> 04:40:21.730
rather than tracking say 200 circuits

04:40:21.730 --> 04:40:25.570
in a relatively large event,
we may actively track

04:40:25.570 --> 04:40:29.130
as many as 700
segments at any given time.

04:40:29.130 --> 04:40:32.320
So one of the things in
our operations procedures,

04:40:32.320 --> 04:40:35.100
you know, as we look
to de-energized circuits

04:40:35.100 --> 04:40:38.100
and understand which
devices will operate

04:40:38.100 --> 04:40:41.900
and really go through the
process of confirming verifying

04:40:41.900 --> 04:40:45.480
those devices, it actually
takes an average of about five

04:40:45.480 --> 04:40:50.020
to 10 minutes per
de-energization action.

04:40:50.020 --> 04:40:52.150
So you can envision
that when we start getting

04:40:52.150 --> 04:40:55.140
into situations where
things are escalating quickly,

04:40:55.140 --> 04:40:57.840
or we have a relatively large event,

04:40:57.840 --> 04:41:01.960
we need to figure out a way
where we have high confidence

04:41:01.960 --> 04:41:04.140
that our thresholds
are gonna be breached.

04:41:04.140 --> 04:41:05.580
How do we do so in a way

04:41:05.580 --> 04:41:08.100
that we prioritize it based on risk?

04:41:08.100 --> 04:41:13.100
So, we look at things
like additional risk factors

04:41:13.330 --> 04:41:17.010
that may cause us to take action sooner

04:41:17.010 --> 04:41:19.990
with the belief that
the weather stations

04:41:19.990 --> 04:41:22.320
are reading in such a
way that these conditions

04:41:22.320 --> 04:41:26.475
are very likely to occur,
but being able to do so

04:41:26.475 --> 04:41:27.867
where we're not waiting, you know,

04:41:27.867 --> 04:41:30.930
and then subsequently
things really escalated out

04:41:30.930 --> 04:41:34.210
of control, and we missed
the opportunity to de-energize

04:41:34.210 --> 04:41:35.970
to ensure public safety.

04:41:35.970 --> 04:41:38.286
So, hopefully that answers the question.

04:41:38.286 --> 04:41:40.320
It's not that we're
ignoring our threshold,

04:41:40.320 --> 04:41:42.320
it's just that's more
that we're prioritizing

04:41:42.320 --> 04:41:44.700
how we do de-energization
with a high confidence

04:41:44.700 --> 04:41:46.960
that our thresholds will be breached

04:41:46.960 --> 04:41:50.023
and using our best information
possible to assess the risk.

04:42:00.177 --> 04:42:03.720
<v Nathan>Great, if PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E</v>

04:42:03.720 --> 04:42:04.960
don't have anything else to add,

04:42:04.960 --> 04:42:09.207
I can go to the next question,
which is also for SCE,

04:42:10.200 --> 04:42:13.990
which is regarding the
PSPS mitigations for access

04:42:13.990 --> 04:42:15.880
and functional needs customers.

04:42:15.880 --> 04:42:18.370
This is from Megan Somogyi

04:42:18.370 --> 04:42:20.793
from the joint local
governments coalition.

04:42:22.480 --> 04:42:26.830
SCE's WMP and PSPS
corrective action plan focused

04:42:26.830 --> 04:42:29.520
on partnering with
community based organizations

04:42:29.520 --> 04:42:32.060
and other organizations
to share information

04:42:32.060 --> 04:42:35.180
with AFN populations
so that they can increase

04:42:35.180 --> 04:42:38.210
their personal resiliency plans,

04:42:38.210 --> 04:42:43.210
as well as SCE's existing
backup battery programs.

04:42:45.330 --> 04:42:48.130
But the needs for
resources and assistance

04:42:48.130 --> 04:42:51.910
goes beyond information
and personal resiliency plans.

04:42:51.910 --> 04:42:54.940
PG&amp;E's partnerships
in 2020 with food banks,

04:42:54.940 --> 04:42:56.680
meals on wheels, et cetera,

04:42:56.680 --> 04:42:59.120
were greatly appreciated and widely used

04:42:59.120 --> 04:43:00.760
by impacted customers.

04:43:00.760 --> 04:43:05.750
The lack of similar resources
from SCE is noticeable.

04:43:05.750 --> 04:43:08.070
For example, the current
Independent Living Center

04:43:08.070 --> 04:43:11.770
receives resources from
PG&amp;E, but they can only be used

04:43:11.770 --> 04:43:15.833
for PG&amp;E customers, which
leaves Independent Living Centers,

04:43:17.260 --> 04:43:20.740
ILC members served by SCE out of luck.

04:43:20.740 --> 04:43:24.030
What plans does SCE
have to provide resources

04:43:24.030 --> 04:43:26.280
beyond information and backup batteries

04:43:26.280 --> 04:43:29.243
to AFN customers during PSPS events?

04:43:30.630 --> 04:43:32.070
<v ->Yeah, thank you
for the question.</v>

04:43:32.070 --> 04:43:36.970
And I will kind of leverage
a little bit of the spirit

04:43:36.970 --> 04:43:39.750
in which Aaron had
talked about other utilities

04:43:39.750 --> 04:43:41.380
and learning from each other.

04:43:41.380 --> 04:43:43.170
So as part of our action plan,

04:43:43.170 --> 04:43:45.920
one of the things that
we recognize is, you know,

04:43:45.920 --> 04:43:48.843
I'll just take the critical
care battery backup program.

04:43:49.700 --> 04:43:51.780
Last year, we had every intention

04:43:51.780 --> 04:43:53.253
of reaching more customers.

04:43:55.110 --> 04:43:58.760
You know, at the timing of
which we went for procurement

04:43:58.760 --> 04:44:01.220
and solicitation for the batteries,

04:44:01.220 --> 04:44:04.920
COVID impacted in part
some of our ability to do that.

04:44:04.920 --> 04:44:08.240
But we learned a lot
and a great deal in terms

04:44:08.240 --> 04:44:10.340
of how to expand our programs.

04:44:10.340 --> 04:44:12.950
So, a little bit of what
we've seen in other utilities,

04:44:12.950 --> 04:44:16.700
we're now expanding those
critical care battery backups

04:44:16.700 --> 04:44:18.820
to all medical baseline.

04:44:18.820 --> 04:44:21.000
Knowing also that we have overcome

04:44:21.000 --> 04:44:23.860
some of the supply chain
issues that we've had.

04:44:23.860 --> 04:44:26.350
But there's a greater
opportunity here for AFN

04:44:26.350 --> 04:44:31.010
that we recognize, and one
is in addition to partnerships,

04:44:31.010 --> 04:44:33.050
it's really about
understanding the needs

04:44:33.050 --> 04:44:36.200
of the population, you know,

04:44:36.200 --> 04:44:40.060
beyond just the current programs
and services that we offer.

04:44:40.060 --> 04:44:42.400
So we're gonna be conducting
an air con research study

04:44:42.400 --> 04:44:45.880
to understand what the needs
of those populations might be.

04:44:45.880 --> 04:44:48.710
So we can better augment
our programs and services

04:44:48.710 --> 04:44:50.320
to meet those needs.

04:44:50.320 --> 04:44:52.990
We're gonna undergo
quite a bit of marketing efforts

04:44:52.990 --> 04:44:56.170
to get more information
and education out there

04:44:56.170 --> 04:44:57.687
about the things that we provide.

04:44:57.687 --> 04:45:00.660
And we're gonna be
looking at alternative ways

04:45:00.660 --> 04:45:04.390
to support the community,
including looking at

04:45:04.390 --> 04:45:06.080
what we can do with new banks

04:45:06.080 --> 04:45:09.160
and other organizations to
provide a broader support.

04:45:09.160 --> 04:45:11.330
So, those are the
things that are outlined

04:45:11.330 --> 04:45:15.150
in our action plan, and
we certainly look forward

04:45:15.150 --> 04:45:18.173
to expanding our role in that space.

04:45:27.677 --> 04:45:29.360
<v Nathan>Great, and I
also have a question</v>

04:45:29.360 --> 04:45:33.320
from John Hooker from
wildfire safety division.

04:45:33.320 --> 04:45:36.970
There was some, I think,
some answers in the chat,

04:45:36.970 --> 04:45:38.640
but for the benefit of those who are

04:45:38.640 --> 04:45:43.090
just participating remotely
or cannot see the chat,

04:45:43.090 --> 04:45:46.510
the question is for Brian from SD&amp;E.

04:45:47.690 --> 04:45:52.190
We can see a later and
to fire seasons recently,

04:45:52.190 --> 04:45:53.240
how about the beginning?

04:45:53.240 --> 04:45:58.240
Is it moving earlier, staying
put or moving later as well?

04:46:02.000 --> 04:46:04.740
<v ->Yeah, generally what
we're finding is that</v>

04:46:04.740 --> 04:46:07.430
the start a fire season
is very dependent

04:46:07.430 --> 04:46:10.440
upon the rainfall patterns
that weren't there before, right?

04:46:10.440 --> 04:46:13.360
So if you look at
where we are right now,

04:46:13.360 --> 04:46:16.580
where, you know, 40
to 45% of normal rainfall

04:46:16.580 --> 04:46:18.670
in the Southern half of California,

04:46:18.670 --> 04:46:21.550
that will tend to lead
to an earlier onset

04:46:21.550 --> 04:46:25.033
of fire season, right, unfortunately.

04:46:26.190 --> 04:46:29.050
When it comes to
actual wind driven fires,

04:46:29.050 --> 04:46:33.030
which are the cause of
most catastrophic impacts

04:46:33.030 --> 04:46:36.370
in Southern California,
those generally are tied

04:46:36.370 --> 04:46:41.010
in to the colder air starting
to come in in the fall.

04:46:41.010 --> 04:46:44.080
So those have actually
been trending a little later

04:46:44.080 --> 04:46:47.540
and the risk of those
has been moving further

04:46:47.540 --> 04:46:50.600
into the winter because
we're not seeing that onset

04:46:50.600 --> 04:46:52.490
of winter rainfall.

04:46:52.490 --> 04:46:56.060
The climate science right
now, doesn't really indicate

04:46:56.060 --> 04:46:59.880
that we'll be seeing
those earlier in the season.

04:46:59.880 --> 04:47:02.610
But that being said, 2020
was a bit of an exception

04:47:02.610 --> 04:47:05.920
where we did have three red
flags in the month of September,

04:47:05.920 --> 04:47:08.140
which was earlier than usual.

04:47:08.140 --> 04:47:11.590
But that the short
answer is that, you know,

04:47:11.590 --> 04:47:13.240
where those wind-driven fires,

04:47:13.240 --> 04:47:16.400
we don't expect those to
consistently start earlier,

04:47:16.400 --> 04:47:19.330
but we do expect them
to last longer in the winter

04:47:19.330 --> 04:47:20.530
due to lack of rainfall.

04:47:29.080 --> 04:47:32.267
<v ->And this is Erik from SCE,
and maybe related, you know,</v>

04:47:33.330 --> 04:47:35.750
we are still tracking the precipitation

04:47:36.800 --> 04:47:39.260
that we were receiving
in our service territory.

04:47:39.260 --> 04:47:44.260
So, you know, there is some
evidence that we're, again,

04:47:45.550 --> 04:47:49.130
looking at a drier
than normal situation.

04:47:49.130 --> 04:47:52.510
I think one of the concerns
we have, you know,

04:47:52.510 --> 04:47:54.400
it's different than
the wind driven fires

04:47:54.400 --> 04:47:58.200
that we see as Brian was explaining.

04:47:58.200 --> 04:48:00.380
But last year, one of
the things that we had

04:48:00.380 --> 04:48:03.630
to contend with our,
what we call fuel fires.

04:48:03.630 --> 04:48:07.970
These are things that
just kinda add to each other

04:48:07.970 --> 04:48:11.160
when fuel conditions just
that don't have an opportunity

04:48:11.160 --> 04:48:14.770
to change as a result
of expected precipitation

04:48:14.770 --> 04:48:17.080
we would wanna see in the winter time.

04:48:17.080 --> 04:48:19.040
So actively tracking it.

04:48:19.040 --> 04:48:22.630
I agree that the winter
season might last longer,

04:48:22.630 --> 04:48:26.180
but I wouldn't necessarily
rule out fire season

04:48:26.180 --> 04:48:28.070
actually beginning sooner as well.

04:48:33.250 --> 04:48:36.040
<v ->Thank you, I think that
really addressed the question</v>

04:48:36.040 --> 04:48:41.010
that we had on our list
earlier about climate change

04:48:41.010 --> 04:48:43.283
into the future and
how that may play in.

04:48:44.130 --> 04:48:49.130
But if there's anything
else to say on that matter,

04:48:49.540 --> 04:48:51.270
feel free to chime in.

04:48:51.270 --> 04:48:54.530
But I wanted to turn to
a question on response

04:48:56.600 --> 04:48:58.410
during an implementation.

04:48:58.410 --> 04:49:00.640
And it's related to the
conversation earlier

04:49:00.640 --> 04:49:05.630
about communication
with the County emergency

04:49:05.630 --> 04:49:10.493
and State emergency management agencies.

04:49:11.400 --> 04:49:12.943
And the question really is,

04:49:16.350 --> 04:49:19.530
what is your incident
management team use,

04:49:19.530 --> 04:49:21.840
do you have a dedicated
incident management team

04:49:21.840 --> 04:49:24.243
for public safety power shutdowns?

04:49:25.480 --> 04:49:28.620
And then the second part,
there was some discussion

04:49:28.620 --> 04:49:33.620
about provision of circuit
sectionalization information

04:49:33.820 --> 04:49:36.050
and other information, is that included

04:49:36.050 --> 04:49:39.080
in the portal information
that is provided

04:49:39.080 --> 04:49:40.500
to in your communication

04:49:40.500 --> 04:49:44.630
with emergency management
government agencies?

04:49:44.630 --> 04:49:46.080
And that's for all utilities.

04:49:56.440 --> 04:49:58.150
<v ->This is Aaron with PG&amp;E.</v>

04:49:58.150 --> 04:50:00.730
I'm happy to start.
<v ->Thanks.</v>

04:50:00.730 --> 04:50:05.223
<v ->So, I'll take them
in reverse order.</v>

04:50:08.359 --> 04:50:11.310
For the provision
of circuit information,

04:50:11.310 --> 04:50:16.080
we did offer and provide
coaching for anyone

04:50:16.080 --> 04:50:19.600
that wanted it circuit
specific information

04:50:19.600 --> 04:50:21.420
for any emergency management office

04:50:21.420 --> 04:50:23.320
that wanted that information.

04:50:23.320 --> 04:50:25.210
Many of them that are more sophisticated

04:50:25.210 --> 04:50:28.540
with their GIS capabilities
were interested in having that,

04:50:28.540 --> 04:50:30.143
others were less interested.

04:50:31.970 --> 04:50:34.050
You know, there's a range of resources

04:50:34.050 --> 04:50:35.170
and approaches out there.

04:50:35.170 --> 04:50:38.243
So we have made that
available for those that want it.

04:50:40.130 --> 04:50:43.730
Our mindset is to make
the information available,

04:50:43.730 --> 04:50:47.740
but what we also, I like to
joke in some of those meetings

04:50:47.740 --> 04:50:48.573
with the emergency managers,

04:50:48.573 --> 04:50:50.210
that I'm not trying to turn them all

04:50:50.210 --> 04:50:54.000
into electrical engineers, right?

04:50:54.000 --> 04:50:56.450
We need to help them
understand the outcomes

04:50:56.450 --> 04:50:57.500
for their communities.

04:50:57.500 --> 04:51:02.070
And so that's why those outage
maps that we provide both in,

04:51:02.070 --> 04:51:05.370
you know, various GIS
formats, as well as PDFs

04:51:05.370 --> 04:51:08.410
'cause many local first responder types

04:51:08.410 --> 04:51:13.290
are much more interested
in a PDF map as well,

04:51:13.290 --> 04:51:14.440
so we provide both.

04:51:14.440 --> 04:51:17.830
And so it's more about,
let me help you understand

04:51:17.830 --> 04:51:21.100
where events are possible
and where they're likely

04:51:21.100 --> 04:51:24.270
as opposed to let me
give you circuit data,

04:51:24.270 --> 04:51:26.600
and you have to sort of figure out

04:51:26.600 --> 04:51:27.890
the electrical system, right?

04:51:27.890 --> 04:51:30.210
So that's kinda been the approach.

04:51:30.210 --> 04:51:32.980
And again, it's
jurisdiction by jurisdiction,

04:51:32.980 --> 04:51:34.340
there's different levels of interest,

04:51:34.340 --> 04:51:39.340
and we wanna sort of rise or
lower how you engage there

04:51:41.080 --> 04:51:43.010
based on, you know,
the level of engagement

04:51:43.010 --> 04:51:44.990
that they wanna have and
the level of understanding

04:51:44.990 --> 04:51:46.253
that they want to have.

04:51:48.020 --> 04:51:49.760
So that's been our approach there.

04:51:49.760 --> 04:51:52.870
For in terms of incident
management teams,

04:51:52.870 --> 04:51:54.810
we do not have a dedicated

04:51:54.810 --> 04:51:57.590
incident management teams within PG&amp;E.

04:51:57.590 --> 04:52:02.173
We used a 14 rotation
for PSPS events last year.

04:52:03.810 --> 04:52:05.877
It's really two teams
because there's a day

04:52:05.877 --> 04:52:08.983
and a night shift inherent
in those 12 hour shifts.

04:52:10.070 --> 04:52:14.737
And so we have also
had in non PSPS times

04:52:19.200 --> 04:52:22.520
we have been building
out an eight team capability

04:52:22.520 --> 04:52:25.470
to address some of the
employee fatigue issues

04:52:25.470 --> 04:52:27.070
and the disruption of core business

04:52:27.070 --> 04:52:29.450
when the same employees are pulled in

04:52:29.450 --> 04:52:31.173
to help manage those events.

04:52:32.320 --> 04:52:33.820
It's particularly challenging for some

04:52:33.820 --> 04:52:37.570
of our non-operating
units where they don't sort

04:52:37.570 --> 04:52:42.160
of work incidents and
emergencies, incidents in events.

04:52:42.160 --> 04:52:43.640
And so it can be disruptive

04:52:43.640 --> 04:52:46.770
to their more office-based nine to five,

04:52:46.770 --> 04:52:48.830
Monday through Friday
schedules and the work

04:52:48.830 --> 04:52:51.690
that they perform in planning
and functions like that.

04:52:51.690 --> 04:52:54.650
So that is a clearly identified issue

04:52:54.650 --> 04:52:56.693
that we are working on this year for us.

04:52:58.100 --> 04:52:59.530
I would highlight that one of the areas

04:52:59.530 --> 04:53:01.230
that we're looking actively right now,

04:53:01.230 --> 04:53:04.170
and we haven't settled on
developing a permanent team

04:53:04.170 --> 04:53:08.763
is for our plans function
in the EOC around,

04:53:09.870 --> 04:53:11.830
which is the brains, right?

04:53:11.830 --> 04:53:15.920
The meteorology does a lot
of that, but the plan's function

04:53:17.240 --> 04:53:19.830
is the one that turns the weather risk

04:53:19.830 --> 04:53:23.010
into, through a series of tech tools,

04:53:23.010 --> 04:53:27.270
into operational plans of where
we're going to de-energize,

04:53:27.270 --> 04:53:29.470
which is then used for
customer notifications,

04:53:29.470 --> 04:53:31.680
agency collaboration, all of those sorts

04:53:31.680 --> 04:53:32.863
of things, public maps.

04:53:34.130 --> 04:53:38.580
And that function is
so critical in the events

04:53:38.580 --> 04:53:41.910
and that we are looking at while

04:53:41.910 --> 04:53:44.820
we do have some dedicated
members that build those tools

04:53:44.820 --> 04:53:46.910
over the off seasons over
the last couple of years,

04:53:46.910 --> 04:53:48.950
and tend to work the events.

04:53:48.950 --> 04:53:52.310
We think that we would
benefit from a slightly larger team

04:53:52.310 --> 04:53:54.980
of folks that are
dedicated to that function,

04:53:54.980 --> 04:53:58.670
given its criticality to PSPS
and how the PSPS season

04:53:58.670 --> 04:54:00.003
seems to be expanding.

04:54:02.949 --> 04:54:05.380
And so that's something
we're actively looking at

04:54:05.380 --> 04:54:10.380
is having a dedicated team
to really be the brain trust

04:54:10.500 --> 04:54:14.080
of executing the PSPS
events that all the other teams

04:54:14.080 --> 04:54:18.150
in the EOC build off of
for those actual events.

04:54:18.150 --> 04:54:20.290
So, that's a little
insight as to where we're

04:54:20.290 --> 04:54:22.280
our current thinking lies there.

04:54:22.280 --> 04:54:23.660
Thank you.
<v ->Thank you.</v>

04:54:24.670 --> 04:54:28.380
<v ->And maybe I can build a
little bit off of what Aaron</v>

04:54:28.380 --> 04:54:29.550
was talking about.

04:54:29.550 --> 04:54:33.950
In terms of the sectionalization plans.

04:54:33.950 --> 04:54:36.960
That is gonna be
part of a broader effort

04:54:36.960 --> 04:54:40.610
to engage our County emergency managers

04:54:40.610 --> 04:54:43.520
around the decision-making process

04:54:43.520 --> 04:54:46.300
in addition to our grid hardening plans,

04:54:46.300 --> 04:54:48.570
and specifically the types of issues

04:54:48.570 --> 04:54:50.303
we can get into in operations.

04:54:52.240 --> 04:54:55.180
As far as the incident
management team is concerned,

04:54:55.180 --> 04:54:59.377
so we have about 172
employees who are trained

04:55:00.560 --> 04:55:02.193
in ICS, NIMS and SEMS.

04:55:04.600 --> 04:55:08.450
We had opt in operating in
this mode for a number of years.

04:55:08.450 --> 04:55:11.570
One of the things that
we did a little bit differently

04:55:11.570 --> 04:55:14.750
last year is we established a dedicated

04:55:14.750 --> 04:55:16.670
and permanent team.

04:55:16.670 --> 04:55:18.850
This right now we have about 32 people

04:55:18.850 --> 04:55:21.110
who are dedicated to PSPS.

04:55:21.110 --> 04:55:25.860
These would be the primary
folks that would be set up

04:55:25.860 --> 04:55:27.573
in terms of an activation.

04:55:28.560 --> 04:55:32.470
And also once we're
done with an activation,

04:55:32.470 --> 04:55:36.490
these same folks, go in
and evaluate our performance

04:55:36.490 --> 04:55:39.920
and implement corrective
actions that are needed

04:55:39.920 --> 04:55:41.990
to get to the next event.

04:55:41.990 --> 04:55:44.100
Right now, the way the team had started,

04:55:44.100 --> 04:55:47.910
it was more or less operations focused,

04:55:47.910 --> 04:55:50.880
but we have built some
additional functions.

04:55:50.880 --> 04:55:54.050
And essentially now
have folks that are able

04:55:54.050 --> 04:55:58.650
to handle a 24 hour
events in a dedicated way.

04:55:58.650 --> 04:56:02.220
And then when we get
into very complex events,

04:56:02.220 --> 04:56:04.360
we have what we call surgery sources

04:56:04.360 --> 04:56:08.470
that are leveraging our ICS structure

04:56:08.470 --> 04:56:11.200
to bring in additional personnel

04:56:11.200 --> 04:56:14.420
to handle not just a
complex PSPS events,

04:56:14.420 --> 04:56:17.410
but when we get into other
situations with windstorms

04:56:17.410 --> 04:56:19.200
that happen concurrently,

04:56:19.200 --> 04:56:22.030
if we happen to have
other hazards that exist,

04:56:22.030 --> 04:56:24.830
if we get into situations
with rotating outages,

04:56:24.830 --> 04:56:28.100
we have a process
of escalating our teams

04:56:28.100 --> 04:56:30.800
to deal with increasing
and increasing complexity.

04:56:30.800 --> 04:56:34.890
So, hopefully that the
answers it from SCE's point.

04:56:37.184 --> 04:56:39.605
<v ->From the SDG&amp;E
perspective, when we really look</v>

04:56:39.605 --> 04:56:43.387
at the communications
with, you know, the County

04:56:43.387 --> 04:56:45.700
and the response, I
mean, a lot of that starts

04:56:45.700 --> 04:56:49.700
with the comprehensive
training and exercise program,

04:56:49.700 --> 04:56:52.210
which you know, will be
implemented throughout the summer

04:56:52.210 --> 04:56:57.120
as we get ready for
the 2021 wildfire season.

04:56:57.120 --> 04:57:00.550
Also to build on, like
Aaron mentioned, right?

04:57:00.550 --> 04:57:02.880
Where we take all
this weather information

04:57:02.880 --> 04:57:07.070
and we generate
that detailed circuit list.

04:57:07.070 --> 04:57:11.210
Then our team of fire
scientists and meteorologists,

04:57:11.210 --> 04:57:15.470
we then input all of this
information into a GIS portal.

04:57:15.470 --> 04:57:20.040
And this GIS portal
becomes, you know, again,

04:57:20.040 --> 04:57:22.990
it's very important to
the execution of PSPS,

04:57:22.990 --> 04:57:27.790
but part of it is that that
establishes a rest API

04:57:27.790 --> 04:57:31.910
to send all of the
detailed PSPS information

04:57:31.910 --> 04:57:34.940
out to our community
partners, including Cal OES,

04:57:34.940 --> 04:57:37.530
including the San Diego County office

04:57:37.530 --> 04:57:39.060
of emergency services.

04:57:39.060 --> 04:57:41.500
So it gives them all of
this information really,

04:57:41.500 --> 04:57:43.090
as soon as we know it.

04:57:43.090 --> 04:57:45.900
And as soon as we get it into our system

04:57:45.900 --> 04:57:49.270
and do our QA QC from
a fire science standpoint,

04:57:49.270 --> 04:57:53.320
we hit send, and it becomes
immediately available

04:57:53.320 --> 04:57:54.853
to all of those teams.

04:57:55.727 --> 04:57:59.130
You know, within our
emergency operations center,

04:57:59.130 --> 04:58:03.070
we are all trained, all
responders are trained in ICS,

04:58:03.070 --> 04:58:05.690
multiple levels, and that
is what we implement.

04:58:05.690 --> 04:58:07.350
Just to build on what Erik said,

04:58:07.350 --> 04:58:08.910
really deal with the complexities,

04:58:08.910 --> 04:58:12.870
like what we were dealing
with in September of this year

04:58:12.870 --> 04:58:16.940
with the heat waves and
everything that came with that,

04:58:16.940 --> 04:58:21.940
the PSPS we had the Valley
fire, 17,000 acres burning.

04:58:23.220 --> 04:58:26.320
So, having that complexity
to be able to scale

04:58:26.320 --> 04:58:28.780
and deal with the multiple
issues simultaneously

04:58:28.780 --> 04:58:30.310
are the only, that's
the only other thing

04:58:30.310 --> 04:58:32.830
that I'd like to emphasize that.

04:58:37.280 --> 04:58:38.113
<v ->Appreciate it.</v>

04:58:39.150 --> 04:58:43.440
We have, I know we're
a little past our time,

04:58:43.440 --> 04:58:45.410
but I wanted to take one more question

04:58:45.410 --> 04:58:50.410
from the stakeholders if
that's okay with our partners.

04:58:52.790 --> 04:58:55.563
From Henry Burton, I will
leave you have your hand up.

04:58:59.650 --> 04:59:01.960
<v ->Thank you, I'll actually
defer to Jo Mitchell</v>

04:59:01.960 --> 04:59:04.449
if he has another question as well.

04:59:04.449 --> 04:59:06.449
<v ->Okay, appreciate that.</v>

04:59:08.760 --> 04:59:11.650
<v Joseph>Okay, I'd like to go back</v>

04:59:11.650 --> 04:59:16.650
to the question of hardening.

04:59:20.350 --> 04:59:24.210
So couple of years back,

04:59:24.210 --> 04:59:28.760
I raised the belt and
suspenders question.

04:59:28.760 --> 04:59:33.160
So, if PSPS is going to be executed

04:59:33.160 --> 04:59:38.160
under many circumstances
anyway, is hardening duplicative?

04:59:41.520 --> 04:59:45.070
I know that PG&amp;E had raised the question

04:59:45.070 --> 04:59:47.720
or made the statement
that catastrophic risk

04:59:48.590 --> 04:59:52.160
is different than
climate to logical risk.

04:59:52.160 --> 04:59:57.160
And if that's the
case, what is the ratio?

04:59:57.720 --> 05:00:01.370
Because it seems to
me that most of the losses

05:00:01.370 --> 05:00:04.650
that California has experienced has been

05:00:04.650 --> 05:00:07.100
on the catastrophic side

05:00:07.100 --> 05:00:10.240
rather than the climatological side.

05:00:10.240 --> 05:00:15.240
And related to that, if we
wanted to get rid of PSPS,

05:00:17.950 --> 05:00:20.840
just from a visionary standpoint,

05:00:20.840 --> 05:00:25.840
what hardening strategies
or other technologies

05:00:26.140 --> 05:00:29.290
would need to be put into place in order

05:00:29.290 --> 05:00:34.223
to eliminate the need
for turning off the power.

05:00:46.600 --> 05:00:48.710
<v ->This is Aaron
Johnson with PG&amp;E,</v>

05:00:48.710 --> 05:00:50.290
I can start that conversation,

05:00:50.290 --> 05:00:52.290
but I definitely look for the feedback

05:00:52.290 --> 05:00:54.333
from my sister utilities on this one.

05:00:56.050 --> 05:00:59.280
So, one of the things
we look at when we train

05:00:59.280 --> 05:01:02.470
our PSPS models is we
look at how they've performed

05:01:02.470 --> 05:01:05.910
against various fires.

05:01:05.910 --> 05:01:08.190
There's a sort of a two by two matrix

05:01:08.190 --> 05:01:12.823
that we often put together
where we look at sort of,

05:01:16.120 --> 05:01:20.760
you look at wind and weather risk.

05:01:20.760 --> 05:01:25.760
And what you see is that
there are a large number of fires

05:01:26.270 --> 05:01:29.530
that have started where they are,

05:01:29.530 --> 05:01:31.630
what our meteorology
team would call, you know,

05:01:31.630 --> 05:01:34.140
hot, dry summer fires.

05:01:34.140 --> 05:01:36.963
And they tend not to be as wind-driven.

05:01:38.700 --> 05:01:40.600
And sometimes that's
when the fire starts.

05:01:40.600 --> 05:01:42.620
And then maybe a couple of days later,

05:01:42.620 --> 05:01:44.380
the wind will pick up
and that fire will turn

05:01:44.380 --> 05:01:46.070
into a much larger fire,

05:01:46.070 --> 05:01:48.940
but it doesn't initially
start as one of these fires

05:01:48.940 --> 05:01:51.290
that's moving at these record speeds

05:01:51.290 --> 05:01:52.920
that we've seen the
last couple of years.

05:01:52.920 --> 05:01:57.080
So PSPS is very much about, you know,

05:01:57.080 --> 05:01:58.880
the wind patterns, which are, you know,

05:01:58.880 --> 05:02:02.990
there's a small window of
them, of Diablo winds in Northern

05:02:02.990 --> 05:02:05.330
and Central California
that tend to occur

05:02:05.330 --> 05:02:06.453
in early summer.

05:02:07.581 --> 05:02:10.360
And then we don't see that
same wind phenomenon picking up

05:02:10.360 --> 05:02:12.630
again until the fall
really in September.

05:02:12.630 --> 05:02:15.440
And then it tends to
persist and it's even present

05:02:15.440 --> 05:02:18.320
in the winter, but oftentimes
accompanied by moisture.

05:02:18.320 --> 05:02:21.300
And so the fire risk isn't there.

05:02:21.300 --> 05:02:25.150
PSPS is very much
intended to identify that risk.

05:02:25.150 --> 05:02:28.980
Our larger hardening effort is addressed

05:02:28.980 --> 05:02:32.900
at the wildfire risk that
occurs on any given day

05:02:32.900 --> 05:02:34.730
during fire season, maybe not on one

05:02:34.730 --> 05:02:36.060
of these larger wind days.

05:02:36.060 --> 05:02:38.930
So, I would say the
programs are not duplicative,

05:02:38.930 --> 05:02:40.233
they are complimentary.

05:02:41.670 --> 05:02:46.670
When I think about
PSPS, as you pointed out,

05:02:48.800 --> 05:02:52.550
Mr. Mitchell, the PSPS
is a mitigation for that risk.

05:02:56.660 --> 05:02:59.350
And increasingly, you know,

05:02:59.350 --> 05:03:03.010
as we've seen this
wildfire risk really escalate

05:03:03.010 --> 05:03:06.950
in the last several years, it is
an immediate term reaction.

05:03:06.950 --> 05:03:11.790
And our intent is that to look at that

05:03:11.790 --> 05:03:15.890
and say that is not necessarily
a sustainable mitigation.

05:03:16.967 --> 05:03:20.220
And so how can we begin
to mitigate that part of it

05:03:20.220 --> 05:03:22.747
is getting better about where we do it

05:03:22.747 --> 05:03:25.550
and understanding
where that risk really exists.

05:03:25.550 --> 05:03:28.210
But even as you narrow where it is that

05:03:28.210 --> 05:03:29.650
we will reach limits on that.

05:03:29.650 --> 05:03:32.470
And, you know, as
Brian pointed out earlier

05:03:32.470 --> 05:03:34.980
in the canyons and the peaks,

05:03:34.980 --> 05:03:38.620
which is where we often
see that highest fire danger.

05:03:38.620 --> 05:03:42.420
And so, it's more
consistent with the literature

05:03:42.420 --> 05:03:43.800
in PG&amp;E service territory.

05:03:43.800 --> 05:03:48.750
And so we will have to harden the assets

05:03:48.750 --> 05:03:50.257
or come up with other mitigation there.

05:03:50.257 --> 05:03:53.300
And we are looking in
our wildfire mitigation plan.

05:03:53.300 --> 05:03:56.840
We have the REFCL pilot, you know,

05:03:56.840 --> 05:03:58.110
different pilots for looking at,

05:03:58.110 --> 05:04:00.620
are there other technologies
that we can apply

05:04:00.620 --> 05:04:01.940
to the electric grid?

05:04:01.940 --> 05:04:05.300
Again, this is state
of the art type of stuff

05:04:05.300 --> 05:04:08.350
where we would, you
know, find other ways

05:04:08.350 --> 05:04:11.030
other than rebuilding that
infrastructure underground

05:04:11.030 --> 05:04:12.780
or hardening it, that we might be able

05:04:12.780 --> 05:04:14.620
to apply technological solutions,

05:04:14.620 --> 05:04:19.150
which would allow us to
mitigate that risk at a lower cost.

05:04:19.150 --> 05:04:20.810
So we're certainly looking to pilot some

05:04:20.810 --> 05:04:23.460
of those technologies,
and I think that will help us.

05:04:26.000 --> 05:04:28.470
With, sort of the vision
of how you move away

05:04:28.470 --> 05:04:30.153
from PSPS over time.

05:04:31.800 --> 05:04:35.140
But again, I'd really welcome an answer

05:04:35.140 --> 05:04:37.610
on that vision question
because we have been moving

05:04:37.610 --> 05:04:38.443
from year to year.

05:04:38.443 --> 05:04:43.443
And I would say, in
terms of self-criticism

05:04:43.950 --> 05:04:48.380
that we have not developed
yet a long-term plan

05:04:48.380 --> 05:04:53.380
for how we will, what the end
state is of the PSPS program.

05:04:53.880 --> 05:04:57.160
And that is something we
are turning our attention to now,

05:04:57.160 --> 05:04:59.690
now that we feel like
we have a better handle,

05:04:59.690 --> 05:05:03.780
we do have much to do on
the PSPS continue to improve,

05:05:03.780 --> 05:05:06.500
but because we have a
better handle on that program,

05:05:06.500 --> 05:05:09.000
based on the progress we saw last year,

05:05:09.000 --> 05:05:13.840
we think we have some capacity
to begin really understanding

05:05:13.840 --> 05:05:15.630
what that vision would look like

05:05:15.630 --> 05:05:17.734
and what we might be able to do there.

05:05:17.734 --> 05:05:21.340
But again, you know, really
looking to my sister utilities,

05:05:21.340 --> 05:05:23.340
to collaborate on that
effort and understand,

05:05:23.340 --> 05:05:26.020
and especially, you know,
would welcome Brian's comments

05:05:26.020 --> 05:05:27.760
'cause, you know, they are further along

05:05:27.760 --> 05:05:29.693
on this journey certainly than we are.

05:05:33.630 --> 05:05:35.330
Not to put you on the spot, Brian.

05:05:37.520 --> 05:05:40.220
<v ->Well, it's okay, I'll just
put Jonathan on the spot.</v>

05:05:41.225 --> 05:05:46.225
No, you know, and I
know as we continue to look

05:05:46.300 --> 05:05:50.760
at the hardening, you
know, I will invite Jonathan

05:05:50.760 --> 05:05:52.030
to join as well.

05:05:52.030 --> 05:05:54.730
But I think to your point,
one of the biggest impacts

05:05:54.730 --> 05:05:59.220
that we've seen is building
the weather network.

05:05:59.220 --> 05:06:02.063
What we have found is
local known conditions,

05:06:02.921 --> 05:06:05.390
where we've identified several areas

05:06:05.390 --> 05:06:10.390
where the winds are
measured, you know, 85, 95,

05:06:10.870 --> 05:06:13.210
even over 100 miles an hour in places

05:06:13.210 --> 05:06:18.210
where geo 95 didn't
have us built at that point.

05:06:18.500 --> 05:06:22.120
So now the integration of
all of this weather information

05:06:22.120 --> 05:06:25.950
really is to now build to
the local known conditions.

05:06:25.950 --> 05:06:29.580
So I think that is a big
benefit of integrating all

05:06:29.580 --> 05:06:31.970
of this science, and
it is something that,

05:06:31.970 --> 05:06:33.030
to Aaron's point, you know,

05:06:33.030 --> 05:06:37.330
creates this separation
between, you know,

05:06:37.330 --> 05:06:40.250
the hardening of the system
to what we now understand

05:06:40.250 --> 05:06:43.893
the weather to be and the PSPS.

05:06:46.490 --> 05:06:47.323
<v ->Yeah, thanks Brian.</v>

05:06:47.323 --> 05:06:50.880
I would also add to what
Aaron and Brian had said,

05:06:50.880 --> 05:06:54.070
just that, you know, as we
continue to see the hardening

05:06:54.070 --> 05:06:55.527
our system with the cover conductor

05:06:55.527 --> 05:06:57.940
and undergrounding technologies, right?

05:06:57.940 --> 05:07:00.540
We may not be able to
apply the undergrounds

05:07:00.540 --> 05:07:03.970
in certain areas because of
terrain because of, you know,

05:07:03.970 --> 05:07:06.410
not being able to get
easements or other things, right?

05:07:06.410 --> 05:07:10.330
So we might continue to
depend on the covered conductor,

05:07:10.330 --> 05:07:14.280
but even in that case,
flying debris and, you know,

05:07:14.280 --> 05:07:18.750
additional things that we
may not have, you know,

05:07:18.750 --> 05:07:22.300
anticipated may come
to be an impact, right?

05:07:22.300 --> 05:07:24.300
More so than we're thinking now,

05:07:24.300 --> 05:07:27.030
with no additional climate issue.

05:07:27.030 --> 05:07:31.170
So if we find that
we're more successful,

05:07:31.170 --> 05:07:34.720
and experienced in current technology,

05:07:34.720 --> 05:07:36.530
then I think we will be
able to leverage that

05:07:36.530 --> 05:07:40.010
and see great results
towards reducing PSPS impacts

05:07:40.010 --> 05:07:41.890
as well as wildfire risk impacts.

05:07:41.890 --> 05:07:45.600
And as I said earlier, improve
our risk models accordingly,

05:07:45.600 --> 05:07:48.610
but then we may also
have to continue to leverage

05:07:48.610 --> 05:07:51.440
after PSPS attacks to
what are some innovations

05:07:51.440 --> 05:07:53.620
that we can do, just
like you shared earlier.

05:07:53.620 --> 05:07:56.190
We have a fixed generator solution

05:07:56.190 --> 05:07:59.069
that we're putting out
in front of customers,

05:07:59.069 --> 05:08:00.430
or our customers are installing,

05:08:00.430 --> 05:08:01.980
you know, permanent generators.

05:08:03.540 --> 05:08:05.790
And while we do, right?

05:08:05.790 --> 05:08:10.790
In app or put a in place PSPS action,

05:08:11.070 --> 05:08:13.500
then the customers can
still at least have power

05:08:13.500 --> 05:08:17.220
for the whole home, or maybe even just

05:08:17.220 --> 05:08:18.590
at least partial load.

05:08:18.590 --> 05:08:20.917
So that maybe the sources of microgrids,

05:08:20.917 --> 05:08:24.450
we can maybe leverage as we continue

05:08:24.450 --> 05:08:26.187
to help out PSPS impacts.

05:08:29.960 --> 05:08:34.320
<v ->I agree with all of the
comments made, maybe only thing</v>

05:08:34.320 --> 05:08:39.320
that I'll add is, you know,
PSPS grid hardening,

05:08:40.960 --> 05:08:44.510
they're all efforts to
reduce wildfire risk.

05:08:44.510 --> 05:08:47.423
And, you know, if we are able to deploy

05:08:47.423 --> 05:08:51.093
a more cover conductor that
reduces the frequency of PSPS,

05:08:51.093 --> 05:08:53.640
that also has a significant
buydown the risk

05:08:53.640 --> 05:08:55.390
to prevent wildfires.

05:08:55.390 --> 05:08:57.590
So I don't think that
these are duplicative.

05:08:57.590 --> 05:09:00.970
I also don't think that we would expect

05:09:00.970 --> 05:09:04.580
that if we do harder than the
system with cover conductor,

05:09:04.580 --> 05:09:07.180
that we'll never do a
PSPS with that again.

05:09:07.180 --> 05:09:09.950
I think there'll always be
extreme weather events,

05:09:09.950 --> 05:09:11.810
but it does raise the threshold

05:09:11.810 --> 05:09:16.530
at which we would be activating,
you know, a PSPS protocol.

05:09:16.530 --> 05:09:18.910
So just to add that additional,

05:09:18.910 --> 05:09:21.160
but I agree with what
everyone else has said.

05:09:24.750 --> 05:09:25.583
<v ->Thank you.</v>

05:09:29.770 --> 05:09:33.340
<v Nathan>I really wanna thank
you all for the discussion</v>

05:09:33.340 --> 05:09:38.340
and definitely appreciate
the questions from all sources,

05:09:40.750 --> 05:09:42.800
really great questions and discussions.

05:09:42.800 --> 05:09:47.370
So thank you all for a
very valuable session.

05:09:47.370 --> 05:09:49.650
And at this point I
would like to turn it over

05:09:49.650 --> 05:09:51.343
for closing to Koko.

05:09:52.830 --> 05:09:55.040
<v Koko>Hey, Kevin, thanks for that.</v>

05:09:55.040 --> 05:09:59.810
Just real quick, I do see Will
Abrams has his hand raised.

05:09:59.810 --> 05:10:03.800
I probably don't need as
much time for closing remarks.

05:10:03.800 --> 05:10:05.420
So Will, I don't know
if you had a question,

05:10:05.420 --> 05:10:07.870
but I'm happy to offer
you an opportunity

05:10:07.870 --> 05:10:09.883
to ask one last question if you want.

05:10:11.317 --> 05:10:13.760
<v ->Thanks Koko, yeah,
no, I appreciate it.</v>

05:10:13.760 --> 05:10:18.470
It's sort of picking up where
that last question left off

05:10:18.470 --> 05:10:21.230
and really what I'm trying to understand

05:10:21.230 --> 05:10:22.750
is sort of the intersection

05:10:22.750 --> 05:10:27.560
of when catastrophic wildfires occur

05:10:27.560 --> 05:10:31.410
at times when we are doing
a public safety power shutoff,

05:10:31.410 --> 05:10:35.540
and how to analyze that
situation to better inform

05:10:35.540 --> 05:10:38.160
how we manage shutoffs in the future.

05:10:38.160 --> 05:10:42.760
So I think, you know, in
the past sort of the reaction

05:10:42.760 --> 05:10:45.950
have been when fires
occur when there's shutoffs,

05:10:45.950 --> 05:10:48.730
is that, oh, well that's because
we should've gone broader

05:10:48.730 --> 05:10:53.390
with the power shutoff
and that, you know,

05:10:53.390 --> 05:10:58.100
and some sort of self
praise that aren't we so glad

05:10:58.100 --> 05:11:00.630
that we shut off the
power because these fires

05:11:00.630 --> 05:11:04.010
would have been a lot worse
hadn't we shutoff the power.

05:11:04.010 --> 05:11:08.130
And of course, in some
cases, that is the case.

05:11:08.130 --> 05:11:13.130
And I just wanted to understand
how each of the utilities

05:11:13.240 --> 05:11:17.450
were analyzing those
cases where we have fires,

05:11:17.450 --> 05:11:20.210
catastrophic fires at the
same time is shutting off

05:11:20.210 --> 05:11:25.180
the power to sorta understand
the contributing factors

05:11:25.180 --> 05:11:28.410
and really do an analysis
of, you know, did we,

05:11:28.410 --> 05:11:31.220
you know, was it the
right prescriptive measure

05:11:31.220 --> 05:11:32.280
for the power shutoff?

05:11:32.280 --> 05:11:36.450
Where did we perhaps
not apply the power shutoff

05:11:36.450 --> 05:11:37.650
in the right way?

05:11:37.650 --> 05:11:40.900
And to what extent you
believe that those are sort

05:11:40.900 --> 05:11:44.270
of unique opportunities
to really analyze a situation

05:11:44.270 --> 05:11:47.053
where those two
things collide, thank you.

05:11:55.370 --> 05:11:56.960
<v ->This is Aaron Johnson.</v>

05:11:56.960 --> 05:12:00.123
I'm happy to answer
from a PG&amp;E perspective.

05:12:01.891 --> 05:12:03.630
And I do apologize, I
have another commitment.

05:12:03.630 --> 05:12:05.600
So I will be jumping off
here in a few minutes,

05:12:05.600 --> 05:12:07.350
but I can stay a few extra minutes.

05:12:10.980 --> 05:12:14.533
Exactly what you described,
Mr. Abrams is what we try to do.

05:12:14.533 --> 05:12:17.060
So what the meteorology
team is going through right now

05:12:17.060 --> 05:12:21.010
is analyzing all of the 240
plus incidents of damage

05:12:21.010 --> 05:12:24.530
that we saw during
events, as well as looking

05:12:24.530 --> 05:12:28.700
at the fire season itself,

05:12:28.700 --> 05:12:30.620
and the number of fires that were there

05:12:30.620 --> 05:12:34.500
and re-analyzing all of that
data and trying to understand

05:12:34.500 --> 05:12:39.350
if there are elements that
we can put in to our system.

05:12:39.350 --> 05:12:42.160
I'll give you an example,
from last off season,

05:12:42.160 --> 05:12:44.750
we had Kincade Fire, which again,

05:12:44.750 --> 05:12:46.880
we haven't seen a Cal fire report on it,

05:12:46.880 --> 05:12:49.210
but we understand at a
high level that our equipment

05:12:49.210 --> 05:12:51.140
was responsible for that fire.

05:12:51.140 --> 05:12:56.140
And so we looked at
what are the criteria there?

05:12:56.410 --> 05:12:58.617
That was a very healthy
piece of equipment

05:12:58.617 --> 05:13:00.420
that had been inspected multiple times.

05:13:00.420 --> 05:13:02.240
There had been high
definition cameras taking it,

05:13:02.240 --> 05:13:04.080
nothing was identified.

05:13:04.080 --> 05:13:06.453
However, the fire
conditions on the ground

05:13:06.453 --> 05:13:08.647
were quite extreme during that time.

05:13:08.647 --> 05:13:12.970
And so we adopted something
in our transmissions protocols,

05:13:12.970 --> 05:13:15.370
we call a Black Swan criteria.

05:13:15.370 --> 05:13:18.310
It's basically saying what would happen

05:13:20.029 --> 05:13:24.600
if an ignition did start, are
the conditions so extreme

05:13:24.600 --> 05:13:29.160
on the ground that we have
to consider de-energizing,

05:13:30.820 --> 05:13:34.110
even though there's nothing
on that transmission system

05:13:34.110 --> 05:13:38.690
that points us to the normal
criteria that we would look at.

05:13:38.690 --> 05:13:43.690
And so we adopted that
criteria after 2019 into 2020

05:13:44.190 --> 05:13:47.740
and put that in our
protocol to continue to learn

05:13:47.740 --> 05:13:51.210
from those different
events that we see out there.

05:13:51.210 --> 05:13:54.420
So, it doesn't necessarily
have to be a fire that was,

05:13:54.420 --> 05:13:56.440
you know, started by utility equipment.

05:13:56.440 --> 05:13:57.810
We wanna learn from, you know,

05:13:57.810 --> 05:14:00.270
every incidence of damage,
we wanna learn from the outages

05:14:00.270 --> 05:14:01.530
we have in our system.

05:14:01.530 --> 05:14:03.850
And we wanna just learn
from the fire behavior

05:14:03.850 --> 05:14:07.510
of that fire season and
incorporate all of those things

05:14:07.510 --> 05:14:10.400
and continue to just retrain the models

05:14:10.400 --> 05:14:13.400
and continue to get a
little bit better every year

05:14:13.400 --> 05:14:15.480
at our understanding
of what really drives this

05:14:15.480 --> 05:14:18.380
and accommodate the
changing conditions, right?

05:14:18.380 --> 05:14:21.520
As we see as San Diego
pointed out, you know,

05:14:21.520 --> 05:14:24.480
changing weather
patterns over time as well.

05:14:24.480 --> 05:14:27.730
So that is very much
the mindset we have.

05:14:27.730 --> 05:14:31.900
It is quite humbling of the
opponent that we're taking

05:14:31.900 --> 05:14:36.700
on here is pretty challenging
and in terms of wildfire,

05:14:36.700 --> 05:14:39.270
but we would like to think
that we are incorporating all

05:14:39.270 --> 05:14:41.070
of that information.

05:14:41.070 --> 05:14:43.170
We're certainly
endeavoring to do so to try

05:14:43.170 --> 05:14:46.050
and get a little bit better at
our understanding each year,

05:14:46.050 --> 05:14:48.493
based on all of that
information and data.

05:14:52.350 --> 05:14:53.513
<v ->Thanks, thanks.</v>

05:14:54.470 --> 05:14:56.658
<v ->Yeah, I think you've
covered that really well.</v>

05:14:56.658 --> 05:14:58.040
I don't know that I
have a whole lot to add

05:14:58.040 --> 05:15:01.220
other than we learn
from every ignition event.

05:15:01.220 --> 05:15:04.473
So, regardless of whether
it's PSPS or non PSPS,

05:15:04.473 --> 05:15:07.023
I will tell you that if
something like that occurs,

05:15:07.920 --> 05:15:11.390
you know, in situations
that are PSPS, you know,

05:15:11.390 --> 05:15:13.670
have conditions that would potentially,

05:15:13.670 --> 05:15:17.370
or even more than a
PSPS, we'll start, you know,

05:15:17.370 --> 05:15:19.043
really trying to understand, you know,

05:15:19.043 --> 05:15:23.060
what went right or what
went wrong with a decision

05:15:23.060 --> 05:15:25.173
either to activate or not activate.

05:15:27.040 --> 05:15:32.040
We had an interesting
situation one year where we had,

05:15:32.160 --> 05:15:36.230
what's kinda sort of considered
a monsoonal phenomenon,

05:15:37.230 --> 05:15:42.230
where we just had a very
quick, rapid wind event

05:15:42.570 --> 05:15:44.800
that you wouldn't be able to predict,

05:15:44.800 --> 05:15:49.010
and it's very short lived, but
the conditions on the ground

05:15:49.010 --> 05:15:50.740
are off the charts in terms

05:15:50.740 --> 05:15:54.450
of what would cause typically a PSPS.

05:15:54.450 --> 05:15:56.287
So we would look at that
and then consider not just

05:15:56.287 --> 05:15:59.720
the PSPS protocols, but
our protection schemes,

05:15:59.720 --> 05:16:02.239
if we would need to have, you know,

05:16:02.239 --> 05:16:04.800
recloser locking restrictions in place,

05:16:04.800 --> 05:16:07.750
under conditions that
are not necessarily

05:16:07.750 --> 05:16:09.620
classic PSPS conditions.

05:16:09.620 --> 05:16:11.880
There are other types of
things that we could do,

05:16:11.880 --> 05:16:13.860
but all of that in terms
of learning from ignitions,

05:16:13.860 --> 05:16:15.930
learning from what happens before,

05:16:15.930 --> 05:16:18.240
during and after events is all important

05:16:18.240 --> 05:16:22.823
for us to digest and consider.
<v ->Thanks.</v>

05:16:25.450 --> 05:16:28.380
<v ->So a little bit to add from
an SDG&amp;E perspective,</v>

05:16:28.380 --> 05:16:31.110
you know, from having
this program in place

05:16:31.110 --> 05:16:34.200
for over a decade, what
we fortunately, have not been

05:16:34.200 --> 05:16:36.760
in a position to this point that we have

05:16:36.760 --> 05:16:40.240
had a catastrophic
wildfire on the ground

05:16:40.240 --> 05:16:42.190
during the public safety power shutoff.

05:16:43.270 --> 05:16:45.660
But what did come to mind was last year,

05:16:45.660 --> 05:16:50.660
day before Halloween 2019,
we were in a very extreme event.

05:16:50.960 --> 05:16:54.240
We did have a public
safety power shutoff in place.

05:16:54.240 --> 05:16:58.710
And there was the Saddle fire broke out

05:16:58.710 --> 05:17:02.570
in our service territory,
not related to the utility,

05:17:02.570 --> 05:17:07.570
but the resources, it was not a big pull

05:17:08.360 --> 05:17:09.880
on the firefighting resources.

05:17:09.880 --> 05:17:12.470
So they were able to keep that contained

05:17:12.470 --> 05:17:14.567
at 100 acres, where a lot of our experts

05:17:14.567 --> 05:17:17.030
and our modeling was immediately showing

05:17:17.030 --> 05:17:19.190
that had that not been contained

05:17:19.190 --> 05:17:21.250
in all resource were available,

05:17:21.250 --> 05:17:24.790
that could have turned
into a catastrophic event.

05:17:24.790 --> 05:17:27.660
And then after they got that contained,

05:17:27.660 --> 05:17:30.130
just a couple hours later,
the Miller fire broke out

05:17:30.130 --> 05:17:31.570
in the community of Valley Center

05:17:31.570 --> 05:17:33.200
also had the potential.

05:17:33.200 --> 05:17:35.240
And a lot of our
consequence modeling showed

05:17:35.240 --> 05:17:38.960
that that could have been a
catastrophic event, but again,

05:17:38.960 --> 05:17:42.020
due to the lack of strain
on the firefighting resources,

05:17:42.020 --> 05:17:44.893
they were able to get that one as well.

05:17:48.545 --> 05:17:50.463
I can now leave that there.
<v ->Okay.</v>

05:17:58.290 --> 05:18:00.210
<v ->All right, with those answers,</v>

05:18:00.210 --> 05:18:05.210
I think we will go ahead and
conclude this panel as well.

05:18:05.870 --> 05:18:08.590
I want to thank all of our panelists,

05:18:08.590 --> 05:18:11.300
not just this afternoon
on the PSPS panel,

05:18:11.300 --> 05:18:13.980
but all of our panels
throughout the two days

05:18:13.980 --> 05:18:17.750
of these workshops,
as well as big thank you

05:18:17.750 --> 05:18:21.710
to all of our moderators

05:18:21.710 --> 05:18:24.360
and the IT folks behind the scene,

05:18:24.360 --> 05:18:27.880
making all this work, really
appreciate all the effort

05:18:27.880 --> 05:18:29.340
and work that went into this.

05:18:29.340 --> 05:18:31.830
I think there was plenty
of good discussion

05:18:31.830 --> 05:18:35.530
that came out of our various panels

05:18:35.530 --> 05:18:37.240
these past couple of days.

05:18:37.240 --> 05:18:42.240
And one thing that I do
wanna flag for any stakeholder

05:18:43.660 --> 05:18:47.290
or folks in the chat who
were not able to get any

05:18:47.290 --> 05:18:49.173
of their questions answered.

05:18:50.270 --> 05:18:52.980
We just wanna remind
folks that we are still

05:18:52.980 --> 05:18:57.980
in the open discovery phase
of the WMP proceeding.

05:18:58.700 --> 05:19:02.840
And so we would remind
folks that you can still send

05:19:02.840 --> 05:19:05.320
any data requests
directly to the utilities

05:19:05.320 --> 05:19:07.580
through that process and
get your questions answered

05:19:07.580 --> 05:19:12.580
that way in the event that
questions remained unanswered.

05:19:12.780 --> 05:19:15.100
With that, I just wanna cover,

05:19:15.100 --> 05:19:18.113
and I'll be pretty brief
here, a few last step.

05:19:19.120 --> 05:19:21.000
And this is the closing remarks.

05:19:21.000 --> 05:19:25.753
One is just flag some upcoming things.

05:19:26.630 --> 05:19:31.630
We have opening comment
on the WMP due March 17th

05:19:35.760 --> 05:19:38.850
and reply comments due March 24th.

05:19:38.850 --> 05:19:43.460
I did see just this afternoon
that we did get a request

05:19:43.460 --> 05:19:45.760
for extension, which
we will be considering

05:19:45.760 --> 05:19:48.363
and responding to shortly.

05:19:50.520 --> 05:19:54.440
Beyond that we do have the small

05:19:54.440 --> 05:19:56.970
and multi-jurisdictional utility,

05:19:56.970 --> 05:20:00.880
as well as the independent
transmission operator, WMT

05:20:00.880 --> 05:20:02.773
is coming in on March 5th.

05:20:04.471 --> 05:20:07.380
And additionally, on top of that,

05:20:07.380 --> 05:20:12.380
we do have the supplemental responses

05:20:12.430 --> 05:20:15.893
from the large IOUs
for the quarterly report,

05:20:18.030 --> 05:20:21.580
evaluations that will be
coming in on this Friday,

05:20:21.580 --> 05:20:26.010
February 26th, so just
wanted to flag those things.

05:20:26.010 --> 05:20:28.550
And then finally just
want to remind folks

05:20:28.550 --> 05:20:32.670
that these web workshops were recorded

05:20:32.670 --> 05:20:36.510
and the WebEx recordings, as
well as the workshop materials

05:20:36.510 --> 05:20:40.240
that were projected
will be posted online

05:20:40.240 --> 05:20:43.610
on the WMP webpage, bear with us,

05:20:43.610 --> 05:20:47.190
it does take several
days for us to render

05:20:47.190 --> 05:20:50.630
and get the videos to upload online.

05:20:50.630 --> 05:20:54.080
And so we will be getting
that on as soon as possible,

05:20:54.080 --> 05:20:57.150
but be on the lookout for that.

05:20:57.150 --> 05:20:59.990
Other than that, I
want to thank everyone

05:20:59.990 --> 05:21:00.960
for their participation.

05:21:00.960 --> 05:21:03.550
I know two full day workshops is,

05:21:03.550 --> 05:21:07.930
especially in this virtual
environment is a bit taxing

05:21:07.930 --> 05:21:12.510
on folks, so I'm hopeful
that people found it useful.

05:21:12.510 --> 05:21:15.590
And thank you all for
your continued engagement

05:21:15.590 --> 05:21:16.640
and participation.

05:21:16.640 --> 05:21:20.540
With that, we'll go ahead
and conclude our workshops

05:21:20.540 --> 05:21:24.940
for the large IOU 2021
WMPs and look forward

05:21:24.940 --> 05:21:27.620
to the comments and
reply comments coming in

05:21:28.510 --> 05:21:31.243
in the next several
weeks, thanks everyone.